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December 8, 2020
The Honorable Randy McNally
Speaker of the Senate
The Honorable Cameron Sexton
Speaker of the House of Representatives
The Honorable Kerry Roberts, Chair
Senate Committee on Government Operations
The Honorable Iris Rudder, Vice Chair
House Committee on Government Operations
and
Members of the General Assembly
State Capitol
Nashville, TN 37243
and
The Honorable Jennifer Nichols, Commissioner
Department of Children’s Services
315 Deaderick Street
Nashville, TN 37243
Ladies and Gentlemen:
We have conducted a performance audit of selected programs and activities of the Department of
Children’s Services for the period October 1, 2016, through July 31, 2020. This audit was conducted
pursuant to the requirements of the Tennessee Governmental Entity Review Law, Section 4-29-111,
Tennessee Code Annotated.
Our audit disclosed certain findings, which are detailed in the Audit Conclusions section of this
report. Management of the Department of Children’s Services has responded to the audit findings; we have
included the responses following each finding. We will follow up the audit to examine the application of
the procedures instituted because of the audit findings.
This report is intended to aid the Joint Government Operations Committee in its review to
determine whether the Department of Children’s Services should be continued, restructured, or terminated.
Sincerely,

Katherine J. Stickel, CPA, CGFM, Director
Division of State Audit
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Division of State Audit

Department of Children’s Services
Performance Audit
December 2020

Our mission is to make government work better.

AUDIT HIGHLIGHTS
Department of Children’s Services’ Mission
Mission: Provide high quality prevention and support services to children and families that
promote safety, permanency and well-being.
We have audited the Department of Children’s
Services for the period October 1, 2016, through July 31, 2020.
Our audit scope included a review of internal controls and
compliance with laws, regulations, policies, procedures, and
provisions of contracts or grant agreements in the following
areas:
Child Services
Foster Care Services
Probation and Aftercare Supervision
Incident Reporting at Youth Development
Centers
Safety of Children
Foster Care Placements
Employee and Volunteer Screening
Child Abuse Hotline Investigations
Child Protective Investigative Teams
Case Manager Caseloads

Scheduled Termination Date:
June 30, 2021

Providers, Licensed Facilities, and Wilder
Youth Development Center
Provider and Licensed Facilities
Wilder Youth Development Center
Restrictive Behavior Management
Techniques
Investigations of Provider Employees and
Wilder Youth Development Center
Employees
Employee Qualifications and Turnover
Analysis
Public Records Management
Information Systems

KEY CONCLUSIONS

FINDINGS
Child Services
 The Office of Juvenile Justice staff did not consistently document their supervisory
review of family service workers’ probation and aftercare supervision; did not perform
the required number of contacts for probation and aftercare; and did not document
actions taken for electronic monitoring alert notifications (page 17).
Safety of Children
 The department staff did not maintain accurate and complete lists of volunteers and did
not perform and maintain background checks on employees and volunteers in
accordance with state statute and departmental policy (page 31).
 Management improved their response to allegations of child abuse; however,
management and staff still have documentation weaknesses and delays in moving
through key points of the investigative process (page 40).
Providers, Licensed Facilities, and Wilder Youth Development Center
 Management did not have a sufficient monitoring process to document and analyze that
provider agencies had performed all required background checks for provider
employees before they were hired (page 57).
 Licensing Division staff did not maintain documentation to support the conclusion that
juvenile detention centers met staffing ratios (page 62).
 The department’s PREA compliance managers did not complete the Wilder Youth
Development Center’s PREA staffing pattern assessment (page 67).
 The Office of Continuous Quality Improvement staff did not have evidence that they
followed up on provider employees or conducted in-depth reviews on provider
employees or department employees who were investigated for violating department
standards, contract provisions, or state regulations (page 78).
Public Records Management
 Management did not ensure staff maintained and protected the department’s public
records as required by statute (page 93).
Information Systems
 Department management and Strategic Technology Solutions management did not
provide adequate internal controls in one area, increasing the risk of unauthorized
access to sensitive data (page 100).

 Although department management took steps to improve TFACTS’ performance and
network issues, the TFACTS financial functions are still not fully implemented after
10 years (page 101).

OBSERVATIONS
The following topics are included in this report because of their effect on the operations of
the Department of Children’s Services and the citizens of Tennessee:
Safety of Children
 Department management should amend the department’s rule related to placements of
more than six children in a foster home (page 28).
 Management should improve their process to monitor case managers’ caseload counts
(page 49).
Providers, Licensed Facilities, and Wilder Youth Development Center
 Licensing Division management had not developed formal policies and procedures for
supervisory reviews and documentation requirements (page 63).
 The department’s contract requirements for hardware-secure residential child caring
agencies contradict the department’s rule governing staffing levels (page 65).
 Wilder Youth Development Center staff did not maintain complete staffing
documentation and did not comply with PREA staffing standards (page 68).
 Department management should address clarity and consistency in the use of restrictive
behavior management techniques (page 70).
Employee Qualifications and Turnover Analysis
 On December 29, 2019, the Commissioner appointed an interim Deputy Commissioner
of Juvenile Justice who did not meet employment qualifications set forth in statute
(page 86).
 The department’s Office of Human Resources did not require staff to document and
maintain verification of candidates’ education and references required for hiring
decisions (page 87).
 Department management should evaluate turnover rates (page 90).

MATTER FOR LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION
The General Assembly may wish to consider amending statutory language to specify the period
the department should use to calculate and analyze caseload averages to meet the intent of state
statute. (page 52).
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INTRODUCTION

AUDIT AUTHORITY
This performance audit of the Department of Children’s Services was conducted pursuant
to the Tennessee Governmental Entity Review Law, Title 4, Chapter 29, Tennessee Code
Annotated. Under Section 4-29-242, the department is scheduled to terminate June 30, 2021. The
Comptroller of the Treasury is authorized under Section 4-29-111 to conduct a limited program
review audit of the agency and to report to the Joint Government Operations Committee of the
General Assembly. This audit is intended to aid the committee in determining whether the
department should be continued, restructured, or terminated.

BACKGROUND
The Department of Children’s
Services was created by the General
Assembly in July 1996. Section 37-5-102
(a), Tennessee Code Annotated, states that
the department was created to “provide
services to those children who are unruly,
delinquent, dependent and neglected, and
their respective families, as well as for
children who are at imminent risk and in
need of services to prevent entry into state
custody, who are in state custody pending family reunification or other permanent placement, or
as otherwise may be required for such children and their families pursuant to state law.” According
to the department’s website, its mission is to “Provide high quality prevention and support services
to children and families that promote safety, permanency and well-being” and to “ensure forever
families for children and youth by delivering high-quality, evidence-based services in partnership
with the community.”
For further background information on the department, see Appendix 3 on department
operations and Appendix 4 for the department’s organizational chart.

COVID-19 RESPONSE
Background
In early 2020, an outbreak of the novel strain of coronavirus (COVID-19) emerged
globally. Federal, state, and local mandates have resulted in an overall decline in economic
activity. At the time of our audit report, management of the Department of Children’s Services
continued to evaluate and address the ongoing impacts of the virus on the department’s children,
families, and staff.
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At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the department began to take
measures to ensure the health and safety of the children and families it serves, as well as its staff.
On March 13, 2020, the department began issuing guidance documents for operating department
facilities and private providers’ facilities, as well as
for foster and birth parent visitations and
videoconferencing visits during the pandemic. This
guidance included increased sanitation of facilities;
staff and children health screenings and testing when
necessary; social distancing measures; decreased
visitation at facilities where possible; and increased
use of videoconferencing for visits. In addition, the
department implemented work-from-home policies
where possible.
When the department first issued the guidance, management held conference calls five
times per week with all of the department’s private providers to communicate new and updated
health and safety guidelines, as well as to answer questions and listen to concerns from the
providers. Over time, management scaled back these calls to once per week, but the department
kept an open line of communication with providers regarding the pandemic. Since March 16,
2020, the department has posted all pandemic-related guidelines on its website.
On April 13, 2020, the department began publishing on its website testing data for children
at the following facilities:
•

Wilder Youth Development Center,

•

private provider facilities, and

•

juvenile detention centers.

The department received approximately $1 million in
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act
funding and a 6.2 percent increase in Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage funds through the Families First Coronavirus Response
Act. Through June 30, 2020, the department spent approximately
$5.2 million from these two funds across four programs:
•

Guardianship Assistance,

•

Stephanie Tubbs Jones Child Welfare Services Program,

•

Foster Care – Title IV-E, and

•

Adoption Assistance.

The department’s expenditures will continue to change through the duration of the CARES Act
funding’ availability.
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As of July 20, 2020, the department or private providers had tested 807 children for
COVID-19 at juvenile detention centers and private provider facilities house both children who
are in the department’s custody and non-custodial children.
The department is communicating with parents of custodial children regarding the virus
and testing. When a child tests positive for COVID-19 in either a provider facility or a foster
home, the child’s case manager notifies that child’s parents. In the case of a mass testing event,
such as at the Wilder Youth Development
Center, facility management notifies the
• 807 children were tested for COVID-19.
children’s parents that staff will test their
children.
• 224 children tested positive.
As of July 29, 2020, the department
continued to update existing guidance and
issue new guidance as the pandemic
evolved.

• 63 children were waiting on results.
• 155 children were placed in quarantine.
• 139 children recovered.

AUDIT SCOPE
We have audited the Department of Children’s Services for the period October 1, 2016,
through July 31, 2020. Our audit scope included a review of internal controls and compliance with
laws, regulations, policies, procedures, and provisions of contracts or grant agreements in the
following areas:
Providers, Licensed Facilities, and Wilder
Youth Development Center
Provider and Licensed Facilities
Wilder Youth Development Center
Restrictive Behavior Management
Techniques
Investigations of Provider Employees and
Wilder Youth Development Center
Employees

Child Services
Foster Care Services
Probation and Aftercare Supervision
Incident Reporting at Youth Development
Centers
Safety of Children
Foster Care Placements
Employee and Volunteer Screening
Child Abuse Hotline Investigations
Child Protective Investigative Teams
Case Manager Caseloads

Employee Qualifications and Turnover
Analysis
Public Records Management
Information Systems

Department management is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective internal
control and for complying with applicable laws, regulations, policies, procedures, and provisions
of contracts and grant agreements.
3

We provide further information on the scope of our assessment of internal control
significant to our audit objectives in Appendix 1. In compliance with generally accepted
government auditing standards, when internal control is significant within the context of our audit
objectives, we include in the audit report (1) the scope of our work on internal control and (2) any
deficiencies in internal control that are significant within the context of our audit objectives and
based upon the audit work we performed. We provide the scope of our work on internal control
in the detailed methodology of each audit section and in Appendix 1, and we identify any internal
control deficiencies significant to our audit objectives in our audit conclusions, findings, and
observations.
For our sample design, we used nonstatistical audit sampling, which was the most
appropriate and cost-effective method for concluding on our audit objectives. Based on our
professional judgment, review of authoritative sampling guidance, and careful consideration of
underlying statistical concepts, we believe that nonstatistical sampling provides sufficient
appropriate audit evidence to support the conclusions in our report. Although our sample results
provide bases for drawing conclusions, the errors identified in these samples cannot be used to
make statistically valid projections to the original populations. We present more detailed
information about our methodologies in Appendix 6 of this report.
We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our
audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

PRIOR AUDIT FINDINGS

REPORT OF ACTIONS TAKEN ON PRIOR AUDIT FINDINGS
Section 8-4-109(c), Tennessee Code Annotated, requires that each state department,
agency, or institution report to the Comptroller of the Treasury the action taken to implement the
recommendations in the prior audit report. The prior audit report was dated October 2016 and
contained four findings. The Department of Children’s Services filed its report with the
Comptroller of the Treasury on June 13, 2017. We conducted a follow-up of the prior audit
findings as part of the current audit.

RESOLVED AUDIT FINDINGS
The current audit disclosed that the Department of Children’s Services resolved two of the
four prior audit findings:
 a Child Protective Investigative Team Advisory Board has been formed, but the board
has not developed statewide protocols; and
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 incident reporting needs to be more timely.

REPEATED AUDIT FINDINGS
The prior audit report also contained a finding stating that a significant number of
investigation files were missing key documentation as required by department policy. The current
audit also disclosed that the department’s staff
still did not maintain key investigation
documentation in the investigation files. This
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES
finding is repeated in Finding 3 on page 40. The
AUDIT FINDINGS
prior audit report also contained a finding
reporting that management had still not
implemented
all
the
2014
finding
October 2016 Performance Audit
recommendations for the Tennessee Family and
Child Tracking System (TFACTS). In the
4 findings
current audit, we found that management still
has not implemented the financial module of
November 2020 Performance Audit
TFACTS. This finding is repeated in Finding
10 on page 101. We found that management had
Resolved 2 of 4 prior audit findings
implemented other recommended functions of
8 new findings
TFACTS.
2 repeat findings
9 observations
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Audit Conclusions

Child Services

Child Services
Children enter the Department of Children’s Services’ custody for various reasons and with
various needs. When a child enters custody, the department performs a Child and Adolescent
Needs and Strengths (CANS) assessment to help identify the specific risks and needs of each child.
Management’s assessment is an ongoing process of collecting and evaluating information needed
to make decisions focused on the goals of community safety and family stability. The CANS
assessment provides management with information related to four levels of care for children. See
Table 1 for descriptions of the levels of care.
Table 1
Department’s Levels of Care for Children
Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Level 4

Description
This level of care includes basic care (such as housing, supervision, and food) in a
least restrictive home-like environment—usually a foster home.
This level of care is characterized by a lower level of mental health and behavior
service needs. In general, the child may need primarily individual and/or group
counseling in combination with basic behavior management. These services can
usually be provided in a least restrictive setting, such as a foster home where in-home
counseling services are provided to the family.
This level of care includes a wide range of placement alternatives from foster home
to hardware-secure. 1 The level of care includes individual, family, and group
counseling in prescribed dosages; programs that are evidence-based; and a behavior
modification component that addresses behavior issues such as noncompliance with
rules, fighting, etc.
Level 3 services also include juvenile justice–enhanced services, which were
specifically developed to serve only juvenile justice (JJ) children who have a more
extensive delinquent history and may have some additional factors such as drug and
alcohol use or chronic runaway behavior. Both programs (the level 3 and the level
3 JJ enhanced) provide the same level of mental health counseling and behavioral
management services but provide those in different settings depending on the age
and offense history or behaviors of the child.
This level of care includes sub-acute services, which are designed for children who
are exhibiting a high level of mental health disturbance or have diagnosed syndromes
that require intermittent psychiatric hospitalization. Level 4 is meant to be short term
and is designed to stabilize the behavior or mental health condition enough to step
the child down to a lower level of care in a least restrictive environment.

Source: The Executive Director of Network Development in the Office of Child Programs.

The department also offers a range of services to provide high-quality prevention and
supports to children in Tennessee. We focused our audit work on child services related to foster

According to the department’s juvenile justice annual report, a hardware-secure facility is the highest level of
supervision and restrictions on the behavior of children.

1
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care services, probation and aftercare supervision, and incident reporting at youth
development centers.

FOSTER CARE SERVICES
Background
The Department of Children’s Services Office of Child Programs oversees the foster care
program. The department strives to maintain children in their homes if their homes are safe and
appropriate but also provides safe placement and adequate care for children who cannot remain in
their homes. Foster parents care for children for many different reasons, including personal
mission, faith-based beliefs, a desire to expand their families, and everything in between. Foster
parenting assures that children feel safe and heal from trauma, have positive role models in their
lives, and have a parent who takes care of their physical and emotional needs while supporting and
preparing them to achieve permanency. When a child enters state custody, the department acts as
the child’s custodian and is committed to finding the most appropriate and least restrictive
placement for that child, which includes placing the child in foster care. In practice, if a foster
home has been identified as an appropriate placement for a child, the department helps match the
child’s needs with the strengths of a foster family. Foster care is meant to be a temporary service
until the family and, in some cases, the child, can address the problems that made the placement
necessary. But when parents cannot, or will not, make their home safe for the child’s return, the
department seeks other permanent options. The number of children in the department’s foster care
program has increased over the last three years. See Chart 1.
Chart 1
Department’s Foster Care Trend for Calendar Years 2018, 2019, and Through July 7, 2020

Source: Obtained from the department’s Team Tennessee dashboard.
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Foster Care Parent Approval
Potential foster parents may apply to foster children through the department or through one
of the many private providers across the state. People interested in becoming foster parents must
be able to
•

give without the expectation of immediate returns;

•

have room in their home and in their daily life;

•

learn and use proven behavioral management skills;

•

love and care for children with problems; and

•

support birth families and help a child return home.

The potential foster parent must go through the department’s approval process, as described
in departmental Policy 16.4, “Foster Home Selection and Approval,” which requires the person to
•

be at least 21 years old;

•

be fingerprinted and pass background checks; 2

•

participate in an informational meeting;

•

complete a training program called TN-KEY (Tennessee Knowledge Empowers You)
(see pre-service training section on page 12);

•

participate in a home study; 3

•

provide documentation of a sufficient income; and

•

complete a health exam.

Once these requirements are completed, the region’s Team Coordinator or Regional Administrator
reviews the information to determine if the potential foster parent can be approved or not.
Foster Care Home Recruitment and Retention
The department’s regional offices are responsible for administering the state’s foster care
system and work to reunite children with their families or find permanent homes for children. Each
region is required to develop and maintain an annual foster home recruitment and retention plan.
According to departmental Policy 16.7, “Foster Family Recruitment and Retention,” the purpose
of a recruitment and retention plan is “To recruit and maintain a diverse pool of approved foster
According to the department, the types of background checks that must be completed include 1) local law
enforcement; 2) national sex offender registry; 3) abuse registry; 4) department database check in TFACTS; 5) other
states’ child abuse and neglect check for each state resided in the last five years; and 6) moving vehicle report for any
violations in the last three years.
3
According to the department, the home study requires a minimum of two visits to interview all people in the home
in order to gather information about the home environment (e.g., number of bedrooms); childhood history; medical
history; legal history; type of job; family interactions; ethics and values; religion; and references.
2
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and kinship families that ensure quality home placements for children in DCS [department]
custody.”
Recruitment and
retention plans are based
upon the demographic
needs of each region and
focus on increasing the
number of kinships 4 and
foster
homes
and
supporting and retaining
current homes.
These
plans use characteristics of
each region’s foster care
population and current
foster homes, obtained
from the department’s
TFACTS
system,
to
identify the number and
type of foster homes
needed.
Each region
develops a set of goals,
strategies, and action steps
needed to improve foster
home recruitment and
retention.

Source: The department’s website https://www.tn.gov/dcs.html.

Each plan also sets goals for increasing the number of children placed with families and
increasing the number of children placed in their own communities. Strategies also include
requesting recruitment assistance from local community partners and the faith-based community
and using social media to promote community needs. Once the region has completed the plan
(usually in December), it is reviewed by a Program Director or the Director of Foster Care and
Resource Eligibility. Once reviewed, the plan is returned to the region for revisions, as necessary.
The Office of Child Programs organizes and facilitates three quarterly review phone calls with
each region to discuss the progress of the recruitment and retention efforts. During the last quarter,
department management expects to begin work on the new plan and to evaluate the current plan’s
successes, failures, and barriers.
Department staff perform monthly visits with foster parents to
address any problems or concerns and to provide continuous training,
which includes resources, on relevant issues that foster parents may encounter. Department
management hosts an annual foster parent conference, which provides much of the required annual
training, as well as support and an opportunity to connect with other foster parents. In addition,
management supports a foster parent advocacy group and a foster parent mentorship program
through the Tennessee Community Services Agency. The foster parent advocacy group educates
4

“Kinships” refers to when a child is placed with a relative.
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parents on department policies, conducts training on the Foster Parent Bill of Rights, and
represents foster parents in grievances and appeals. The foster parent mentorship program also
provides support and encouragement for new foster parents. Department management, along with
community partners, also hosts appreciation events for foster parents, such as cookouts at the park,
a trip to the zoo, or a foster parent night out.
Management tracked foster home approval rates by calendar year for 2017, 2018, and 2019.
The department’s statewide goal is to recruit 10% more homes than the number of homes that
close in good standing during the previous year. See Table 2.
Table 2
Department of Children’s Services
Foster Home Closures and Approvals by Calendar Year for 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019
Unaudited Information
Calendar Year
2016
2017
2018
2019

Foster Home Closures
918
802
880
1,089

Statewide Goal*
1,010
882
968

Foster Home Approvals
930
1,309
1,122
1,253

*The targeted statewide recruitment goal was effective beginning in calendar year 2017.
Source: The department’s Director of Foster Care and Resources Eligibility.

Pre-Service and Continuous Training to Foster Care Parents
The department’s Office of Training and Professional Development
is responsible for providing learning opportunities that support foster parents
and include pre-service and in-service training requirements.
The
department’s initial and ongoing training provides support and resources on
relevant issues that foster parents may encounter.
Pre-Service Training
The department requires all potential foster parents to complete 23 hours of pre-approval
(pre-service) training courses. Once a potential foster parent completes all pre-service training,
the trainer meets with the potential foster parent to discuss and assess the parent’s understanding
of the requirements for becoming a foster parent. The trainer documents the training completion
dates for each required pre-service training course on an assessment form. The trainer’s supervisor
then reviews and approves the assessment form. Upon receiving the supervisor’s review and
approval of the assessment form, the potential foster parent can continue the foster parent approval
process.
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In-Service Training
After approved into the program, foster parents are required to complete 15 hours of
continuous (in-service) training annually. Specific training courses are required based on the year
of fostering and make up a part of the 15 hours. The foster parent selects the remaining hours from
a list of pre-approved elective training courses. The department’s training officer uploads foster
parent training records to the department’s shared drive on a quarterly basis and maintains a
cumulative training report that provides training records for each foster parent. The report includes
the name of the training course, the date it was completed, and the credit hours for each course.
Foster parent support staff, who are assigned to each foster home, use the training report to
communicate with foster parents the training courses and number of hours they have completed
and the courses and number of hours they need to complete. Foster parents who do not meet the
in-service training requirements are placed on a Foster Home Performance Improvement Plan. If
foster parents do not progress toward completing training requirements, the home is placed on
suspension and can be closed if noncompliance continues.
Audit Results
1. Audit Objective: Did the Office of Child Programs management evaluate and approve foster
care parents as required by the department’s Policy 16.4, “Foster Home
Selection and Approval”?
Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, the Office of Child Programs management evaluated
and approved foster care parents as required by department policy.

2. Audit Objective: Did management have a process in place to recruit and retain foster parents?
Conclusion:

Based on our review, management had a process in place to recruit and
retain foster parents and met their statewide goal to recruit 10% more foster
homes than the number of homes that were closed in good standing during
the previous year.

3. Audit Objective: Did management follow the department’s policies and procedures to ensure
that foster parents completed in-service training?
Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, department management followed Policy 16.8,
“Responsibilities of Approved Foster Homes,” and 16.9, “Required Foster
Parent In-Service Training,” to ensure that foster parents completed inservice training.
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PROBATION AND AFTERCARE SUPERVISION
The Office of Juvenile Justice in the Department of Children’s Services offers state
probation and aftercare supervision services to children who are found delinquent by a juvenile
court. Some juvenile courts operate their own probation
programs through local probation, grant-funded probation, and
private probation, and do not place children in state probation.
The department provides probation services as a preventive
measure to divert children who have broken the law from
entering the department’s custody. The department also
provides aftercare supervision services to children who are
exiting its custody to ensure that children continue to
successfully transition into the community after the end of a
trial home visit. 5
Probation
Once the juvenile court places a child on state probation, a DCS family service worker
monitors the child’s case. The department developed Policy 13.12, “Probation Requirements for
Delinquent Youth,” which oulines the procedures the family service worker should follow to
monitor the child’s case. The family service worker completes the Child and Adolescent Needs
and Strengths (CANS) assessment and a Community Risk Tool to help identify the child’s risks
and needs. Based on the assessment, the family service worker meets with the child and the child’s
family to further discuss the child’s level of risk to the community and the appropriate level of
supervision. The family service worker discusses the rules of probation, which may include
curfew, prohibition of alcohol or illegal drugs, counseling services, and schooling or employment
options. There are four levels of probation supervision and four different corresponding kinds and
frequencies of contact that the family service worker should have with the child on probation (see
Table 3). See Table 4 to see how the Community Risk Tool and CANS assessments are used to
determine how often the family service worker or court liaison needs to perform contact
supervision.
Table 3
Department’s Probation Supervision Levels*
High

Moderate

•

3 face-to-face visits in one month

•

2 face-to-face visits in one month

•

Monthly contact with the child’s school

•

Monthly contact with the child’s school

Low
•

1 face-to-face visit in one month

•

Monthly contact with the child’s school

Inactive
•

No face-to-face visits, but ongoing case
management and phone contact

* These requirements are based on the CANS assessment and apply to youth placed at home on probation.
Source: Department of Children’s Services Policy 13.12, “Probation Requirements for Delinquent Youth.”
5

A trial home visit is a period where a child in the department’s custody reconnects with their family and community.
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CANS
Assessment
Intensity

Table 4
CANS Assessment and Community Risk Tool Contacts*

Level 1
Level 2
Level 3/4

Community Risk Result
Low
Medium
High
1 face-to-face
2 face-to-face
2 face-to-face
contact per month contacts per month contacts per month
2 face-to-face
2 face-to-face
3 face-to-face
contacts per month contacts per month contacts per month
3 face-to-face
3 face-to-face
3 face-to-face
contacts per month contacts per month contacts per month

*These requirements are based on the CANS assessment and apply to youth placed at home on probation.
Source: Department of Children’s Services Policy 13.12, “Probation Requirements for Delinquent Youth.”

A child can be placed on probation for up to six months unless otherwise extended through
the court. The child’s level of supervision can change during the probation period depending on
the child’s behavior or needs. The family service worker documents the probation supervision
contacts in the Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System (TFACTS).
Trial Home Visit and Aftercare Supervision
When the Child and Family Team 6 believes the child is ready to be released from the
department’s custody, they can make a request to the juvenile courts to begin a 30-day trial home
visit, to help integrate the child back with his or her family and community. When supervising
children on trial home visit or aftercare supervision, family service workers follow the same rules
as with probation supervision and as outlined in departmental Policy 13.11, “Trial Home Visit and
Aftercare Requirements for Delinquent Youth.” If the child successfully completes the trial home
visit, the child is released from the department’s custody; however, DCS monitors the child for a
60-day aftercare period. If the child violates any terms of the trial home visit or aftercare
supervision, the family service worker may file a violation with the court. If the child is adjudicated
for new charges that warrant custody, the child is removed from the home and placed back into
the department’s custody.
Electronic Monitoring
The department also has the option to use electronic
monitoring devices (ankle bracelets) to help family service workers
supervise children. Electronic monitoring, using Global Positioning
System (GPS), helps the family service worker monitor the child’s
movement. For example, the family service worker can ensure the
child attends school or work, meets curfew, and stays out of restricted
zones. The Office of Juvenile Justice requires children who score moderate or high-risk on the
Community Risk Tool while on probation and aftercare to wear an electronic monitoring device.
Electronic monitoring can also be assigned or avoided at the court’s discretion. For example, a
A Child and Family Team includes the child’s parents and/or guardians, DCS staff, the child, attorneys and any
others who may have a significant influence in the child’s life.

6
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juvenile court judge can order electronic monitoring of a delinquent child on low supervision level
or can order a delinquent child not to have an electronic monitor.
The department developed Policy 13.5, “Electronic Monitoring for Delinquent Youth,”
which outlines the procedures family service workers should follow when electronic monitoring
equipment is used on a child. The family service worker places the device on the child, creates a
profile in VeriTracks 7 with the child’s monitoring requirements, and documents in TFACTS that
the child is under electronic monitoring. The policy requires the family service worker to check
the child’s activity daily by logging into VeriTracks and to investigate and close out VeriTracks
alert notifications. If the child violates the supervision requirement or tampers with the device, or
if the device’s battery is low or dead, VeriTracks sends a one-time alert to the family service
worker via email or a cell phone application. The family service worker is required to contact the
child, perform actions to correct the alert, and log into VeriTracks to close the alert notification.
Even if the family service worker does not receive an alert, the family service worker is required
to log into the VeriTracks system to review the child’s activity at least once a day.
Supervisory Reviews
To ensure family service workers complete the proper face-to-face visits, team leaders
review all probation and aftercare cases monthly. Supervisors check case information such as
•

the percentage of youth contacts by region;

•

caseloads and contact requirements each case worker has in each region;

•

how many contacts are required for each case and how many contacts have actually
occurred; and

•

contact dates, methods, and locations for each case. 8

The department also uses SafeMeasures, a live dashboard that displays the most current probation
case information, including whether contacts are needed for custody and non-custody cases,
medical and dental visits needed, and information about an ongoing diligent search. 9
Audit Results
Audit Objective: Did management and staff monitor children on probation and aftercare
supervision, as required by department policy?

VeriTracks is an internet-based application that receives, stores, and distributes monitoring data transmitted by
electronic monitoring equipment.
8
Team leaders view this information in a Juvenile Justice Supervision Level report, generated using the Oracle
Business Intelligence Suite Enterprise Edition (OBIEE) system. The department uses the OIBEE platform to gather,
store, and provide access to TFACTS data.
9
A diligent search refers to the activities the family service worker performs to locate the absent parent/guardian of
child.
7
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Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, management and staff did not complete the number of
supervision contacts that department policy requires to monitor children on
probation and aftercare supervision. See Finding 1.

Finding 1 – The Office of Juvenile Justice staff did not consistently document their
supervisory review of family service workers’ probation and aftercare supervision; did not
perform the required number of contacts for probation and aftercare; and did not document
actions taken for electronic monitoring alert notifications
Department of Children’s Services management is responsible for establishing internal
controls to achieve the department’s mission and vision. When children break the law and the
juvenile courts find them delinquent, courts can assign the department’s Office of Juvenile
Justice’s the responsibility to monitor delinquent children, through probation services, to provide
the necessary treatment and support to help them successfully remain in the community as lawabiding citizens. Children who are exiting the department’s custody on aftercare supervision have
the opportunity to return to their homes and successfully thrive with their families within the
community. The contact the department has with these children to ensure they adhere to the rules
of probation and aftercare could prevent the children from continuing down the path of juvenile
delinquency and entering the department’s custody.
Condition and Cause
Probation and Aftercare Supervision
Department management did not design sufficient internal controls to ensure staff
completed probation and aftercare supervision. We found that top management and the Office of
Juvenile Justice did not require team leaders to document their supervisory review of family
service workers’ probation and aftercare cases. Based on our discussion with the Office of Juvenile
Justice Executive Director, team leaders review each probation and aftercare case through case
conferences 10, on spreadsheets, and discuss any areas of concern with the family service worker
during their monthly performance review; however, team leaders do not have a consistent method
to document these reviews.
In addition, we found that family service workers did
“Family service workers
not always make the required number of supervision contacts
did not always make the
with children on probation or aftercare supervision. We
reviewed a nonstatistical, random sample of 62 probation cases
required number of
and 60 aftercare cases and found that the family service
supervision contacts with
workers did not make the number of contacts required by
children on probation or
department Policy 13.11, “Trial Home Visit and Aftercare
aftercare supervision.”
Requirements for Delinquent Youth,” and Policy 13.12,
“Probation Requirements for Delinquent Youth.” We noted
that for 55 of 62 of probation cases (89%) and 43 of 60 aftercare cases (72%) we reviewed, the
A meeting between a staff member in the case management series and supervisor to discuss case specific issues
and next steps.

10
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family service worker did not make the required contacts to ensure the child was adhering to the
rules of probation for the safety of the child and the community. See Figures 1 and 2 for our
testwork results.
Figure 1
Results of Auditor’s
Probation Case Review

Figure 2
Results of Auditor’s
Aftercare Case Review

The family service
worker (FSW) did not
make monthly contact
with the child’s school.

The FSW did not
perform at least 1
face-to-face visit in the
home each month.

The family service
worker (FSW) did not
make monthly contact
with the child’s school.

The FSW did not
perform at least 1
face-to-face visit in the
home each month.

The FSW did not
perform 3 face-to-face
visits within the first 30
days of the child’s
probation term.

The FSW did not
perform the monthly
face-to-face visits
based on the child’s
level of supervision.

The FSW did not
perform 3 face-to-face
visits within the first 30
days of the child’s
aftercare term.

The FSW did not
perform the monthly
face-to-face visits
based on the child’s
level of supervision.

We tested management’s and staff’s supervision activities for probation and aftercare cases
that were open within the scope period of our audit, which could have been several months. If the
family service worker did not complete all the required contacts, we counted the case as an error.
For both the probation and aftercare cases we reviewed, we noted high error rates regarding family
service workers’ contact with the child’s school. 11 School contacts allow the family service worker
to work with a school professional to assure the child attends regularly and complies with school
rules; to assess academic performance; and to develop a strategy to address any concerns.
According to the Office of Juvenile Justice Executive Director, staff experienced several
challenges that prevented them from making the required number of contacts. Management
reported that (1) youth and family members were difficult to locate, and sometimes avoidant; (2)
staff experienced difficulty meeting the youth in the home at a time that was convenient for the
family; and (3) school personnel were not always available for a monthly visit. As a result of these
challenges staff face while supervising youth, department management stated that they are revising
their current probation and aftercare policies.
Electronic Monitoring Supervision
We also noted that department management’s internal control design for electronic
monitoring supervision was not sufficient. Department management require staff to perform
additional procedures for children on electronic monitorng as part of their probation and aftercare
If a child was obtaining his or her Graduate Equivalent Diploma, was home schooled, or was required to work
instead of going to school, we did not test the case for the school contact requirements.
11
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supervision. Based on our review, we found that top management did not require staff to document
their action to resolve electronic monitoring alert notifications. Even though department Policy
13.5, “Electronic Monitoring for Delinquent Youth,” requires the family service worker to check
the VeriTracks system daily for electronic monitoring alerts, neither department management nor
department policy required the family service worker to document their adherence to the policy in
TFACTS or in some other form. When the family service worker does not document their actions
to work or close alerts, team leaders could not ensure staff monitored children on electronic
monitoring.
When we discussed the issues with management, they stated that the family service worker
can run the Agent Login Detail Report from VeriTracks, which shows the family service worker’s
login activity; however, management indicated this report does not capture the family service
worker’s login activity through the cell phone app. The department can also run an Alert
Notification Report, which provides the status of a worker’s alert notifications, including
outstanding or open alerts; however, the report does not provide any information on what
procedures the family service worker performed to close alert notifications. Team leaders are not
required to use either of these reports. Without requiring team leaders to use tools designed to
help ensure policy compliance and to document the actions staff take, neither top management nor
the team leader has maintained sufficient evidence of staff’s performance of required child
contacts, which are necessary to supervise children who are at a higher risk of committing
delinquent acts.
Office of Juvenile Justice management stated that they trust team leaders and staff to do
their jobs. However, management also acknowledged that team leaders could not monitor staff’s
work if staff did not document their actions taken to resolve electronic monitoring, including
closing alert notifications. As of the end of our audit fieldwork, the Executive Director stated that
the department was in the process of creating a new division whose focus would be to monitor
children on electronic monitoring, which includes resolving and documenting alert notifications.
Risk Assessment
Given the problems identified during our fieldwork, we reviewed the department’s
December 2019 Financial Integrity Act Risk Assessment and determined that management did not
properly assess probation and aftercare supervision for any potential risks of errors, fraud, waste,
abuse, fiscal and operational risks, and noncompliance with department policy.
Department management is responsible for identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks
over the probation and aftercare program. The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book) sets internal control
standards and is considered best practice for nonfederal entities. Green Book Principle 7.01,
“Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Risks,” states,
Management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the
defined objectives.
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Attributes
The following attributes contribute to the design, implementation, and operating
effectiveness of this principle:
•

Identification of Risks

•

Analysis of Risks

•

Response to Risks

Criteria
Green Book Principle 10.03, “Design of Appropriate Types of Control Activities,” states
that management should design “appropriate types of control activities for the entity’s internal
control system.”
According to the department’s Policy 13.12, “Probation Requirements for Delinquent
Youth,” Section C.2, all children on probation are classified as high risk for the first 30 days of
supervision, which requires the family service worker or court liaison to make 3 face-to-face
contacts within the first 30 days. At least 1 of these visits must be in the child’s home.
In addition, department Policy 13.11, “Trial Home Visit and Aftercare Requirements for
Delinquent Youth,” Section E, states that during the first two months of aftercare, the youth
remains on moderate supervision (a minimum of two face-to-face visits per month). If aftercare
supervision extends beyond two months, the level of supervision remains at moderate until the
family service worker completes a CANS reassessment that identifies the need for a lower or
higher level of service and supervision. If there are intensive in-home services, then a low level
of supervision is required. At least one of these visits must be in the child’s home.
Section D of department Policy 13.11 and Section E of Policy 13.12 both state
A school visit occurs during the first thirty (30) days . . . (d) Contact (via a visit,
phone call or email) is made with school personnel monthly to monitor the youth’s
attendance, behavior and progress which are documented in TFACTS.
Section C of Policy 13.5, “Electronic Monitoring for Delinquent Youth,” effective during
our audit scope states,
The FSW [Family service worker] is responsible for the placing the EM [electronic
monitor] on the youth and for monitoring alerts and notifications (includes nights,
weekends, and holidays). The FSW . . .
•

Checks the youth’s activity by logging into the electronic monitoring
computer system daily; [and]

•

Investigates and closes out alerts unless there are concerns that need to
be discussed with the TC [team coordinator].
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Effect
When management does not establish controls to ensure that team leaders consistently
perform a sufficient review of staff’s probation and aftercare supervision, there is an increased risk
that staff will not monitor children who pose a higher risk of
not following probation rules and a higher risk to the
“Adequate controls over
community. Adequate controls over the supervisory review
the monitoring of children on
of staff who are responsible to ensure children adhere to
probation and aftercare
probation and aftercare requirements help children remain in
supervision help children
the home and community and decrease the risk of children
remain in the home and
continuing down the path of delinquency and entering the
department’s custody.
community and decrease
the risk of children
continuing down the path of
Recommendation
delinquency and entering
the department’s custody.”
The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner of

Juvenile Justice, and the Executive Director of the Office of
Juvenile Justice should require team leaders to consistently document their review of probation
and aftercare cases to ensure family service workers perform the required level of supervision.
Management should continue working to improve internal controls over management’s
supervisory review of staff who have responsibility to ensure children on probation and aftercare
supervision meet those requirements. Management should ensure staff are aware of and follow
department policy and should require staff to use available reports as part of the supervisory review
process.

In addition, management should continue to develop and instate the new electronic
monitoring division to review electronic monitoring cases and ensure the division’s staff document
actions taken to resolve the alert notifications.
Management should perform an adequate risk assessment to identify all risks associated
with probation and aftercare supervision. Management should implement effective controls to
address the risks noted in this finding and in management’s risk assessment as necessary; assign
staff to be responsible for ongoing monitoring of the risks and mitigating controls; and take action
if deficiencies occur.
Management’s Comment
We concur in part. The finding has three conclusions, and each will be addressed
separately.
The Office of Juvenile Justice staff did not consistently document their supervisory review
of family service workers’ probation and aftercare supervision.
We concur. Management acknowledges a lack of consistency in supervisory tracking and
documentation; however management provided the auditors with evidence of the multiple ways
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supervisors track and document family service worker expectations using different reports that
have been developed in recent years. These include the creation and use of reports from
SafeMeasures and OBIEE (using data extracted from TFACTS). However, these reports require
continued feedback from managers to develop and maintain their accuracy and do not track all
requirements of supervision (school contacts, for example). Supervisors document family service
workers’ efforts in multiple places, including case conferences, spreadsheets, and monthly
performance briefings; however, there is currently not a standardized method to document the
different reviews that occur.
Management is developing a protocol for Team Leaders and Team Coordinators that
establishes clear expectations regarding specific reports that must be used monthly to track case
manager contacts. As an internal control mechanism, Team Leaders will be required to use specific
reports and monitor the contact entries. Team Leaders will document the completion of this review
on a spreadsheet and the spreadsheet will be turned in monthly to the Team Coordinator. The
spreadsheet is currently under development using the Continuous Quality Improvement process
and including input from Team Leaders and Team Coordinators. Management projects the
standardized protocol and the spreadsheet to be finalized before the end of 2020 and the process
to be written into the Team Leaders’ and Team Coordinators’ 2021 performance plans.
Additionally, Office of Juvenile Justice management will continue to review current reports for
improved data collection and has requested a SafeMeasures report to track school contacts.
The Office of Juvenile Justice did not perform the required number of contacts for probation
and aftercare.
We concur in part. This is not only an issue of missed contacts but also of undocumented
contacts for probation and aftercare services. Management is taking a multi-pronged approach to
ensure contacts occur and are documented which includes simplifying the policies and procedures,
re-training case managers on expectations, standardizing internal controls (discussed above),
developing new controls, retraining all managers on the use of SafeMeasures and OBIEE reports,
and requiring all Team Leaders to use a standardized reports to monitor and document contacts
(discussed above).
The Office of Juvenile Justice management acknowledges that the policies and procedures
regarding required contacts for probation and aftercare have multiple steps and requirements, some
of which cannot be adequately measured and cause confusion for front line case managers. A
simplified policy is under development as of this response that will include a handbook for case
manager reference. Once the policy is finalized and approved, management will complete
statewide training for all case managers and leadership to ensure there is an adequate understanding
of expectations. Management will consistently assess staff understanding of policies and followthrough of requirements through additional training, coaching, and disciplinary action. If
deficiencies are noted, management will hold staff accountable. The Office of Juvenile Justice
management plan for improving the supervisory review process is noted above and includes a
comprehensive review of data reports and development of an additional report by SafeMeasures
to track all face-to-face requirements and additional contacts.
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The Office of Juvenile Justice did not document actions taken for electronic monitoring alert
notifications.
We concur and management has already taken significant steps to address this finding.
Prior to the sunset performance audit, the Office of Juvenile Justice management started to
develop an Electronic Monitoring Unit (EMU). The new unit’s first day of operation was
October 11, 2020. The EMU consists of one supervisor and eight staff who provide support to
case management staff 24 hours a day, seven days a week. EMU staff completed an extensive
two-week training with the provider on the VeriTracks electronic monitoring system and protocols
were established for case manager and EMU staff to ensure all actions taken are documented.
Juvenile Justice management is developing internal controls to ensure the protocols are followed
and required documentation occurs. The Office of Juvenile Justice plans to use program
coordinators in the division to complete a monthly review of a percentage of alerts worked and
documented.
Auditor’s Comment
Management did not provide evidence to support their statement as to which child contacts
were undocumented versus missed.

INCIDENT REPORTING AT YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTERS
During the November 2016 audit and until August 31, 2018, the department operated three
youth development centers: John S. Wilder, Mountain View, and Woodland Hills. In 2017, the
department closed Woodland Hills and transitioned youth to a nearby facility that was renamed
Gateway to Independence. The department privatized Mountain View in 2017 and Gateway to
Independence in 2018. As of September 2020, the department continues to operate John S. Wilder
(see Table 5). The department provided residential
services at the youth development centers for youth ages
Incidents at youth
13 to 18 who the juvenile courts have committed to state
development centers are any
custody for various criminal offenses. As with any
serious event that affects a
institution setting, there is an inherent risk that dangerous
child or a program’s operation.
situations will arise. The department considers any event
of serious consequence that affects a child or a program’s
operation to be an incident. The department’s Policy 1.4, “Incident Reporting,” states, “All
incidents involving children/youth, occurring within the custody of the Department of Children’s
Services (DCS) shall be reported to the Commissioner or designee.” The policy requires
department staff, including staff at the youth development centers to enter incidents into TFACTS
within five business days. See Appendix 7 for the types of incidents and their definitions.
When an incident occurred, staff at the facilities completed incident report documentation
and submitted it to the shift supervisor. At the end of the shift, the shift supervisor emailed the
incident information and the incident report to the department’s Administrative Secretary. The
Administrative Secretary was responsible for documenting the incident reports in TFACTS within
five business days of the incident.
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Results of Prior Audit
In the department’s November 2016 performance audit report, we recommended that staff
at the youth development centers needed to report incidents in accordance with department policy.
Management concurred in part with the prior audit finding and attributed the timeliness issue to
the fact that only one staff person at each facility was responsible for entering the incidents.
Management stated in its six-month follow-up report, dated June 13, 2017, that
The Office of Juvenile Justice has assigned staff in each Youth Development Center
to ensure that incident reporting is processed timely. We have identified and trained
one primary staff member and one backup for both Gateway to Independence and
Mountain View. We have identified and trained two primary staff members and
one backup for Wilder based on anticipated volume.
Department management also stated that the central office data analyst would monitor the
timeliness of incident reporting. According to the Office of Juvenile Justice’s Executive Director,
beginning in April 2017, the Program Coordinator reviewed the timeliness of incident reports
entered in TFACTS. She performed the reviews monthly until May 2019; afterward, she
performed the reviews bi-monthly. The Office of Juvenile Justice management discuss latereported incidents with youth development center management to determine the cause and
corrective action.
Current Audit Results
Subsequent to our 2016 audit and during the current audit, management privatized
Mountain View and Woodland Hills. According to the department’s Chief of Staff, only facilities
that the department owns and operates can be classified as youth development centers; therefore,
the John S. Wilder facility remains the only youth development center in the state. See Table 5.
Table 5
Department of Children’s Services
Changes in Youth Development Centers
Youth Development Center
Mountain View

Location
Dandridge, TN

Woodland Hills

Nashville, TN

John S. Wilder

Somerville, TN

Status as of September 2020
Privatized in 2017.
Closed in 2017 and transitioned to Gateway
to Independence. Privatized in 2018.
Department owned and operated.

To follow up on the prior finding, we reviewed youth development center incidents that
occurred while the facilities were operated by the department to ensure that department staff
submitted incident reports on time. The Office of Continuous Quality Improvement staff review
incident reports submitted by private provider facilities as part of their monitoring visits at the
privatized facilities.
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Audit Results
Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did department management ensure
timely reporting of incident reports that occurred at the former and current
youth development centers operated by the department?

Conclusion:

Based on our review, we found that management ensured timely incident
reporting at the former and current youth development centers, with minor
exceptions.
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Safety of Children

Safety of Children
The Department of Children’s Services has established measures to ensure the safety of
children supported in state-run and privately operated facilities, as well as in the community.
Management has five critical safety mechanisms to help ensure children are safe: foster care
placements, employee and volunteer screening, Child Abuse Hotline investigations, Child
Protective Investigation Teams, and case manager caseloads.

FOSTER CARE PLACEMENTS
According to the Department of Children’s
Services’ 2019 Foster Parent Handbook, when a child
enters state custody, the department is committed to
identifying the most appropriate and least restrictive
placement for that child. The department initially
attempts to place all custodial children in a relative/kin
placement if there are no safety concerns and a
relative/kin placement can meet the child’s needs. If a
relative/kin placement cannot be identified, a traditional
department or provider foster home is identified to meet
the child’s needs. As of August 2020, the department had
2,787 foster homes and contracted with 2,562 foster
home providers to serve children in state custody. 12
Office of Child Programs
The Office of Child Programs’ main goal is to
maintain children in their homes when their homes are
safe and appropriate; however, when their home is not an option, the goal is to provide these
children with a safe placement and adequate care. The office’s custodial programs, such as foster
care, adoption, and independent living, are available for children in the department’s custody. The
department promulgated Rule 0250-4-9-.07(5), “Foster Homes,” effective March 1999, to govern
foster care agencies. The rule states that “The foster home shall not have more than six children
including the foster parents’ own children.”
When the placement specialists deem a child’s foster care placement is best in a home that
already contains six children, the placement specialists must complete a placement exception
request 13 (PER) form for each child in the home and obtain the regional administrator’s verbal
approval to place additional children in the home. Once the regional administrator gives verbal

This information was obtained from the department’s Mega Report as of August 28, 2020.
Staff completes a Placement Exception Request when staff has to place a custodial child in a home with more than
six children, more than two children under the age of two, more than two therapeutic children, a detention, jail or
facility designated to serve delinquent youth, a DCS office, or a placement that requires separation of siblings, or
separation of a child from a minor parent.

12
13
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approval for the PER, staff have 72 hours to complete the PER form and upload it into Tennessee
Family and Child Tracking System (TFACTS) 14, which is the department’s official record system.
Audit Results
Audit Objective: Did the Office of Child Programs comply with department Rule 0250-4-9.07(5) to ensure children were placed in foster homes with six children or less?
Did the Office of Child Programs staff complete the placement exception
request form in accordance with department Policy 16.46?
Conclusion:

The Office of Child Programs did not comply with the rule and has not yet
amended the rule to allow management to make decisions to place more than
six children in a foster home when that decision is in the best interest of
children and their families. In addition, the Office of Child Programs did not
follow policy and procedures when they completed the PER forms for placing
more than six children in a foster home. See Observation 1.

Observation 1 - Department management should amend the department’s rule related to
placements of more than six children in a foster home
The department’s Rule 0250-4-9-.07(5) does not allow more than six children in a foster
home. Based on our discussions, management shared their perspective of certain situations where
the promulgated rule does not allow management to make decisions in the best interest of children
and their families. For example, management stated that keeping large sibling groups together for
placement is preferred when possible; these preferred placements may result in placements that
exceed the limit of six children in the home.
Under the previous department’s administration, and in line with the Brian A. lawsuit
settlement agreement 15, department management created the policy exception in Policy 16.46,
“Child/Youth Referral and Placement,” which allowed case managers to place more than six
children in a foster home. When the department was released from the Brian A. settlement
provisions in February 2019, the department’s rule once again became the department’s governing
authority for the placement of children in foster homes. In an effort to maintain positive actions
resulting from the Brian A. settlement, the department’s current management has continued the
practice of placing more than six children in a foster home if doing so is in the best interest of
children and their families and further enhanced the Policy 16.46 exception by implementing
supplemental guidelines for placing more than six children in a home. The policy 16.46 can be
found on the department’s website at https://www.tn.gov/dcs/program-areas/qi/policies-reportsmanuals/policiesprocedures.html.
Tennessee Child and Family Tracking System (TFACTS) is the department’s statewide child welfare information
system that supports child protection, adoption, foster care, juvenile justice, and prevention services provided to the
children and families served by DCS.
15
Brian A. was a class-action lawsuit that was filed against the state in 2001 on behalf of children in DCS custody,
alleging defendants’ systemic failure to protect Tennessee’s most vulnerable children and to provide them with legally
required services. The Department of Children’s Services worked to fulfill its obligations under the Settlement
Agreement and in February 2019, was released from the Settlement Agreement.
14
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We followed up with management about their status of amending the current rule, and they
stated that on November 2, 2020, they filed an emergency rule to amend the rule.
Based on our review of the department’s May 11, 2020, Resource Home Mega Report, we
identified 139 of the 5,293 foster homes where management had placed 7 or more children. 16 We
performed a review of management’s adherence to Policy 16.46 and found that management
needed to ensure that staff follow the specific documentation and approval requirements set for in
the policy/supplement. We tested 25 foster homes to determine whether management and staff
met placement exception requirements required by policy. For 19 of the 25 homes tested (76%),
which impacted documentation related to 65 of 92 children (71%), we found that:
•

staff did not create a Placement Exception Request (PER) form;

•

regional administrators did not approve the PER forms, did not approve the forms
within three days, or did not include the verbal approval date; and

•

staff did not upload the PER forms into TFACTS.

After our discussion with management about the noted deficiencies, management revised
Policy 16.46 to further clarify staff’s responsibilities for properly completing and documenting the
placement exception request forms.
The Commissioner and the Office of Child Programs should quickly work to finalize and
file the amended rule for foster homes placements involving more than six children. In the
meantime, management should ensure staff follow all policy requirements when making
exceptions to the department’s existing rule. Ultimately, when the amended rule is approved,
management should adhere to the rule as approved and any applicable policy to ensure the
department acts in the best interest of the children and their families.

EMPLOYEE AND VOLUNTEER SCREENING
Background
The Department of Children’s Services employs over 3,600 individuals to carry out the
mission and vision of the department. The department requires all employees (who may or may
not have direct contact with children) to be free from a criminal or abuse history that could pose a
safety risk to children.
The department uses volunteers as additional resources to enhance program services for
the children and families the department serves. According to the department’s Volunteer Service
Procedures Manual, “Volunteers offer support in any area of the department where there are
identified needs. Volunteers do not supplant department staff in providing services but contribute
to the agency by offering their distinct talents, skills, and resources.” Volunteers are required to
be at least 18 years old if serving in one of the department’s regional offices and at least 21 years
old if serving at a youth development center.
16

9 of the 139 foster homes did not have any custodial children.
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The department categorizes in-service volunteers in two distinct types:
•

regular 17 in-service volunteers serve in a department facility more than three days per
year; and

•

occasional in-service volunteers serve in a department facility less than three days per
year and do not have direct contact with children and families served by the department.

The department’s other volunteer categories include job shadow volunteers, foster parent
volunteers and support volunteers. We focused our efforts on the department’s background
check screening process for employees and regular in-service volunteers.
In order to maintain safe conditions, the
department is legally required to obtain a criminal
background check on any employees and volunteers
whose function would include direct contact with
children in the department’s custody or who may have
access to children’s information. The department’s
human resources analysts in each region perform initial
and follow-up background checks of employee
applicants. For volunteer applicants, a department
employee, the volunteer coordinator at each of the
department’s regional offices or youth development centers is responsible for conducting initial
and follow-up background checks of volunteer applicants. Other duties of volunteer coordinators
include recruiting volunteers and maintaining volunteer records. To fulfill their responsibilities,
staff are instructed to use the Background Check History and IV-E Eligibility Checklist to track
the progress of each employee or volunteer applicant’s background check.
Audit Results
1. Audit Objective: Did the Office of Human Resources staff conduct background checks on
employees before their hire date?
Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, we found that the Human Resources staff did not
conduct required background checks for employees before hiring them. We
also noted that Human Resources staff did not accurately document these
checks on their internal checklist. See Finding 2. Additionally, we noted
that once employees ended their service with the department, Human
Resources staff destroyed documentation of their background check results
without following the state’s records disposition authorization process. See
Finding 8.

2. Audit Objective: Did the regional volunteer coordinators conduct background checks on
volunteers before allowing them to serve the department?
There are two sub-types for regular in-service volunteers: college or university student interns, and Title IV-E
Tuition Program interns.
17
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Conclusion:

Based on our work, we found that the department did not maintain complete
and accurate volunteer lists, and we found that volunteer coordinators did
not conduct required background checks on volunteers before allowing
them to serve the department. We also noted that the volunteer coordinators
did not accurately document these checks on the department’s checklist.
See Finding 2. Additionally, we found that after the volunteers were no
longer certified to serve the department staff destroyed volunteers’ files
without following the state’s records disposition authorization process. See
Finding 8.

Finding 2 – The department staff did not maintain accurate and complete lists of volunteers
and did not perform and maintain background checks on employees and volunteers in
accordance with state statute and departmental policy
We analyzed the department’s background
check process for employees and volunteers and
found multiple issues, all of which potentially
jeopardize the safety of children in the
department’s custody.

Problems with employee and
volunteer background checks could
jeopardize the safety of children in
the department’s custody.

Criteria, Condition, Cause and Effect
For all employees and volunteers applying to work with children, state statute 18 and
departmental policy 19 require Office of Human Resources staff to conduct fingerprint criminal
background checks through the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and to review the Department of Health’s vulnerable persons registry (Abuse
Registry). Departmental policy also requires additional pre-hire checks of local criminal records,
driving records, the national sex offender registry, and the department’s own Tennessee Family
and Child Tracking System (TFACTS). 20
Condition A: Department Staff Did Not Perform Employee and Volunteer Background Checks
Before Hire/Start Dates
We selected a sample of 60 employees and 60 volunteers to perform testwork on the
background check results. Because the Office of Human Resources staff destroyed the check
results, we could not test the department’s documentation of pre-hire checks other than fingerprint
check results for five employees, and we could not test pre-hire checks other than the fingerprint
check and the TFACTS check for one volunteer in our samples. 21 Therefore, we reviewed the

Section 37-5-511(a), Tennessee Code Annotated.
Policy 4.1, “Employee Background Checks,” Section A.
20
TFACTS is the database of information about children and families who are associated with Tennessee’s
Department of Children’s Services cases. By searching this database in the background check process, department
staff can identify individuals involved in prior cases, including caretakers or accused perpetrators.
21
See Finding 8 for records disposition authorization noncompliance.
18
19
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department’s background check results for 55 employees and 59 volunteers. We identified the
deficiencies in the department’s performance of background checks shown in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6
Testwork Results of Employee Background Checks

Deficiency
Identified
Not in File
Not
Performed

Local
Criminal
Background
6 of 55
employees
(11%)
1
2

Performed
Late

-

Not Dated
Other

3
-

Driving
Record
12 of 55
employees
(22%)
3

National Sex
Offender
Registry
2 of 55
employees
(4%)
1

Abuse
Registry
4 of 55
employees
(7%)
-

TFACTS
4 of 55
employees
(7%)
-

4

-

-

-

4
(between 7 and
539 days late)
1
-

1
(338 days
late)
-

1
(338 days
late)
3
-

3
(between 29 and
330 days late)
1*

*Performed using the wrong Social Security number, rendering the check ineffective.

Table 7
Testwork Results of Volunteer Background Checks

Deficiency
Identified
Not in File
Not
Performed

Local
Criminal
Background
11 of 59
volunteers
(19%)
5

TBI/FBI
Fingerprint
5 of 60
volunteers
(8%)
-

-

Performed
Late

2
(61 and 91
days late)

Not Dated

4

Driving
Record
11 of 59
volunteers
(19%)
4

National Sex
Offender
Registry
8 of 59
volunteers
(14%)
4

Abuse
Registry
10 of 59
volunteers
(17%)
5

TFACTS
5 of 60
volunteers
(8%)
3

-

3

-

-

-

5
(between 3
and 96 days
late)
-

4
(between
1and 95
days late)
-

4
(between 8
and 263 days
late)
-

3
(between 8
and 91
days late)
2

2
(1 and 95
days late)
-

For the 120 sample items we tested, we reperformed the checks for the sex offender
registry, abuse registry, and TFACTS, and we did not find information on any employees or
volunteers that should have disqualified them from service.
When we discussed our testwork results with management, they provided comments for
each error and our follow-up comments as follows:
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•

Background Checks Not in File – For volunteers, management indicated a
“combination of oversight and misunderstanding that need to be corrected through
training sessions” caused the errors. For employees, management indicated local
employees were not performing job duties appropriately and were no longer with the
department.

•

Background Checks Not Performed – Although background checks are required for
all employees and volunteers, management stated that they do not have the ability to
run or purchase driving record checks or local criminal background checks through
court clerks’ offices in other states on employees and volunteers who live or previously
resided in another state.

•

Checks Performed Late and Performed Using the Wrong Social Security Number –
Management stated that the checks were performed late because of a combination of
staff’s misunderstanding of the background check policy and a simple error in using
the wrong Social Security number.

•

Results Not Dated – According to management, the date on the checks is beyond the
department’s control because some criminal court systems do not include the dates on
the printouts, and the abuse registry checks did not include the date on the printout until
January 2019. However, we suggest that management should add the date on the
background check results.

Performing and maintaining background checks allows the department to ensure and
maintain evidence that only appropriate individuals were allowed to work or volunteer with
children. When the department does not conduct the required background checks according to
state statute and department policy, there is an increased risk that someone who poses a threat to
children could come in contact with children or have access to children’s information.
Condition B: Department Staff Did Not Maintain Complete and Accurate Volunteer Records
We noted that the coordinators had not kept complete or accurate volunteer records.
Specifically, we noted that the records did not include volunteer start dates, the start/end dates
were either incomplete or incorrect, and/or the start date fields contained
information other than dates. We performed testwork on volunteer background
checks based on applicant start dates; in instances where staff provided incomplete
start date information, we requested volunteer start dates from the volunteer
coordinators for the sample we selected from a population of volunteers provided
by each volunteer coordinator. We received this information in various formats, such as emails
and volunteer approval letters.
Incompatible Department Policy and Documentation of Background Check Compliance
According to the Volunteer Service Procedures Manual,
Pursuant to DCS [Department of Children’s Services] Policy 4.1, Regular InService Volunteers must complete a thorough background investigation prior to
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their approval and service. The background investigation must be completed within
sixty-one days (61) calendar days from the date the application was received.
The department’s policy for volunteer background checks requires that background checks
are performed based on when the application is received; however, department staff did not
document the date the volunteer’s application was received on the department’s Background
Check History and IV-E Eligibility Checklist. Instead, staff included the volunteers’ start dates on
the checklist.
We found that for 17 of 60 volunteers tested (28%), volunteer coordinators performed
checks between 70 and 434 days before the volunteers’ start dates.
Based on our discussion with management, they believe that the volunteer coordinators
either misunderstood or overlooked the timing of background checks in relation to the volunteers’
start dates. Without complete and accurate records, neither department management nor we can
ensure the established critical safety process was working and timely performed. By performing
background checks long before a volunteer begins service, the department risks missing
information that may affect its decision to allow someone access to children in the department’s
care.
Condition C: Department Staff Did Not Comply With Department Policy for Ensuring
Background Checks Results Were Documented on the Required Checklist
According to the department’s Policy 4.1, “Employee Background Checks,” Section A,
Results from the completed background checks must be documented on form CS0687, Background Check History and IV-E Eligibility Checklist and filed with
supporting results documentation attached in the employee’s official personnel file.
While performing our testwork on the department’s compliance with conducting
background checks, we reviewed the checklist for each background check to ensure staff were
completing the required checklist forms. We found that for 14 of 55 employees (25%) and 13 of
60 volunteers (22%), the department’s Human Resources staff or volunteer coordinators did not
properly complete or maintain the checklist. We noted multiple issues with the checklists and
found that Human Resources staff who conducted the background checks
•

did not document the staff person requesting the checks and did not sign and review
checklists after completing the checks;

•

did not include the applicants’ identifying information on the checklists to show for
whom they ran the background checks;

•

did not document the dates of completion for the required checks;

•

dated their documented review either before the checks were completed or after the
employees’ or volunteers’ start dates; and
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•

did not include the checklists in the employees’ or volunteers’ files or destroyed the
checklists without following the established records disposition authorization process.

The department implemented the Background Check History and IV-E Eligibility
Checklist for staff to track the progress of the background checks for each potential employee and
volunteer. However, management did not ensure that staff were completing the checklists to
ensure the various background checks were performed. According to management, even though
the checklist is required by departmental policy, the checklist is used as a reminder and some
employees do not use this document. Management does believe that this problem can be corrected
through training sessions.
When staff do not follow department policy for completing the checklist, the risk increases
that the appropriate backgrounds checks will not be performed. Without a sufficient supervisory
review, management has no assurance that staff are properly performing background checks as
required.
Risk Assessment
Given the problems we identified during our fieldwork, we reviewed the department’s
December 2019 Financial Integrity Act Risk Assessment and determined that management did not
properly assess employee and volunteer background checks for any potential risks of errors, fraud,
waste, abuse, fiscal and operational risks, and noncompliance with state law or other regulatory
requirements.
Department management is responsible for identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks
over employee and volunteer background checks. The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book) sets internal control
standards and is considered best practice for nonfederal entities. Green Book Principle 7.01,
“Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Risks,” states,
Management should identify, analyze, and respond to risk related to achieving the
defined objectives.
Attributes
The following attributes contribute to the design, implementation, and operating
effectiveness of this principle:
•

Identification of Risks

•

Analysis of Risks

•

Response to Risks
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Recommendation
The Executive Director of Human Resources should ensure that regional Human Resources
staff and volunteer coordinators keep accurate, complete volunteer records as a basis for initiating
the background check process. The Office of Human Resources should conduct a comprehensive
review to ensure that all existing departmental employees and volunteers have completed
background check results on file. The Commissioner and the Executive Director of Human
Resources should ensure that all the required background checks are completed as required in a
reasonable timeframe. The Executive Director of Human Resources should also implement
sufficient controls to ensure that staff accurately and completely document their review on the
internal checklist.
Additionally, management should perform an adequate risk assessment to identify all risks
associated with completing background checks for employees and volunteers. Management
should implement effective controls to address the risks noted in this finding and based on their
own risk assessment; assign staff to be responsible for ongoing monitoring of the risks and
mitigating controls; and take action if deficiencies occur.
Management’s Comment
We concur with the finding.
Regarding employee background checks, management accepts the finding but notes that
issues found in the testwork primarily occurred in regions which have had human resources staff
turnover in the past year. Previous human resources staff in those regions had documented
performance deficiencies. Management believes current deficiencies are being corrected. The
department is currently taking the following corrective action:
•

Human Resources staff are in the process of reviewing all current personnel files;

•

All new and current human resources staff will be trained or re-trained on appropriate
policy;

•

Field human resources staff are now required to attach all pre-employment checks to
the ePAF hiring request in Edison when the new hire is entered. Central Office HR
staff will review documentation for deficiencies prior to the new hire being approved
for hire in Edison. Pre-employment checks will include all background checks,
references, and proof of education.

In addition to an annual file audit, the Executive Director of Human Resources has
implemented an additional file audit of new employees conducted by the Regional Field Human
Resources Directors each quarter.
Regarding volunteer background checks, management accepts the finding, and believes
current deficiencies can be corrected. The department will take the following corrective action:
•

All current volunteer files will be reviewed by Central Office Child Program staff;
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•

All new and current volunteer coordinators will be trained or re-trained on appropriate
policy;

•

Regional volunteer coordinators will now submit volunteer files to Central Office Child
Program staff for review of dated background checks and dated applications prior
requesting the volunteer certification letter;

•

Central Office Child Program staff will review each volunteer file for all required
documentation, including dated background checks and dated applications, to ensure
policy requirements have been met;

•

Once Central Office Child Program staff has determined the volunteer file meets all
documentation and date requirements, the request for the volunteer certification letter
will be submitted to Central Office HR; and

•

All volunteer files will be maintained in a centralized folder on the department’s shared
drive managed by Central Office Child Program staff.

In addition to review of all new volunteer files when submitted for certification, Central
Office Child Program staff will conduct annual reviews of volunteer files as outlined in policy.

CHILD ABUSE HOTLINE INVESTIGATIONS
Background
The Office of Child Safety is
responsible for receiving and screening
reports of child abuse and neglect via
the Child Abuse Hotline. Allegations
are then assigned to the appropriate
staff for investigation.
In the screening process, Child
Abuse Hotline staff assign a priority
level to each case to determine when
the alleged child victim must be seen.
Department policy defines the priority
levels as follows:

Source: https://www.tn.gov/dcs/program-areas/childsafety/reporting/child-abuse.html.

•

Priority 1 cases allege that
children may be in imminent danger and require face-to-face contact with the alleged
child victim within 24 hours;

•

Priority 2 cases allege injuries or risk of injuries that are not imminent or life
threatening, or do not require immediate care and require face-to-face contact with the
alleged child victim within two business days; and
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•

Priority 3 cases allege situations or incidents that pose a low risk of harm to the child
and require face-to-face contact with the alleged child victim within three business
days.

Investigators then conduct investigations to assess the child’s safety. Investigators use the
Family Advocacy and Support Tool (FAST) “to help identify safety concerns, underlying risks,
needs and strengths of families,” according to department policy. They then use evidence obtained
to either substantiate or refute the allegation in order to classify the case. According to the
department’s policy, at the discretion of the department, cases are classified in one of seven
categories:
1. Allegation Substantiated, Perpetrator Substantiated;
2. Allegation Substantiated, Perpetrator Unsubstantiated;
3. Allegation Substantiated, Perpetrator Unknown;
4. Allegation Unsubstantiated, Perpetrator Unsubstantiated;
5. Allegation Unsubstantiated, Child With Sexual Behavior Problems;
6. Unable to Complete; or
7. Administrative Closure.
Prior to closing their investigation, if necessary, investigators may transfer cases to other
department offices so that the child or family can receive other support services from the
department or for the department to take the child into the department’s custody. Once
investigators complete all investigative responsibilities, they can close the case.
The office often coordinates with law enforcement, child advocacy centers, prosecutors,
juvenile court representatives, and the state’s Child Protective Investigation Teams (CPIT). The
CPITs, created under Section 37-1-607, Tennessee Code Annotated, are multi-disciplinary teams
composed of key members in the community who work together to aid the investigation of severe
child abuse to ensure child safety and support.
When the department receives allegations of severe abuse or otherwise identifies this abuse
during investigations, they convene a CPIT to help ensure a collaborative, multi-disciplinary
investigation. Section 37-1-102(b)(27), Tennessee Code Annotated, defines severe child abuse,
and the department’s “Work Aid 1: CPS Categories and Definitions of Abuse/Neglect” provides
guidance to staff. Severe abuse includes physical abuse and neglect likely to cause serious bodily
harm, any sexual abuse, and child death or near death. See page 47 for more information on the
department’s role on the state’s Child Protective Investigation Teams.
Results of Prior Audit
In the department’s November 2016 performance audit report, we reported the following
eight weaknesses related to Priority 1 cases from three regions:
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•

cases involving severe abuse lacked key, mandated CPIT meeting documentation
(repeated in the current audit);

•

cases lacked documentation of interviews of all children living in the home as required
(corrected);

•

cases lacked detailed documentation of interviews with alleged perpetrators
(corrected);

•

cases did not contain documentation that a required home visit occurred (corrected);

•

cases lacked documentation that adequate closing supervisory review had occurred
(corrected);

•

Structured Decision Making Safety Assessments were not completed within the
required 72 hours of initial contact with the child and family (repeated in the current
audit); 22

•

classifications were not completed within 30 days for non-severe abuse allegations and
within 60 days for severe abuse allegations (repeated in the current audit); and

•

case closures did not occur within 60 days (repeated in the current audit).

Management concurred with the prior audit finding and stated, “Administrative reviews by
supervisors were identified as a driving indicator of quality work. OCS [Office of Child Safety]
is currently piloting a process using pre-existing fields in TFACTS for supervisors to document
administrative reviews at key points during the investigation.”
Current Testwork Results
Based on our testwork on Priority 1 cases, the department corrected four of the eight
conditions we noted in the 2016 audit. We are repeating the uncorrected conditions along with
two new conditions, which are detailed in the finding.
Audit Results
Audit Objective: In response to the prior audit finding, did the department ensure that
investigations of Priority 1 allegations of child abuse were completed timely
and that case files contained the appropriate documentation, as required by the
department’s policies and procedures?
Conclusion:

We found that the department corrected four of the eight conditions noted in
the prior finding. For the remaining four conditions, we found department staff
did not complete the required documentation and timely close investigations
for Priority 1 investigations. We also found two new conditions where the
Child Protective Investigation Team did not convene within the timeframe

During the 2016 performance audit of the Department of Children’s Services, the department used the Structured
Decision Making Safety Assessments. In 2017, management implemented the FAST Safety Assessment to be
submitted within 72 hours of initial contact with the child and family.
22
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outlined in department policy, and the department’s administrative review was
not designed to ensure that all key points of the case were completed within
the required timelines. See Finding 3.
Finding 3 – Management improved their response to allegations of child abuse; however,
management and staff still have documentation weaknesses and delays in moving through
key points of the investigative process
Based on our testwork, we found the Department of Children’s Services made
improvements to 4 of the 8 conditions noted in the prior audit related to its timely response to child
abuse allegations (see Table 8).
Table 8
Error Rates for the Department’s Response to Child Abuse Allegations

Timely Submission of FAST Safety
Assessments Within 5 Days
Timely Classifications of Cases
Within 30 Days
Timely Case Closure, Transfer, or
Extension Within 60 Days
Documentation of CPIT Review
Forms

Prior 2016 Audit
Testwork Error Rate

Current Audit Testwork
Error Rate

33%

33%

48%

7%

57%

37%

24%

20%

We again, however, noted that department investigators did not complete required
documentation or meet key timeline benchmarks while conducting the highest risk (Priority 1)
investigations. We also identified two new conditions where the Child Protective Investigation
Team (CPIT) did not convene within the
timeframe outlined in department policy, and
Department investigators did not
the department’s administrative review was not timely complete required documentation
designed to ensure that all key points of the case
while conducting investigations of the
were completed within the required timelines.
highest risk child abuse allegations.
We reviewed a sample of 27 cases
involving Priority 1 investigations to determine if department staff performed key investigative
procedures as required by department policy and state statute. Exhibit 1 highlights the key
procedures we analyzed.
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Exhibit 1
Department’s Investigative Process

Respond

•Child Abuse Hotline staff assign allegations a priority level and assign the case to
the region in which the abuse occurred or the child resides.
•Investigator makes face-to-face contact with the alleged child victim within 24
hours of referral for Priority 1 cases.

Submit FAST
Safety Assessment

•Investigator completes safety assessment tool to obtain recommendation regarding
need for immediate intervention.
•Investigator submits assessment for supervisor review within 5 calendar days of
referral.

Approve FAST
Safety Assessment

•Supervisor reviews and approves safety assessment within 3 business days of
submission.

Investigate

•Investigator
•Performs visit to home or site of incident.
•Determines nature, extent, and cause of harm.
•Identifies alleged perpetrator.
•Reviews prior allegations against the child’s caregiver.
•Identifies others in the home and conditions of other children in the home.
•Evaluates caregivers and home environment.
•Convenes CPIT if receive severe abuse allegation and document the outcome
of their review and the agreement or disagreement of each member.

Classify

•Investigators evaluate evidence and classify the case within 30 calendar days of
referral.
•Exceptions are allowed for severe abuse cases.

Closure

•Investigator completes case recordings and closing summary then submits the
case to the supervisor, and the supervisor reviews and approves the case for
closure.
•Investigator transfers cases if additional services are needed.
•Supervisor documents an explanation for delays and the plan for completing the
case if closure cannot occur within 60 days.
•Closure, transfer, or extension should be documented within 60 days of referral.

Source: Auditor created based on the department’s policy and state statute.

Conditions, Criteria, and Cause
Based on our review of the process above, we identified the following repeated and new
conditions.
Family Advocacy and Support Tool Safety Assessments (FAST Safety Assessments)
We found that for 9 of 27 cases (33%) tested, investigators did not submit the FAST Safety
Assessment within 5 business days. These assessments help determine whether a child is safe in
the current environment and are critical to swiftly address any safety concerns. Based on the
Protocol for the Completion of the Family Advocacy and Support Tool (FAST), the FAST Safety
Assessment must be submitted to the supervisor within 5 business days from the referral date.
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According to the Deputy Commissioner of the Office of Child Safety, 2 of these cases involved
delays in locating the family. For the remaining 7 cases, she indicated staff did not have
explanations for the delays. She also stated, “Some staff have difficulty prioritizing their daily
activities to include allocating time to enter documentation into TFACTS regularly.”
Timely Classifications
We found that for 2 of 27 cases (7%) tested, investigators did not classify the case within
30 days. Classification requires the investigator to have performed enough of the investigation to
determine the validity of the allegation. According to the department’s Policy 14.7, “Child
Protective Services Investigation Track,” allegations must be classified within 30 days of the
referral, but the policy allows exceptions for investigations marked as severe. These 2 cases were
not identified as severe and did not have other documented reasons for exceptions. The Deputy
Commissioner noted that these 2 cases involved difficulties locating and maintaining contact with
the family. We believe supervisors should document difficulties and expectations for completing
required investigation steps; one case progressed without contact with the family, and the other
included contact with the family prior to the date classification was due.
Case Closure, Transfer, and Extension
We found that for 10 of 27 cases (37%) tested, investigators did not close, transfer, or
extend the case within 60 days. The department’s Policy 14.7, “Child Protective Services
Investigation Track,” requires investigators to complete their responsibilities and close the case
within 60 calendar days. This policy also dictates that if an investigation is open beyond 60
calendar days, the supervisor should document an administrative review in TFACTS, assessing
the status of the case with an explanation for the delay and a plan for completing the case.
According to the Deputy Commissioner, delays in closures occurred because of issues with
coordinating with CPIT, court actions, and locating the family. Investigators can have cases open
longer than 60 days, but they must have documented supervisory approval, which did not occur
within 60 days for these cases. The Deputy Commissioner also noted that investigators caused
additional delays in closing cases by not closing the case before they were required to perform
another monthly face-to-face visit. When a case does not get closed, then it will require contact
with the family the next month before the case can be closed. These delays place an unnecessary
time burden on staff when they could be performing additional investigations. The Deputy
Commissioner also indicated that “staff turnover and vacancies can often impact timeframes and
compliance.” Management agreed with our results and are considering steps toward resolution.
Child Protective Investigative Team and Severe Abuse Cases
Documentation of the Child Protective Investigative Team Review Form
Of the 27 cases we reviewed, the department had 15 severe abuse cases, which require the
CPIT to convene. We found that for 3 of 15 severe cases (20%), investigators did not document a
completed and signed CPIT form, “CS-0561, Child Protective Investigative Team Review.” The
department’s Policy 14.6, “Child Protective Investigation Team,” requires this form for all severe
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abuse cases. These forms demonstrate that the child’s situation was examined from a variety of
perspectives, including legal, medical, and psychological. The form also notes any disagreements
among CPIT members. In two of these cases, the case manager documented the occurrence of the
CPIT meeting in TFACTS but did not upload the document; the third case only documented that
the meeting would occur. The Deputy Commissioner indicated these requirements changed with
improvements to TFACTS, and case managers struggled to upload the required documentation.
She stated that management needs to review current policy to clarify expectations and assess
potential duplicative requirements.
Convening of the Child Protective Investigation Team
We found that for 1 of 15 severe abuse cases (7%), investigators did not convene all
members of the CPIT immediately upon disclosure of sexual abuse. The child made allegations
of sexual abuse on July 5, 2017; according to the CPIT review form, the CPIT did not convene
until February 20, 2018. The department’s Policy 14.6, “Child Protective Investigation Team,”
stipulates that the CPIT must be convened upon notification of severe or sexual abuse allegations.
The Deputy Commissioner indicated that the department did not initially assign this case as an
investigation because the initial facts did not include severe abuse; however, because the child
made an allegation of sexual abuse when the case worker met with the child, the case was
immediately reassigned as an investigation. She also stated that although not explicitly
documented in the case notes, the “CPIT was convened,” and that the involvement of law
enforcement and the Child Advocacy Center in the case equated to the convening of CPIT at the
time the child disclosed sexual abuse. Department policy required the CPIT team, consisting of
the following partners, to convene immediately to address the immediate services needed for the
child and the family:
•

a member from the department’s Child Protective Services team;

•

a representative from the Office of the District Attorney General;

•

a juvenile court officer or investigator from a court or competent jurisdiction;

•

a law enforcement officer with countywide jurisdiction from the county where the child
resides or where the alleged abuse occurred; and

•

the Director of the Children’s Advocacy Center or designee.

For this case, however, the Child Advocacy Center, a required partner was not involved until
almost one month later.
Administrative Reviews
The department’s Policy 4.4, “Performance and Case Supervision Practice Guidelines and
Criteria,” states, “Supervisors are responsible for monitoring staff performance. They demonstrate
the skills and coach staff to work with families and children utilizing engagement, individualized
strategies, monitoring and accountability. Supervisors. . . [p]rovide constructive feedback and
intervene when performance does not meet agency expectations.”
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Although the department requires a supervisor’s review in order to close an investigation
case, we found that this review is not designed to ensure that all key points of the case are
completed within the required timelines. Supervisors should review cases throughout the course
of the case, document the review, and ensure investigators conduct investigations timely in
accordance with policy. The Deputy Commissioner stated that following the prior audit, they
revised policy regarding administrative reviews, but “this process was not as successful as
anticipated.” The Deputy Commissioner indicated management is again revising policy and
creating a new report to monitor compliance.
Risk Assessment
Given the problems identified during our fieldwork, we reviewed the department’s
December 2019 Financial Integrity Act Risk Assessment and determined that management did not
properly assess the risks of not maintaining documentation and/or not meeting key timeline
benchmarks during investigations as risks related to errors, fraud, waste, abuse, fiscal and
operational risks, and noncompliance with state law or other regulatory requirements so that
management could establish proper mitigating controls.
Department management is responsible for identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks
as outlined in the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government (Green Book) which sets internal control standards and is considered best
practice for nonfederal entities. Green Book Principle 7.01, “Identify, Analyze, and Respond to
Risks,” states,
Management should identify, analyze, and respond to risk related to achieving the
defined objectives.
Attributes
The following attributes contribute to the design, implementation, and operating
effectiveness of this principle:
•

Identification of Risks

•

Analysis of Risks

•

Response to Risks

Overall Effect
The quality and quantity of case documentation and the thoroughness of the investigation
are very closely related. Without quality documentation, top management cannot ensure
investigative staff have conducted thorough and timely investigations to support management’s
critical decisions about children’s safety.
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Recommendation
Management should ensure that all investigations are consistently and thoroughly
conducted, documented, reviewed, and closed, and that staff meet key investigative time
benchmarks. As a part of this effort, the department should continue to perform investigation
quality reviews.
Management should perform an adequate risk assessment to identify all risks associated
with fraud, waste, abuse, noncompliance, error of the department’s operations, and ability to meet
its mission. Management should then implement effective controls to address the risks noted in
this finding and based on an adequate risk assessment. As necessary, management should assign
staff to be responsible for ongoing monitoring of the risks and mitigating controls, and take action
if deficiencies occur.
Management’s Comment
We concur in part with this finding. However, the finding relates only to procedural issues
and is not indicative of children being left in unsafe situations. Documentation is one important
component to an investigation, but field work is critical to ensuring children are safe. The
department’s priority is always placed on the urgency to ensure child safety.
Family Advocacy and Support Tool Safety Assessments (FAST Safety Assessments)
The auditors’ comments on the Family Advocacy and Support Tool Safety Assessments
(FAST Safety Assessments) relate to documentation, not child safety. The FAST is a tool to guide
the investigator and provide a measure of consistency in decision making related to safety.
However, assessing child safety is ongoing. It begins at the point a referral comes to the
department and continues until the case is closed. Priority response times are met consistently in
the 90 percentiles, which is a key point in assessing child safety. To address timely completion of
the FAST, a performance measure for Child Protective Services staff and supervisors has been
developed and will be added to the 2021 performance review cycle.
Timely Classifications
Office of Child Safety management has already implemented strategies that are showing
improved outcomes, including specialized training and a focus on documentation and global
assessments. In addition, requiring timely classification will be included in the individual
performance plans for the 2021 performance cycle.
Case Closure, Transfer, and Extension
Office of Child Safety management was proactive and updated policy 4.4 on October 6,
2020 to address this issue, adding:
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If an investigation is open beyond sixty (60) calendar days, the LI (lead investigator)
documents an administrative review in TFACTS, including an explanation for the delay
and a plan for completing the case.
Additionally, there will be enhanced training for supervisors to ensure case extensions are
documented within TFACTS.
Child Protective Investigative Teams and Severe Abuse Cases
Office of Child Safety management has reviewed the expectations as outlined in policy.
While policy has provided that documents are to be uploaded, specific documents are not
delineated. To remedy this, Work Aid 3 was updated in July 2020 to include the expectation for
uploading the CPIT form.
Management does not concur that in one of the severe abuse cases reviewed by the auditors
“investigators did not convene the CPIT immediately upon disclosure of sexual abuse.” This was
disputed with the auditors during the audit process. The case was initially assigned as an
assessment but reassigned to an investigation on the same day. The opening summary of the
documentation indicates the District Attorney was notified per local protocol and law enforcement
was involved and working with the CPS investigator on July 5, 2017, the day the abuse allegation
was reported. The notification to the DA, the presence of law enforcement, and the documentation
supporting the involvement of the CAC, all constitutes not only a functional “convening” of CPIT,
but also highlights the typical coordination of efforts during the investigative process.
Administrative Reviews
Office of Child Safety management was proactive and updated Policy 4.4 on October 6,
2020, to mandate all supervisors enter administrative reviews into TFACTS and eliminate the
options for multiple points of data entry. This action was followed by the creation of the
Administrative Review Report, which will be extracted from Safe Measures to measure for
compliance.
Additionally, management updated the Quality Review Tool to specify administrative
reviews be completed with specified timeframes outlined in policy and to clarify and measure
expectations. The updates will be reflected in case reviews conducted in the first quarter of 2021.
Auditor’s Comment
Management has established procedures to ensure children are not left in unsafe situations
and should ensure that they maintain documentation to show that their staff follow the critical
procedures.
As required by the department’s Policy 14.6, “Child Protective Investigation Team,”
management must ensure all required partners are included in CPIT meetings to discuss the case
to determine the necessary services for the alleged child victim and family.
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CHILD PROTECTIVE INVESTIGATION TEAMS
Background
Child Protective Investigation Teams are statutorily defined as multi-disciplinary teams
composed of key members in the community who work together to review the department’s
investigations of severe child abuse to ensure child safety and support. Section 37-1-607,
Tennessee Code Annotated, requires the department to “coordinate the services of child protective
teams” and indicates that teams will be composed of the following:
•

one person from the Department of Children’s Services;

•

one representative from the office of the district attorney general;

•

one juvenile court officer or investigator from a court of competent jurisdiction;

•

one properly trained law enforcement officer with countywide jurisdiction from the
county where the child resides or where the alleged offense occurred;

•

a Child Advocacy Center (CAC) director, or designee, in areas where a CAC is located;
and

•

an optional additional member from the mental health discipline.

Statute further requires each county to have a CPIT team. According to the Tennessee
Child Protective Investigation Team (CPIT) Protocol Guidelines, “The need for a statewide
standardization of CPIT practices was noted in the Second Look Commission’s 2011 Annual
Report.” In order to develop standards and take other steps to help CPITs across the state work
more consistently and effectively, the department created the CPIT Advisory Board in 2014. In
May 2017, the CPIT Advisory Board issued the Statewide CPIT Protocol Guidelines to outline
standards of practice for the state’s CPITs, including responsibilities of the various members of
the CPIT and procedures for CPIT meetings.
On September 9, 2019, the CPIT Advisory Board voted to disband and merge with the
CPIT Committee of the Tennessee Joint Task Force on Children’s Justice and Child Sexual Abuse
(Joint Task Force). According to the Executive Director of the Office of Child Safety, the members
and functions of this committee and the Advisory Board were the same. The department was
tasked with creating the Joint Task Force, composed of representatives from other state agencies.
Section 37-1-603, Tennessee Code Annotated, indicates the Joint Task Force is responsible for
“Developing a plan of action for better coordination and integration of the goals, activities, and
funding of the department pertaining to the detection, intervention, prevention, and treatment of
child sexual abuse.” The CPIT Committee of the Joint Task Force supports and provides protocols
and training for CPIT members.
Results of Prior Audit
In the department’s November 2016 performance audit, we reported that the CPIT
Advisory Board had not established standardized statewide protocols. Additionally, we found
little documentation to demonstrate that the board had made significant progress since its initial
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2014 meeting. The board met only two times in 2015, and attendance was low at those board
meetings.
Audit Results
Audit Objective: In response to the prior audit finding, did the department issue statewide
protocols for Child Protective Investigation Teams (CPITs)?
Conclusion:

Through the CPIT Advisory Board, the department issued statewide protocols
for CPITs. The advisory board disbanded in favor of the CPIT Committee of
the Tennessee Joint Task Force on Children’s Justice and Child Sexual Abuse,
which performs the same functions.

CASE MANAGER CASELOADS
Background
To fulfill the Department of Children’s Services responsibilities as Tennessee’s public
child welfare agency, management employs approximately 1,800 case managers across 12 regions
and the central office. Through the service of case managers, the department investigates
allegations of child abuse and neglect; administers the state’s foster-care system; works to find
permanency for the children and youth who come into its care; and serves youth that the courts
have determined to be delinquent.
Section 37-5-132(a), Tennessee Code Annotated, sets maximum caseload standards for the
department’s regional 23 staff working these cases. Effective July 1, 2018, the statute states,
The department shall maintain staffing levels of case managers so that each region
has enough case managers to allow caseloads not to exceed an average of:
(1) Twenty (20) active cases relating to initial assessments, including investigations
of an allegation of child abuse or neglect; or
(2) Twenty (20) children monitored and supervised in active cases relating to
ongoing services.
Case managers are the departmental staff who are assigned “cases” related to the support
of children and the families who, based on circumstances, come into contact with and need services
through the department. Case managers have the responsibility to manage each case to ensure the
best outcome for the children and their families, and high caseloads may impact and even limit
their ability to obtain the best outcome.

The department conducts operations from 12 regional offices in addition to a central office. When assessing
caseloads, the department also separately identifies Special Investigations caseloads. Special Investigations cases
address “allegations of abuse and neglect where it involves an employee or volunteer acting as a caregiver in schools,
day cares or foster homes,” according to the department’s annual report.
23
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To ensure compliance with the state law, the Office of Continuous Quality Improvement
(CQI) program manager stated that he begins his monthly process by reviewing the Caseload
Summary report, which he generates monthly in OBIEE 24 based on the data from one day’s
caseload count in a particular month. This one-day caseload summary includes the number and
type of cases held by each case manager on that specific day. As part of his monthly process, the
CQI program manager separates cases into the following types: Social Services; Juvenile Justice;
Foster Care Intervention Program and In-home; Child Protective Services Investigation; and Child
Protective Services Assessment. Depending on the case type, one case is equivalent to one child
or a family with one or more children.
The CQI program manager explained that the department’s process and methodology to
monitor caseloads has been established to obtain caseload data from one day in each month. For
the selected day in the month, the program manager captures the caseload numbers across all
regions and reports the data by case type, region, and caseload manager. The program manager
then calculates an average of the number of cases by region and case type; the calculation
represents the average number of cases within the region. According to the CQI program manager,
he provides this summary and calculated averages to management for their review to ensure
compliance with state statute. In addition, he provides management with actual caseload counts
data for each case manager with a focus on the caseload counts greater than 20 cases. The program
manager uses his summaries and calculations for the single day each month to prepare the
department’s internal, monthly Caseload Compliance and Averages report. The department also
uses OBIEE to generate data to present caseload information in its annual report, which is required
by statute (Section 37-5-105, Tennessee Code Annotated) to be provided to the Governor, the
General Assembly, and other relevant entities and is available on the department’s website.
Audit Results
Audit Objective: Did the department analyze caseloads to ensure compliance with state statute?
Conclusion:

We found that department staff analyzed caseload counts and reported an
average of caseloads for each region for the selected day each month for the
year. See Observation 2 for additional information about the department’s
caseload data. We also found that state statute does not provide clarity as to
period of time the department should use to calculate the average caseload for
the region (e.g. monthly, quarterly, annually, etc.). The department used one
day each month to calculate the average for the region for a total of 12 days
each year. See Matter for Legislative Consideration.

Observation 2 – Management should improve their process to monitor case managers’ caseload
counts
Section 37-5-132(a), Tennessee Code Annotated, as noted above, requires the Department
of Children’s Services to maintain staff within each region to ensure that caseloads do not exceed
The department uses the Oracle Business Intelligence Suite Enterprise Edition (OBIEE) system to gather, store, and
provide access to TFACTS data.
24
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an average of 20 cases. The statute did not provide a specific time period for the department to
determine the average caseloads (see Matter for Legislative Consideration on page 52). In the
absence of a specified time period, according to management, to comply with this requirement, the
department performs an analysis of caseload counts based on one day for each month to determine
compliance with the statute.
Based on the department’s caseload analysis, each region has maintained an average
caseload of 20 cases. While the department’s regional averages were 20 active cases or below, we
found that the department’s caseload data showed that between 18.5% and 28.8% 25 of the
department’s case managers carried more than 20 cases based on the day chosen by the department.
We also performed a separate review of the department’s caseload summaries maintained
by the Office of Child Programs management and staff, and we found 252 case managers carried
more than 20 cases for at least 6 months, 125 case managers carried more than 20 cases for at least
9 months, and 33 case managers carried more than 20 cases in all 12 months of 2019. See Table
9 and Chart 2 below for the number of staff carrying actual caseloads at or below the allowed
average and caseloads above the allowed average. We also identified for the staff that carried
more than 20 cases, that there were case managers (6 in one month and 35 in another month) that
carried 40 or more cases on at least one day for the year. See Appendix 8.
Table 9
Staff Caseload Count for Calendar Year 2019
Based on the Department’s Method of One Day Each Month
1-20 Cases
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

Staff
1,479
1,455
1,462
1,443
1,464
1,523
1,646
1,590
1,567
1,544
1,502
1,533

% of Staff
83.0%
82.2%
81.6%
80.0%
81.2%
83.8%
89.4%
87.1%
85.9%
84.9%
81.0%
82.1%

21+ Cases
Staff
302
314
329
360
338
294
196
235
257
275
353
334

% of Staff
17.0%
17.8%
18.4%
20.0%
18.8%
16.2%
10.6%
12.9%
14.1%
15.1%
19.0%
17.9%

Source: Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System reports from the
Department of Children’s Services
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We obtained this information from the department’s monthly Caseload Compliance and Averages reports.
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Chart 2
Number of Caseload Managers With More Than 20 Cases Based on One Day in Each
Month For Calendar Year 2019
Based on the Department’s Method

302

314

329

360

353

338
294
235

257

334

275

196

Source: Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System reports from the Department of Children’s
Services.

As a result of our expanded review and the fact that some case managers carry more than
20 cases for longer periods, we question whether the department’s method to analyze caseloads
for one day a month provides sufficient data for management to mitigate the risk that case
managers within a region will carry a higher number of actual cases while the region as a whole
can still meet an average maximum of 20 active cases.
When case managers carry higher caseloads for long periods of time, management
increases the risk that case managers may not have sufficient time to perform all required functions
for each case. To illustrate, we identified that cases managers were not completing required faceto-face visits with children; see Finding 1. High caseloads also increase staff burdens and could
lead to increased turnover.
Based on our many discussions with management, management told us they are committed
to following state statute and providing the best outcomes possible to children and families. We
recommend that management consider expanding the methodology to review caseload counts
beyond 12 days a year to gain better data for management’s analysis. Management should continue
to monitor case managers who have a higher number of cases over longer periods of time to avoid
case manager burnout, turnover, and/or instances where the case manager does not have sufficient
time to perform all required functions.
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Matter for Legislative Consideration
Section 37-5-132, Tennessee Code Annotated, requires the department to maintain staffing
levels within a region to ensure a maximum average caseload of 20 cases. State statute, however,
does not identify what time period (monthly, quarterly, annual) the department
should use to determine this average.
When management elects to use a longer time period for the average, such
as an annual average, management risks case managers carrying a higher number of
actual cases for an extended period of time while still meeting the maximum average caseload of
20 cases. The General Assembly may wish to consider amending statutory language to define the
time period for the average caseload calculation (monthly, quarterly, annual).
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Providers, Licensed Facilities,
and Wilder Youth
Development Center

Providers, Licensed Facilities, and Wilder Youth
Development Center
Office of Continuous Quality Improvement
The Office of
Department of
Children’s Services
Continuous
Quality
Improvement focuses on
assessing child welfare
practices, outcomes, and
Office of Continuous
Quality Improvement
compliance by using data
and analysis to guide and
change policies and
practices for casework
Provider Monitoring
Child Welfare Licensing
Provider Quality Team
Division
staff
to
improve and Evaluation Division
outcomes for families.
To do this, the Department of Children’s Services uses internal and external reviews of providers
and licensed facilities; it also works with accreditation entities that accredit public child welfare
agencies.
Although the Provider Monitoring and Evaluation Division, the Child Welfare Licensing
Division, and the Provider Quality Team operate separately, they depend on each other to
accomplish the department’s mission to “Provide high quality prevention and support services to
children and families that promote safety, permanency and well-being.” While Provider
Monitoring and Evaluation is responsible for monitoring the department’s contracted providers,
Child Welfare Licensing is responsible for ensuring that child welfare agencies obtain a license to
operate and comply with state statutes and department rules. Often, both divisions monitor the
same agencies, and their monitoring and licensing reviews overlap. The divisions regularly work
together to ensure providers and licensed agencies are complying with statute, rules, and contracts.
Any observations of significant deviations from compliance requirements are then referred to the
Provider Quality Team. Together, the three units make decisions on whether the department
should take adverse action against or increase monitoring of providers and licensed agencies to
ensure compliance.
Office of Juvenile Justice
The Office of Juvenile Justice supervises
the John S. Wilder Youth Development Center
(Wilder), which is a state-owned secure residential
facility that provides supervision and care for delinquent male youth, ages 13 to 18, in need of the
highest level of security. Youth placed at Wilder have committed serious and/or violent felonies,
and community safety requires that they be placed in a structured and secure environment. Wilder
is the only youth development center in Tennessee.
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The Office of Juvenile Justice’s corporals, sergeants, lieutenants, and administrative
personnel provide oversight at Wilder to ensure staff are complying with federal standards and
department policies and procedures.
We focused our audit work on management’s and staff’s responsibilities for provider and
licensed facilities, Wilder Youth Development Center, restrictive behavior management
techniques, and investigations of provider employees and Wilder Youth Development Center
employees.

PROVIDER AND LICENSED FACILITIES
Background
Provider Monitoring and Evaluation
The Provider Monitoring and Evaluation Division
(monitoring division) provides both scheduled and
unscheduled annual contract monitoring for performancebased contracts, subrecipient contracts, and family
preservation contracts. The monitoring division conducts
performance-based contract monitoring to ensure providers
comply with provider contracts and department rules and
policies. The Department of Children’s Services partners
with the Vanderbilt University Center of Excellence to
maintain a database of all the department’s monitoring results and to issue final monitoring reports
to the contractors. During the state fiscal year 2019 review cycle, the monitoring division
completed over 140 contract monitoring reviews of approximately 75 contract providers. Each
review was classified into one of three main categories:
•

custodial placement services (such as group homes, foster homes, and residential
homes);

•

non-custodial services (such as Community-Based Child Abuse Prevention, Children’s
Advocacy, and Juvenile Justice Prevention); and

•

regionally based family preservation services (domestic violence, therapeutic
supervised visitation, and family intervention services).

Monitoring of Licensed Child Welfare Agencies
According to the department’s website, the Child Welfare Licensing Division (licensing
division) “strives to protect the interests, health, and safety of Tennessee’s children and families
by providing information, advice, and support; and by establishing and applying effective
standards to regulate Tennessee’s child welfare agencies.” Licensed child welfare agencies
include family boarding and group care homes, child placing agencies, residential child caring
agencies, maternity homes, runaway shelters, child abuse prevention agencies, temporary holding
resources, and juvenile detention centers. See Appendix 9 for a description of each licensed child
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welfare agency. The licensing division also licenses private facilities known as hardware-secure
residential child caring agencies (RCCAs), which are residential placement facilities that house
delinquent youth in state custody. As of June 2020, the department licensed two RCCAs: (1)
Mountain View Academy for Young Men, located in Dandridge, Tennessee and (2) Hollis
Residential Treatment Center (for young women) located inside the Middle Tennessee Juvenile
Detention Center in Columbia, Tennessee.
Each license type has specific criteria that
constitute the legal basis of licensing. The licensing
division’s staff conduct announced annual
inspections and unannounced spot check
inspections, and they investigate reports of abuse
and deficiencies in licensed child welfare agencies.
The staff use checklists with the different criteria for
each license type when they perform monitoring
reviews to ensure review of key areas. For example,
the licensing division provides targeted monitoring
of the use of seclusion, restraint, and chemical
defense agents at juvenile detention facilities, and reviews staffing at juvenile detention centers to
ensure facilities are complying with a 1:8 staff-to-child ratio during resident waking hours and a
1:16 staff-to-child ratio during resident sleeping hours, as required by department Rule 0250-0408-.07 (8) and the federal Prison Rape Elimination Act.
After staff complete the licensing monitoring reviews, they complete a Licensure Notice
of Compliance Review Corrective Action and Approval Status Form, which includes a summary
of the site inspection; any noted problems or concerns; checked boxes to indicate the type of
documents and files requested and reviewed; and the staff’s approval decision. Staff submit the
review summary to the Licensing Division Director for review and approval. Once the Director
approves the summary, the department issues the agency a valid license that is good for one year.
According to the department, all contracted private providers must comply with department
policies and procedures, as well as specific terms outlined in their respective contracts. The
Provider Monitoring and Evaluation Division ensures providers are compliant and accountable.
Provider Employee Background Checks
For all potential provider employees applying to work with children, state statute and
departmental policy requires provider agencies to conduct fingerprint checks from both the
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and to check the
Department of Health’s vulnerable persons registry (abuse registry). The department’s Contract
Provider Manual, Section 1, “Core Standards,” states that provider agencies must adhere to the
department’s Policy 4.1, “Employee Background Checks.” Departmental policy requires
additional pre-hire checks, including checks of local criminal records, driving records, the national
sex offender registry, and the Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System (TFACTS).
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The Provider Monitoring and Evaluation Division annually monitors providers’ personnel
files on-site to determine if the agencies conducted pre-hire background checks on their
employees. Monitors document the results of their reviews on a standardized paper monitoring
form called the personnel tool. The personnel tool has a section with eight questions (yes, no, or
not applicable) related to the pre-hire background checks.
Audit Results
1. Audit Objective: Did the Office of Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) monitor providers
for compliance with state statutes, department rules, and contract
requirements?
Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, CQI monitored providers for compliance with state
statutes, department rules, and contract requirements, with minor exceptions.

2. Audit Objective: Did CQI staff monitor pre-hire background checks of provider employees to
ensure the providers completed the checks before the employees started
working?
Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, CQI monitors did not accurately analyze the results
of the provider employee background checks. See Finding 4. Additionally,
the department’s Records Officer accidently destroyed a monitor’s file that
included results of the background checks. See Finding 8.

3. Audit Objective: Did CQI monitor and inspect licensed agencies for compliance with state
licensure requirements and department rules?
Conclusion:

Based on our review, CQI did not maintain documentation to support the
conclusion that juvenile detention centers met staffing ratios. See Finding
5. In addition, CQI did not have a sufficient supervisory review process to
ensure staff performed a complete and accurate monitoring review and that
staff maintained documentation that they had monitored key areas of the
licensed agencies. See Observation 3 and Observation 4.

Finding 4 – Management did not have a sufficient monitoring process to document and
analyze that provider agencies had performed all required background checks for provider
employees before they were hired
Condition
Based on our testwork, we found that management did not have a sufficient monitoring
process to document and analyze that provider agencies had performed all required background
checks for provider employees before they were hired. We found that management had not
designed the personnel tool to sufficiently ensure Provider Monitoring and Evaluation monitoring
staff documented their results when analyzing pre-hire checks of the providers’ employees.
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Specifically, we found that monitors did not consistently document the background check
dates on the personnel tool and did not identify when provider agencies had not performed
background checks before hiring their employees. In addition, even though the department has a
supervisory review of monitoring activities, the supervisor would not have identified these
deficiencies because the reviewer does not look at the background check dates as part of the
review.
We selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 17 provider monitoring files for our
testwork; however, we were unable to review 1 of the files because management had improperly
destroyed the file prior to our request (see Finding 8). Based on our review of the remaining 16
provider monitoring files, which included 77 provider employees, we found that monitors did not
properly document and analyze the results of various pre-hire checks for 33 of 77 provider
employees tested (43%). See Table 10 for the specific deficiencies we identified.
Table 10
Monitoring Deficiencies for Provider Employee Background Checks
for October 1, 2016, Through June 20, 2020

Deficiency
Identified
Incorrect Check
Date
Check Date Not
Documented
Section Left
Blank
No
Documentation

Local
TBI/FBI
Driving
Criminal
Fingerprint
Record
Background
17 of 77
13 of 77
21 of 77
provider
provider
provider
employees
employees employees
(22%)
(17%)
(27%)

National Sex
Offender
Registry
14 of 77
provider
employees
(18%)

Abuse
Registry

TFACTS

13 of 77
6 of 77
provider
provider
employees employees
(17%)
(8%)

10

7

10

5

5

1

7

5

4

9

8

4

-

1

-

-

-

1

-

-

7

-

-

-

In addition, due to mistakes in the monitor’s documentation or the lack of documentation,
we found that for 7 of 33 provider employees (21%) noted in Table 10, management could not
provide evidence that monitors actually confirmed that the required criminal background,
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and Federal Bureau of Investigation fingerprint, national sex
offender, abuse registry, or TFACTS checks were performed before the provider employee started
work.
Based on our further review of the providers’ documentation, we found instances where
the providers had performed some of the required checks after their employees had started work;
however, the department’s monitors had not identified the late checks as deficiencies requiring
providers’ corrective action.
We reperformed the checks for the sex offender registry, abuse registry, and TFACTS, and
we did not find disqualifying information on any of the provider employees in our sample.
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Risk Assessment
Given the problems identified during our fieldwork, we reviewed the department’s
December 2019 Financial Integrity Act Risk Assessment and determined that management did not
properly assess monitoring for provider employee background checks for any potential risks of
errors, fraud, waste, abuse, fiscal and operational risks, and noncompliance with state law or other
regulatory requirements.
Department management is responsible for identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks
over monitoring for provider employee background checks. The U.S. Government Accountability
Office’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book) sets internal
control standards and is considered best practice for nonfederal entities. Green Book Principle
7.01, “Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Risks,” states,
Management should identify, analyze, and respond to risk related to achieving the
defined objectives.
Attributes
The following attributes contribute to the design, implementation, and operating
effectiveness of this principle:
•

Identification of Risks

•

Analysis of Risks

•

Response to Risks

Criteria
Section 37-5-511(a), Tennessee Code Annotated, states,
Each person . . . [a]pplying to work with children as a paid employee with a child
care agency . . . shall submit to a criminal history records check to be conducted
through the Tennessee bureau of investigation . . . and the federal bureau of
investigation, and shall submit to a review of such person’s status on the department
of health’s vulnerable persons registry.
The department’s Contract Provider Manual, Section 1, “Core Standards,” states that
provider agencies must adhere to the department’s Policy 4.1, “Employee Background Checks.”
Departmental policy requires additional pre-hire checks, including checks of local criminal
records, driving records, the national sex offender registry, and TFACTS.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government (Green Book) provides guidance to management for using quality
information to achieve the entity’s objectives. According to Principle 16, “Perform Monitoring
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Activities,” “Management evaluates and documents the results of ongoing monitoring and separate
evaluations to identify internal control issues.”
Cause
We discussed our concerns with management, who stated they did not expect or require
their monitors to document the details of their review on the personnel tool.
Management did provide us a response for each type of problem we noted. We provided
additional comments when necessary.
Check Date Incorrectly Documented – Management stated that this discrepancy mainly
happens with third-party background checks used by private providers. These types of checks
differ in format but usually contain three different dates: (1) the date of the request, (2) the date
the entire report was completed, and (3) the date each individual check was completed. Monitors
are trained to look at the date individual checks were completed (3) and not necessarily the dates
in (1) and (2). In our testwork, however, we assessed background checks based on the entire
background report (2) because providers would not have complete information on their employees
until the third party completes and returns the entire report to the provider, which occurs later than
individual check results.
Management also stated that specific dates for each background check result can be
difficult to ascertain because of the varied format of the third-party reports. In our current audit
testwork, we found multiple check date discrepancies. Management could not identify a specific
reason for the third-party documentation discrepancies.
Check Date Not Documented – Management stated that although it is a common and
reasonable practice for monitors to write the date for each check on the personnel tool, it is not an
explicit requirement.
Section Left Blank – For one file, the monitor left the fingerprint and TFACTS sections
blank. Management stated they could not determine why those two fields were left blank.
Unable to Verify Check Dates – One provider agency did not provide any driving record
checks for seven provider employees. Of those seven driving record checks, only two were dated
by the monitor and the remaining five did not include a documented date. We contacted the
provider agency multiple times to request copies of the driving checks; however, they did not
provide evidence for the checks. When we addressed our concerns with management,
management indicated that they do not think this missing provider information is a problem.
However, the contract requires the providers to maintain this documentation and produce it upon
the department’s or the Comptroller’s Office’s request.
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Effect

Failing to conduct even one
background check—or conducting
those checks after the employee
already gained unsupervised
access to a child—could pose
significant safety hazards resulting
in abuse or neglect.

When Provider Monitoring and Evaluation
monitors do not completely and accurately document
the results of provider employee background checks,
management cannot be certain that staff fulfilled their
responsibilities for ensuring providers met
background and safety checks. Failing to conduct
even one criminal background check; sex offender,
abuse, or other type of registry check; or driving
record check—or conducting those checks after the employee already gained unsupervised access
to a child—could pose significant safety hazards resulting in abuse or neglect.
Recommendation
The Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Continuous Quality
Improvement, and the Director of Provider Monitoring and Evaluation should ensure that monitors
1. carefully document on the personnel tool all critical aspects of their reviews for
provider background and safety checks, and
2. identify background checks that were not completed before the provider employee
started work.
Management should perform an adequate risk assessment to identify risks associated with
fraud, waste, abuse, noncompliance, error of the department’s operations, and mission.
Management should then implement effective controls, based on an adequate risk assessment, to
address the risks noted in this finding. As necessary, management should assign staff to be
responsible for ongoing monitoring of the risks and mitigating controls, and take action if
deficiencies occur.
Management’s Comment
We concur in part with this finding.
The department does not concur that Program Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) staff did
not accurately analyze the results of the provider employee background checks. PME staff use a
check-off process for documentation. Monitors are trained to review private providers’ personnel
file documentation to determine (1) that the specific check was completed; (2) when the check was
completed; (3) if the date completed was prior to the date of hire in accordance with DCS policy
4.1; and (4) that check results did not show any history that would make the employee ineligible
for hire. The monitor marks “yes” or “no” to indicate compliance or non-compliance. Writing the
date each check was completed on the monitoring tool is a common and reasonable practice among
monitors but has previously not been an explicit requirement to complete the tool.
Management concurs that the data show that date discrepancies on background checks
primarily occurred with private providers that use third-party vendors to complete the background
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check process. Private providers are permitted to use third-party vendors to run local criminal,
driving, sex offender, abuse registry, and other checks and verifications required before hiring an
employee. While background checks completed by third-party vendors are not standardized and
differ in format, management will continue to allow providers to use third-party vendors so as not
to place a burden on the providers.
Management concurs that PME staff should have stronger documentation of dates on the
monitoring tool. Several immediate solutions have already been implemented, including
mandatory date fields to detail when the check was completed. Additionally, the date of the
completed check can now be entered into the RedCap electronic database in a comment section.
PME is working with Vanderbilt University Center for Excellence to build an enhancement within
the RedCap system that would automatically verify compliance for dates entered for each check
against the employee’s hire date as an additional level of oversight.
Auditor’s Comment
Although management states the PME staff have a process to monitor provider compliance,
the process was not sufficient to ensure PME staff identified providers that hired employees before
obtaining background checks in violation of policy.
Finding 5 – Licensing Division staff did not maintain documentation to support the
conclusion that juvenile detention centers met staffing ratios
The Office of Continuous Quality Improvement’s Licensing Division is required to
complete annual site visits at licensed agencies to assess the agencies’ compliance with licensing
requirements and to ensure safe conditions and effective interventions within child welfare
agencies. Based on our review, we found that the Licensing Division’s staff did not maintain
documentation to support the conclusion that juvenile detention centers met staffing ratios.
Condition and Criteria
We reviewed the Licensing Division’s annual reviews of the juvenile detention centers
and noted that licensing staff did not include supporting evidence in the monitoring/licensure
review working papers to support their conclusion that the facilities met the staffing requirements
outlined in the department rules. Rule 0250-04-08-.07(8), “Minimum Standards for Juvenile
Detention Centers and Temporary Holding Resources,” requires at least 1 direct care staff for every
8 youth (a 1:8 ratio) during waking hours, at least 1 direct care staff for every 16 youth (a 1:16
ratio) during sleeping hours, and never less than 2 direct care staff on duty at any time.
Cause
Based on discussions with management and licensing staff, they rely on a checklist form
to document that staffing levels were reviewed; however, staff did not include details of their
recalculations of staff-to-child ratios or other pertinent evidence to support a facility’s compliance
with the state staffing rules. Therefore, we could not determine if staff performed the necessary
procedures to ensure the facilities complied with the staffing ratios outlined in the department rule.
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Effect
Without maintaining documentation that juvenile detention centers’ staffing ratios
complied with state rules, the Licensing Division cannot provide evidence to the General
Assembly, the Comptroller’s Office, or the public that juvenile detention centers maintained
enough staff to provide a safe environment for youth and staff.
Recommendation
The Commissioner and the Licensing Division Director should ensure staff maintain
documentation to support their conclusions that juvenile detention centers complied with the
required staffing ratios specified in the department’s rule.
Management’s Comment
We concur with this finding.
To address this issue, we have developed standard operating procedures to ensure
consistent documentation of all ratio reviews and sampling. Effective September 1, 2020, a
standard tool was developed to be used by all licensing staff to document all information regarding
records reviewed for ratio compliance, including dates, census information, and total direct care
staff as noted in staffing rosters that will be maintained in the licensing file.
While management has taken immediate steps to improve documentation, we would like
to note that the department does monitor ratios at juvenile detention centers. These procedures
were in place and followed prior to the audit finding. Staffing ratios were actively monitored by
licensing consultants during onsite reviews, and findings in this area are noted in subsequent
licensing evaluation summaries. The juvenile detention centers have been monitored by the DCS
Division of Licensing and our evaluations have reflected consistently that, barring occasional
isolated incidents, staff to student ratios at these facilities are not systemically problematic,
regardless of the size or structure of the facility.
Observation 3 – Licensing Division management had not developed formal policies and
procedures for supervisory reviews and documentation requirements
Department of Children’s Services management is responsible for establishing internal
controls to achieve the department’s mission and vision. Based on best practices and internal
control guidance, we expected management to have a well-designed internal control for the
licensure review process and to adopt the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book). The Green Book provides guidance
for assessing and designing internal controls. According to Principle 3, “Establish Structure,
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Responsibility, and Authority,” management is responsible for developing and maintaining
documentation of its internal control system. 26
Based on our review of the annual licensure monitoring process, we found that
management has not developed policies and procedures governing key aspects of the licensing
process, including conducting supervisory reviews and maintaining sufficient documentation of
completed annual license reviews of licensed agencies.
Supervisory Reviews Were Not Documented
We found that the Licensing Division management could not provide evidence of sufficient
supervisory review of staff’s decision that the agencies met the licensure requirements.
Specifically, we found that the Director of Licensing
did not document his supervisory review of the
“Licensing Division management
Licensure Notice of Compliance Review Corrective
Action and Approval Status Form and that, based on
could not provide evidence of
our discussions, the Director did not review staff’s
sufficient supervisory review of
monitoring files to ensure the accuracy of the files
staff’s decision that the agencies
and the resulting summaries. Management stated
met the licensure requirements.”
and the Director confirmed that he and staff were in
constant communication with the licensed agencies
during the licensing process, and that the Director was aware of staff’s decisions to approve
licenses. Based on our discussions, management relies on the Director and staff to perform all
responsibilities within the licensure process and thus does not perform any additional supervisory
or quality reviews to ensure the licensing Director and staff ensuring agencies are indeed meeting
licensure requirements. We discussed the lack of documentation to substantiate the Director’s
reviews with top management, and they stated that the Director’s signature on the license indicated
that he had reviewed and accepted the site review summary. We expected the Director to indicate
his supervisory review on the review summary or within the monitoring files as evidence of his
review and that his review includes, at a minimum, some periodic review of the supporting
documentation for the license summaries.
Key Documentation Not Maintained
We selected a sample of 80 of the Licensing Division’s annual inspection monitoring files
for our testwork; however, the department improperly destroyed 2 of the files and partially
destroyed 1 file before our request. (See Finding 8 for more information about the department’s
records management and records destructions practices.) Based on our review of the 77 remaining
files, we noted that in 13 files, the licensing staff did not retain documentation to support their
conclusions that the agencies met the licensing criteria. Specifically, we found staff did not include
the following documentation in the files:
26

Paragraph 3.10 of the Green Book goes on to state, “Effective documentation assists in management’s design of
internal control by establishing and communicating the who, what, when, where, and why of internal control execution
to personnel. Documentation also provides a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk of having
that knowledge limited to a few personnel, as well as a means to communicate that knowledge as needed to external
parties, such as external auditors.”
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•

agency staff qualifications checklists;

•

board member rotation and minutes;

•

financial audits documentation;

•

estimated budgets; and

•

fire, health, and safety inspections.

Management disagreed with our conclusions and stated that they had not established formal
policies and procedures requiring supervisors to conduct reviews or staff to maintain
documentation to support licensing decisions. Management further stated that they fully rely on
employees to perform their responsibilities and thus should not be required to document the
supervisory review of the licensing staff’s evidence to support a facility’s compliance with state
rules.
When management has not designed controls to include a sufficient supervisory review of
staff’s work, there is an increased risk that the department will issue a license to an agency that
does not meet the licensure requirements set forth in department policy or state statute. If agencies
do not meet these requirements, their clients could be affected by service deficiencies and
ineffective interventions, which would adversely affect the department’s ability to accomplish its
mission and keep children safe.
We offer that management should formally document all key processes to ensure business
operations can continue through unexpected events, changes, or personnel turnover.
Observation 4 – The department’s contract requirements for hardware-secure residential child
caring agencies contradict the department’s rule governing staffing levels
The department contracts with the Mountain View Academy for Young Men and Hollis
Residential Treatment Center to provide services to delinquent youth. Both facilities are licensed
as hardware-secure residential child caring agencies (RCCAs) and must follow the department’s
Contract Provider Manual 27 and the department’s RCCA rule for staffing levels to maintain their
licenses.
Based on our review of the department’s provider manual and the departmental rule, we
noted that the department’s provider manual did not align with the department’s rule for staffing
requirements for RCCAs.
Department Rule 0250-4-5-.07(1)(b), “Standards for Residential Child Caring Agencies,”
states that “there must be at least one (1) staff member for every eight (8) children in care.” The
Contract Provider Manual, however, states that, for providers such as Mountain View and Hollis
that serve delinquent youth, there must be at least one direct care staff for every eight youth during
waking hours and at least one direct care staff for every sixteen youth during sleeping hours.
27

A document that outlines the responsibilities and requirements of service provision for the contract provider
network.
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With conflicting staffing level guidance, the department increases the risk that hardwaresecure RCCAs will not meet required staff levels to properly supervise children at the facilities.
The Commissioner and management should promptly determine the appropriate staffing ratio
requirements for hardware-secure RCCAs and should take appropriate steps to align all guidance
for the facilities.

WILDER YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER
Background
The John S. Wilder Youth Development Center (Wilder) is owned and operated by the
Department of Children’s Services, and it provides the highest level of hardware-secure residential
placements 28 for male youth who the courts have found to have committed a minimum of two
felonies, with one of those felonies involving another person.
Staffing Level Requirements
Hardware-secure residential facilities, such as Wilder, must comply with the federal Prison
Rape Elimination Act (PREA), which outlines the standards to prevent, detect, and respond to rape
at juvenile facilities. PREA standards require facilities to maintain a 1:8 staff-to-child ratio during
resident waking hours and a 1:16 staff-to-child ratio during sleeping hours. In addition, PREA
standards require facilities to develop, implement, and document a staffing plan that ensures
adequate staffing levels are maintained to protect residents against sexual abuse.
Wilder’s Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent, corporals, sergeants, lieutenants,
Treatment Manager, and Security Manager monitor staffing at the youth development center daily
to ensure that the center’s staffing levels meet PREA staffing requirements. Wilder’s PREA
Compliance Manager and the department’s statewide PREA Coordinator are responsible for
completing Wilder’s annual staffing plan assessment.
Audit Results
Audit Objective: Did the department ensure the Wilder Youth Development Center followed
PREA staffing standards?
Conclusion:

28

Based on our review, we noted that Wilder’s PREA Compliance Manager and
the department’s PREA Coordinator did not complete an annual staffing
assessment plan for Wilder in 2019. See Finding 6. We also noted that Wilder
staff did not maintain all staffing documentation and did not ensure that Wilder
complied with PREA staffing requirements. See Observation 5.

Facilities that have the ability to lock rooms and/or buildings inside a secure perimeter.
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Finding 6 – The department’s PREA compliance managers did not complete the Wilder
Youth Development Center’s PREA staffing pattern assessment
Condition and Criteria
Based on our review, we determined that Wilder’s PREA Compliance Manager and the
department’s statewide PREA Coordinator did not complete the 2019 annual staffing plan
assessment for Wilder. Under Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 115, Section 313(d),
the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) states that each facility the agency operates should, in
consultation with the department’s PREA Coordinator, conduct at least yearly assessments of the
facility’s staffing plan. As part of the assessment, they should assess, determine, and document
whether they should adjust the staffing plan, the staffing patterns, the video monitoring systems
and other monitoring technologies, and the resources used to adhere to the staffing plan.
Cause
On July 21, 2020, we requested the department’s most recent PREA staffing plan
assessment. Management provided us with their July 23, 2020, and March 22, 2018, assessments.
Based on our follow-up discussions, department management stated that, due to oversight by both
the Wilder and the statewide PREA coordinators, they did not complete a PREA staffing plan
assessment for 2019.
Effect
By not completing the 2019 staffing plan assessment, the compliance managers may not
have properly assessed the number of staff need at Wilder. In addition, the compliance managers
may have jeopardized Wilder’s PREA compliance, which could affect the facility’s PREA
certification when it undergoes its next PREA audit in 2021.
Recommendation
Wilder’s PREA Compliance Manager and the department’s statewide PREA Coordinator
should ensure that Wilder’s PREA staffing plan assessment is completed each year.
Management’s Comment
We concur with this finding.
Policy 18.8, Zero-Tolerance Standards and Guidelines for Sexual Abuse, Sexual
Harassment, Assault, or Rape Incidents and Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), did not clearly
reflect the responsible party for annually completing the PREA staffing pattern assessment.
Management has been proactive and has already taken the following corrective action:
•

On October 28, 2020, Policy 18.8 was revised to specify the employee responsible for
ensuring timely completion of CS-1045, Staffing Plan Assessment annually.
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Specifically, the revised Policy 18.8 Section J (Supervision and monitoring for a DCS
YDC/Agency) states the following:
(4) Whenever necessary, but no less frequently than once each year, for the
YDC/Agency, in consultation with the PREA Coordinator, the PREA
Compliance Manager Coordinator DCS assesses, determines, and
documents in form CS-1045, Staffing Plan Assessment whether
adjustments are needed to the staffing plan and or the staffing patterns.
(5) The PREA Compliance Manager, or designee, submits the
completed CS-1045, Staffing Plan Assessment to the PREA
Coordinator for review and signature. The PREA Coordinator
submits the signed form to the DCS Statewide PREA Coordinator.
•

In September 2020, Office of Juvenile Justice management updated the Protocol for
the Statewide PREA Coordinator (supplement to Policy 18:8) to state “the Statewide
PREA Coordinator is responsible for obtaining a copy of the signed (CS-1045,
Staffing Plan Assessment) at least annually from the agency/facility PREA
Coordinator and maintains these documents electronically.”

Observation 5 – Wilder Youth Development Center staff did not maintain complete staffing
documentation and did not comply with PREA staffing standards
To determine if the department’s Wilder Youth Development Center staff maintained
documentation to support that it achieved required staffing levels, we reviewed shift rosters that
the Department of Children’s Services provided as staffing documentation for the Wilder facility.
Based on our review of the rosters, we found that management did not maintain shift rosters for 1
or more shifts for 146 of 790 days (18%) for the period January 1, 2018, through February 29,
2020. We also found that for the shift rosters that were available for our review, management did
not meet the federal Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) staffing requirements for 67 of 644 days
(10%).
PREA standards found in Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 115, Section
313(11)(c), require secure juvenile facilities to maintain a 1:8 staff-to-child ratio during resident
waking hours and a 1:16 staff-to-child ratio during resident sleeping hours. The department
recognized the staffing deficiencies and in April 2020 took action to correct the deficiencies by
implementing a 12-hour shift staffing pattern to comply with the PREA staffing ratio standards.
The department stated that the change has resolved the staffing issues. In August 2020, the
department began storing shift rosters electronically to ensure staffing documentation is properly
maintained. We will evaluate the effectiveness of the department’s staffing changes during future
audits.
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RESTRICTIVE BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
Background
The Department of Children’s Services licenses nine types of childcare facilities. Each
year, the department’s Licensing Division conducts one annual site visit and at least one
unannounced visit at licensed facilities to ensure they are following department rules and
regulations.
The department uses licensed facilities such as juvenile detention centers and hardwaresecure residential child caring agencies (RCCAs) to house adjudicated delinquent youth 29 and
youth awaiting adjudication. Additionally, the department operates the John S. Wilder Youth
Development Center (Wilder), which also houses
adjudicated delinquent youth. See Appendix 10 and Department’s Restrictive Behavior
Appendix 11 for information about the state’s juvenile
Management Technique
detention centers, hardware-secure RCCAs, and Wilder.
Definitions
While all three types of facilities house delinquent youth,
(Rule 0250-04-08-.01)
the facilities differ in treatment services 30 and length of
stay. Hardware-secure RCCAs and Wilder are long-term
hardware-secure placements that provide treatment to Chemical Defense Agents – Any
delinquent youth who have at least two felonies, with one product that is dispensed by an
aerosol spray to control an
of the felonies being against another person. Juvenile
individual’s combative or
detention centers are temporary hardware-secure
restrictive behavior.
placements that house delinquent youth awaiting a court
hearing or placement by the department. Juvenile detention Physical Restraint – Staff’s use of
centers provide educational services to youth but do not body contact to restrict the youth’s
provide treatment services.
freedom of movement or normal
To restrain youth who are a safety risk to themselves
or to others, staff at the licensed facilities and Wilder are
allowed to use a variety of restrictive behavior management
(RBM) techniques, such as physical restraint, mechanical
restraints, and seclusion. The use of chemical defense
agents is allowed at the licensed facilities; however, the
technique is not authorized at Wilder. (See the callout box
for definitions of techniques.) The department promulgated
Rule 0250-04-08-.11 in 2017 to govern the use of RBM
techniques at juvenile detention centers and licensed
hardware-secure facilities. See Appendix 12 for the
department’s Rule 0250-04-08-.11. The department
developed policy 19.11 “Use of Physical Restraint and

access to their body.

Mechanical Restraints – The use of
handcuffs and shackles.
Seclusion – The intentional,
involuntary segregation of an
individual from the rest of the
resident population to prevent the
youth from harming themselves or
others; to prevent others from
harming the youth; to deescalate
violent behavior; or to serve
clinically defined reasons.

A youth who has been determined by a judge to have committed an act designated as a crime under the law if
committed by an adult.
30
Services provided include mental health treatment, family therapy, individual therapy, anger replacement training,
sexually aggressive youth programing, alcohol, and drug treatment services, medical services, general educational,
and special education.
29
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Seclusion”, Policy 27.35 “Use of Mechanical Restraints”, and Policy 27.36 “Use of Chemical
Agents” to govern the use of RBM techniques at Wilder. See Appendix 13 for the department’s
policies.
The department’s Licensing Division reviews the juvenile detention centers’ use of RBM
techniques during annual and unannounced licensing visits to ensure the facilities use the
techniques in accordance with department rules. The department’s regional clinicians monitor the
hardware-secure RCCAs’ and Wilder’s use of RBM techniques by reviewing the incidents in the
department’s Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System (TFACTS). RCCAs and Wilder staff
must upload a summary of all incidents into TFACTS within five business days of the incident.
Because the department’s RBM rule is newly promulgated, the Licensing Division is still
working with facilities to educate them on how to properly administer RBM techniques at licensed
facilities.
Audit Results
Audit Objective: Did the Licensing Division’s staff review restrictive behavior management
(RBM) incidents at juvenile detention centers as part of the annual licensure
reviews? Did regional clinicians review RBM incidents at hardware-secure
residential child caring agencies (RCCAs) and the Wilder youth development
center?
Conclusion:

Based on our review of RBM incident reports, the licensing staff and regional
clinicians performed a review of RBM techniques used at the juvenile
detention centers, hardware-secure RCCAs, and the youth development center.
The licensing staff identified various seclusion incidents for which the juvenile
detention centers’ management disagreed with the department that the events
were seclusion incidents. As a result of our review, we found management
needs to address clarity and consistency in the use of RBM techniques. See
Observation 6.

Observation 6 - Department management should address clarity and consistency in the use of
restrictive behavior management techniques
We found the following concerns:
1. The Department of Children’s Services’ Licensing Division reported that juvenile
detention centers have various interpretations of seclusion based on the department’s
rule.
2. The department has not developed a rule specific to address the use of restrictive
behavior management techniques at hardware-secure residential child caring agencies.
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3. The department’s internal policy addressing the use of restrictive behavior management
techniques at Wilder (the department’s youth development center) is not aligned with
the RCCAs approach to RBMs.
4. The department’s rule allowed staff at juvenile detention centers operated by local
sheriff offices to administer RBM techniques not allowed in other centers.
Concern 1 – Juvenile Detention Centers Differing Interpretations
The Department of Children’s Services’ Licensing Division reported that juvenile
detention centers have various interpretations of seclusion based on the department’s rules.
According to Section 37-1-102(26)(A), Tennessee Code Annotated, seclusion
Means the intentional, involuntary segregation of an individual from the rest of the
resident population for the purposes of preventing harm by the child to oneself or
others; preventing harm to the child by others; aiding in de-escalation of violent
behavior; or serving clinically defined reasons; and
(B) Does not include:
(i)

The segregation of a child for the purpose of managing biological
contagion consistent with the centers for disease control and
prevention guidelines;

(ii)

Confinement to a locked unit or ward where other children are present
as seclusion is not solely confinement of a child to an area, but
separation of the child from other persons;

(iii) Voluntary time-out involving the voluntary separation of an individual
child from others, and where the child Is allowed to end the separation
at will; or
(iv) Temporarily securing children in their rooms during regularly
scheduled times, such as periods set aside for sleep or regularly
scheduled down time, that are universally applicable to the entire
population or within the child's assigned living area.
The department’s Rule 0250-04-08-.01(11) further defines the statute definition. See Appendix
12.
Based on our review and discussions with Licensing Division staff, we were told that the
legal staff representing the juvenile detention centers
See Appendix 14 for
have various interpretations of the seclusion definition.
seclusion and RBM incidents
As such, facility staff disagree with the department’s
Licensing Division staff, who perform annual and
at the juvenile detention
unannounced licensure visits that include reviewing
centers, hardware-secure
restrictive behavior management (RBM) techniques. We
residential child caring
have provided examples of those differences below.
agencies, and Wilder.
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Incidents Classified as Seclusion by the Department
According to Licensing Division staff, they determine the number of seclusion incidents at
each juvenile detention center by reviewing each center’s incident files. See Chart 3.
Chart 3
Number of Seclusion Incidents Reported by the Licensing Division Based on its Annual
Reviews and the Department’s Interpretation of the Seclusion Definition
Total Incidents for Calendar Years 2018 and 2019
R.L. Bean/Knox County
Hamilton County
Putnam County
Rutherford County
Bradley County
Sevier County
Bedford County
Davidson County
Madison County
Blount County
Middle TN
Shelby County
McDowell/UHS
Rhea County
Scott County
Upper East TN
Williamson County

678

519
93
24
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8
6
4
4
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Source: Department of Children’s Services.

We contacted the Knox, Hamilton, and Putnam juvenile detention centers, which had the
highest numbers of reported incidents, and facility staff responded that they do not practice
seclusion at their facilities. The Licensing Division works with the centers’ staff to explain the
department’s rule to ensure the seclusion incidents are properly administered. Even with
additional explanations provided by the Licensing Division, facilities still have differing
interpretations of the department’s rule and the definition of seclusion.
Youth Secluded for Long Periods
Rule 0250-04-08-.11(f)(4) states, “Youth may not be secluded for more than seventy-two
(72) total hours within any fourteen (14) day period” [emphasis added]. We found that the
licensing staff identified 13 seclusion incidents at the juvenile detention centers that lasted beyond
72 hours, 2 of which did not document an end date.
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Seclusion Used as a Form of Disciplinary Action
Rule 0250-04-08-.11(f)(2) prohibits juvenile detention centers from using seclusion for
discipline, punishment, or for reasons other than a temporary response to behavior that threatens
immediate harm to the youth or others. We found that the licensing staff identified two centers
that used seclusion as form of disciplinary action; however, both centers reported to us they did
not use seclusion techniques.
Department Management’s Explanation As to Differing Interpretations
The Director of the Licensing Division acknowledged that the centers have improved how
they administer RBM techniques since the RBM rules were implemented in June 2017. However,
the director also acknowledged that juvenile detention centers have challenged the Licensing
Division on the department’s definition of seclusion, which has made it difficult for licensing staff
to cite centers who feel that seclusion is mitigated by contact with other youth, access to resources,
quarantine, “voluntary isolation,” etc. As a result, the Licensing Division and the department’s
Licensing Standards Committee is in the process of revising department Rule 0250-04-08-.01(11)
to better define seclusion so that all juvenile detention centers can more easily identify seclusion
incidents.
Concern 2 - Lack of Rule for Hardware-secure Residential Child Caring Agencies
The department’s promulgation of Rule 0250-04-08-.11 to govern the use of RBM
techniques in juvenile detention centers did not include the use of those techniques at hardwaresecure residential child caring agencies (RCCAs). Although the rule does not specify hardwaresecure RCCAs, department management stated staff at all hardware-secure RCCAs follow Rule
0250-04-08-.11 when they administer RBM techniques. As noted above, hardware-secure RCCAs
differ substantially from juvenile detention centers in the length of stay, treatment services, and
the type of youth served, and thus management may need to create a rule specific to the RCCA
environment.
Concern 3 - Internal Policy Does Not Align With Rule Concerning RBM Techniques
The department developed internal policies for the use of RBM techniques at its Wilder
facility. We compared the policies to rule 0250-04-08-.11, which as noted in Concern 2
management has stated that all RCCAs follow, and found that the department’s policies and the
rule differ regarding the use of chemical defense agents, use of mechanical restraints, and seclusion
length. Because hardware-secure RCCAs and Wilder treat youth with the same needs, we believe
it is prudent for department management to ensure that their policies and the rule for RBM
techniques are aligned to ensure that both the department and the RCCAs provide youth with
consistent and adequate treatment and supervision, regardless of the facility that is responsible for
their care and treatment. See Appendix 13 for the department’s policies for RBM techniques.
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Concern 4 - Restrictive Behavior Management Techniques at Facilities Operated by Law
Enforcement
Also, as part of our review of RBM techniques, we found that department rule allowed
staff at juvenile detention centers operated by local sheriff offices to administer RBM techniques
not allowed in other centers. Staff at these juvenile detention centers are not acting law
enforcement and thus cannot administer the same techniques. Instead, should these centers need
deterrents such as tasers, center staff must call on law enforcement to come to the center to apply
the restricted RBM techniques to gain control of the youth. See Figures 3 and 4 for the
department’s rule.
Figure 3
Rule 0250-04-08-.11(3)(e)

Figure 4
Rule 0250-04-08-.11(4)

The Licensing Division Director stated that the intent of Rules 0250-04-08-.11 section
(3)(e) and section (4) was to allow law enforcement to use whichever RBM techniques necessary
when needed to assist juvenile detention center staff to restrain an unruly youth. However, we
found that the language in the rule does not clearly state the circumstances in which the department
intended for law enforcement to use the RBM techniques. As a result, juvenile detention centers
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that are operated by local sheriff offices, and staffed by law enforcement, may interpret Rule 025004-08-.11 (4) and Rule 0250-04-08-.11 (3)(e) to believe that they are allowed to use RBM
techniques at any time.
The Commissioner and the department’s Licensing Standards Committee should continue
to review and revise the definition of seclusion in Rule 0250-04-08-.01(11) to clarify what
incidents should be classified as seclusion. In addition, the Commissioner should consider revising
the department’s RBM rule to include language that clearly states the department’s intent
concerning RBM techniques and the circumstances in which law enforcement facilities can use
these techniques. If necessary, the department should work with legislative members to amend
statute to ensure clarity and intent.
The Commissioner should also ensure that management develops a rule to cover the use of
RBM techniques at hardware-secure RCCAs and that the newly developed rule is consistent with
the Wilder RBM policies.
Management’s Comment
The department has been working since early 2020 on revisions to Chapter 0250-04-08
Minimum Standards for Juvenile Detention Centers and Temporary Holding Resources. The
licensing standards committee finalized the proposed revisions on October 27, 2020. One of the
primary objectives of the revision process will clarify wording originally included in the 2017 rules
in the area of restrictive behavior management; specifically, with regard to the use of seclusion
and related practices. Management feels the newly proposed language will provide greater clarity
in the application of state standards to the use of restrictive behavior management in juvenile
detention centers and allow more effective regulation of these practices by the department’s
licensing division.
The proposed revisions will also remove language that provided an exception for law
enforcement in the use of prohibited restraint policies. This will prohibit the use of tasers or any
related “less than lethal” behavior management techniques by any staff in juvenile detention
facilities, re-establishing the original intent of the rule. These rules are currently being prepared
for promulgation.
Additionally, the department plans to amend Chapter 0250-4-5 Residential Child Care
Agencies (RCCA), specifically establishing provisions for the state’s two hardware-secure juvenile
justice facilities licensed as RCCAs. These revisions will (1) include requirements pertaining to
the use of restrictive behavior management and (2) will establish new provisions for program staff
to student ratios during sleeping hours. Both provisions will be developed to more closely align
with existing departmental policy in these areas.
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INVESTIGATIONS OF PROVIDER EMPLOYEES AND WILDER YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
CENTER EMPLOYEES
Background
The Department of Children’s Services’ Provider Quality Team Division has four teams,
called the Provider Quality Teams, that are comprised of department employees and review
investigations against providers, provider employees, or department employees that work at the
department-operated John S. Wilder Youth Development Center (Wilder). Investigations are
conducted by the department’s Special Investigations Unit (SIU) and include a review of
allegations of a provider or individual violating contract provisions, state regulations, or
department standards by engaging in physical abuse, sexual abuse, nutritional neglect, lack of
supervision, or environmental neglect.
Provider Quality Teams’ Reviews of Investigations Against Providers and Provider Employees
The Provider Quality Teams conduct weekly and monthly meetings to discuss
investigations. The department’s Special Investigations Unit investigates allegations to determine
if they are substantiated or unsubstantiated. 31 Completed investigations are presented to the
Provider Quality Teams for discussion. Upon reviewing the investigation, the Provider Quality
Teams determine the next steps for the individual or facility. Next steps may include training or
consultation, face-to-face meetings, creating a corrective action plan, or implementing a Provider
Performance Improvement Plan. The department’s Protocol for Provider Quality Team requires
the Director of the Provider Quality Team Division to follow up on next steps within three business
days to ensure corrective actions have been taken. The protocol also requires the Provider Quality
Teams to document investigations on tracking spreadsheets and to review the spreadsheet quarterly
to assess for trends.
If an individual or facility is placed on a Provider Performance Improvement Plan and
continues to not meet department standards, the Provider Quality Teams, as well as the
department’s executive leadership and legal staff, meet to discuss all investigations and concerns.
The department’s Commissioner, in consultation with the Chief of Staff and the General Counsel,
can decide to terminate a provider’s contract if the provider or its employees continue to not meet
department standards.
In-Depth Reviews on Provider Employees With Multiple Investigations
According to the department’s Protocol for Provider Quality Team, the Provider Quality
Teams are responsible for conducting in-depth reviews on
•

any contract provider employee who has been named as the AP [alleged
perpetrator] in ten (10) or more investigations; or

Investigations include interviewing collateral witnesses and reviewing video footage, incident reports, safety plans,
and other documents.
31
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•

any contract provider employee who has been named as the AP [alleged
perpetrator] in more than five (5) investigations and PQT [Provider Quality
Team] received a referral outlying [sic] concerns regarding this employee.

In-depth reviews include reading incident reports, as well as reviewing Special
Investigations Unit investigations and case recordings involving a history of cases of the provider
employee.
Provider Quality Teams’ Reviews of Investigations Against Department Employees
The Provider Quality Teams also reviews investigations against department employees that
work at the John S. Wilder Youth Development Center. Wilder is operated by the department and
is a hardware-secure residential facility that serves young men ages 13 to 18 years old who have
been committed to state custody by juvenile courts for committing a minimum of two felonies,
with one of those felonies being a crime against another person.
The department’s Protocol for Provider Quality Team specifically requires the Director of
the Provider Quality Team Division or a designee to follow up on next steps within 2 to 3 business
days. Also, the protocol states, “aforementioned data is reviewed by PQT [Provider Quality Team
Division] on a quarterly basis to assess for trends and determine next steps.”
Audit Results
1. Audit Objective: Did the department monitor providers and provider employees that violated
department standards, contract provisions, or state regulations?
Conclusion:

The department’s Office of Continuous Quality Improvement did monitor
providers and provider employees; however, the Office of Continuous
Quality Improvement did not have evidence that staff followed up or
conducted in-depth reviews on provider employees who were investigated
for violating department standards, contract provisions, or state regulations.
See Finding 7.

2. Audit Objective: Did the department conduct in-depth reviews on contract provider
employees that were named as the alleged perpetrator in multiple
investigations?
Conclusion:

The department’s Office of Continuous Quality Improvement did not have
evidence that staff conducted in-depth reviews on provider employees
named as the alleged perpetrator in 10 or more investigations. In addition,
we found that the department did not have a policy for following up on
department employees who were named as the alleged perpetrator in
multiple investigations. See Finding 7.
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Finding 7 - The Office of Continuous Quality Improvement staff did not have evidence that
they followed up on provider employees or conducted in-depth reviews on provider
employees or department employees who were investigated for violating department
standards, contract provisions, or state regulations
Based on our review of the Provider Quality Teams’ meeting minutes, we found that 103
unique providers came before the Provider Quality Teams at least once between January 1, 2018,
and March 13, 2020. Of the 103 providers, we randomly selected 5 providers to determine if the
Provider Quality Team Division documented and followed up on the providers’ corrective actions
as required in the Protocol for Provider Quality Team.
Condition A, Criteria, and Cause
These provider allegations included an employee accepting money from youth in exchange
for food and engaging in inappropriate sexual behavior with youth; employees witnessing another
employee physically assault a youth; and physical abuse, sexual abuse/exploitation, and lack of
supervision within a foster home. The department found all allegations to be unsubstantiated;
however, the Provider Quality Teams documented that the teams would follow up with the
providers and complete the following next steps:
1. obtain a notice of suspension and a performance plan;
2. contact the provider to confirm the employee was terminated; and
3. ensure the foster home received training information and completed a performance
improvement plan.
We determined that the Director of Provider Quality Team Division could not provide
evidence that staff followed the Protocol for Provider Quality Team for 3 of the 5 providers (60%),
which included the Provider Quality Teams following up with the provider within 3 business days
or assessing trends for next steps. The Director of the Provider Quality Team Division stated she
could not provide the documentation because the information had not been properly saved on the
department’s shared drive. 32 The Provider Quality Team Division did hire a staff person in fall
2019 to help maintain documentation and ensure provider documents are properly stored on the
department’s shared drive and documented on the tracking spreadsheets. The investigations that
were missing follow-up documentation occurred before the department hired additional staff.
Condition B, Criteria, and Cause
Provider Employees Named as the Alleged Perpetrator in 10 or More Investigations
While reviewing the Provider Quality Teams’ meeting minutes from January 1, 2018, to
March 13, 2020, we found that 34 provider employees were named as the alleged perpetrator in
more than 1 investigation. Out of the 34 provider employees, 7 employees were named as the
alleged perpetrator in 10 or more investigations. See Chart 4.
32

A shared drive is an electronic space to store, search, and access common files.
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Chart 4
Provider Employees With 10 or More Investigations
Who Appeared Before the Provider Quality Teams
January 1, 2018, Through March 13, 2020
Number of Investigations
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Source: Our analysis of the department’s Provider Quality Teams’ meeting minutes.

According to the department’s Protocol for Provider Quality Team, the Provider Quality
Team Division must conduct an in-depth review on any contract provider employee who has been
named as the alleged perpetrator in 10 or more investigations. The Director of the Provider Quality
Team Division was unable to provide us with evidence that the team conducted an in-depth
review 33 on 5 of 7 provider employees (71%) that were named as the alleged perpetrator in 10 or
more investigations. The Director of the Provider Quality Team Division stated the division did
conduct in-depth reviews on the 5 provider employees; however, she could not provide evidence
of the in-depth reviews because the documentation was not properly saved on the department’s
shared drive. As a result, we could not determine if the division conducted in-depth reviews as
required.
Condition C, Criteria, and Cause
Wilder Youth Development Center Employees With Multiple Investigations
As noted above, department employees run the operations at Wilder Youth Development
Center. While reviewing the Provider Quality Teams’ meeting minutes from January 1, 2018, to
March 13, 2020, we found that 5 Wilder employees were named as the alleged perpetrator in more
In-depth reviews include reading incident reports and reviewing Special Investigations Unit investigations and case
recordings that involve a history of the provider employee’s cases.
33
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than 1 investigation. Out of the 5 Wilder employees, 3 employees were named as the alleged
perpetrator in 10 or more investigations. See Table 11. Based on our review of the Provider
Quality Teams’ meeting minutes, Wilder employees appeared before the Provider Quality Teams
5 times in 2018, 8 times in 2019, and 2 times as of February 24, 2020, for various investigations
such as physical abuse or lack of supervision. Although the Special Investigations Unit had
conducted multiple investigations on these 3 Wilder employees who had 10 or more investigations,
the Provider Quality Team Division did not perform in-depth reviews for any of the three cases.
We found the Protocol for Provider Quality Team did not require department staff to perform indepth reviews or monitoring on Wilder employees who receive 10 or more investigations.
Table 11
Wilder Youth Development Center Employees With 10 or More Investigations
Who Appeared Before the Provider Quality Teams
January 1, 2018 Through March 13, 2020
Employee
1

2

Number of
Department Explanations
Investigations 34
24 Alleged
The department classified all investigations, except for one, as
35
Perpetrator
Allegation Unsubstantiated, Perpetrator Unsubstantiated
(AUPU). The exception was noted as AUPU with concerns.
36
5 Collateral
Investigations occurred between November 2003 and June
2018.
19

The employee was terminated from Wilder in January 2019.
The department classified all investigations as AUPU.
Investigations occurred between June 2013 and August 2019.

3

10

The employee resigned from Wilder in December 2019.
The Provider Quality Team could not locate the Special
Investigations Unit’s Alleged Perpetrator Review reports.
Therefore, we could not determine whether the investigations
were substantiated or unsubstantiated and the timeframe in
which the investigations occurred.
The employee resigned from Wilder in April 2020.

Source: Our analysis of the department’s Provider Quality Teams’ meeting minutes.

According to the Executive Director of the Office of Continuous Quality Improvement, it
is the department’s practice to review the Wilder employee investigations in accordance with the

34
The number of investigations includes all investigations between when the employee’s first investigation was
received and when we completed our review. For example, an employee could have received a first investigation in
2013 and a last investigation in 2019.
35
Alleged perpetrator investigations involve an individual alleged to have committed child abuse or neglect.
36
Collateral investigations involve an individual who was a witness in an incident.
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Protocol for Provider Quality Team. The Executive Director stated that the department is in the
process of updating the protocol to include such requirements.
Risk Assessment
Given the problems identified during our fieldwork, we reviewed the department’s
December 2019 Financial Integrity Act Risk Assessment and determined that management did not
properly assess the Provider Quality Team Division’s monitoring of investigations for any
potential risks of errors, fraud, waste, abuse, fiscal and operational risks, and noncompliance with
state law or other regulatory requirements.
Department management is responsible for identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks
involving investigations of providers, provider employees, and department employees violating
contract provisions, state regulations, or department standards. The U.S. Government
Accountability Office’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book)
sets internal control standards and is considered best practice for nonfederal entities. Green Book
Principle 7.01, “Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Risks,” states, “Management should identify,
analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the defined objectives.”
Management should identify, analyze, and respond to risk related to achieving the
defined objectives.
Attributes
The following attributes contribute to the design, implementation, and operating
effectiveness of this principle:
•

Identification of Risks

•

Analysis of Risks

•

Response to Risks

Overall Effect
Without maintaining evidence that the Provider Quality Team Division followed up and
conducted in-depth reviews on provider employees and department employees at Wilder, the
department cannot ensure that providers and Wilder have corrected potentially harmful practices
that risk the safety of the children who are in their custody.
Recommendation
The Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Continuous Quality
Improvement should ensure that staff maintain documentation of the dates and the corrective
actions providers took to address the department’s concerns. Additionally, the Commissioner and
the Assistant Commissioner should ensure the Office of Continuous Quality Improvement to
create a protocol that requires the Provider Quality Team Division to conduct in-depth reviews or
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follow up on Wilder employees who have been named as an alleged perpetrator in multiple
investigations. The Provider Quality Team Division should document all in-depth reviews or
monitoring and maintain that documentation.
Management should perform an adequate risk assessment to identify risks associated with
fraud, waste, abuse, noncompliance, error of the department’s operations, and mission.
Management should then implement effective controls, based on an adequate risk assessment, to
address the risks noted in this finding. As necessary, management should assign staff to be
responsible for ongoing monitoring of the risks and mitigating controls, and take action if
deficiencies occur.
Management’s Comment
We concur in part with this finding.
Management does not concur that “Office of Continuous Quality Improvement staff did
not have evidence that they followed up on provider employees.” The Provider Quality Team
(PQT) has a myriad of measures in place to ensure contract providers and Youth Development
Center employees are monitored. Numerous documents were provided to the audit team providing
clear evidence of monitoring providers/youth development center(s), as well as evidence of
following up with providers/youth development center(s). These documents include the
following:
•

Internal meeting agendas and meeting minutes (which include actions taken);

•

DCS/Provider partnership meeting minutes;

•

Provider/DCS phone conference meeting minutes;

•

Unannounced and announced site visit reports;

•

Multiple spreadsheets that track Special Investigation Unit (SIU) investigations on
facilities and individual employees (including actions taken);

•

PQT SIU history review reports; and

•

Provider Performance Improvement Plans.

The Department concurs that “staff did not have evidence that they . . . followed up on
department employees who were investigated for violating department standards, contract
provision, or state regulations.” However, it should be noted that as described in the finding
“department employees” refers only to the very small percentage of department employees who
work at Wilder. Moreover, focusing on those relatively few Wilder employees ignores the much
greater pool of private provider employees. Taken together, the vast majority of employees with
10 or more investigations, whether employed by private providers and or by the state, are and have
been reviewed routinely by PQT.
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The previous Provider Quality Team protocol did not specifically state youth development
center(s) should be addressed in the same manner as contract providers. The protocol has now
been revised to drive current practice.
The Department has made substantial changes to the PQT process since 2018, when the
Office of Continuous Quality Improvement hired both a new Executive Director and PQT
Director. In addition, as noted in the audit, in September 2019 CQI hired a PQT Program
Coordinator.
Since the hiring of these staff, multiple quality improvements have been put in place to
build a more consistent and formalized process. The following procedures and tasks were
implemented, among other changes:
•

Data tracking and retention: PQT has improved data tracking and trending by utilizing
a specialized coordinator from the DCS Performance & Quality Improvement Data
Quality Team to create quarterly and annual reports of provider trends. Additional
tracking logs are used to ensure actions steps are completed in a timely manner.
Designated PQT staff capture both internal and provider meeting minutes and phone
conference minutes and ensure all documents are saved to the Department’s shared
drive. PQT now also obtains contract provider/youth development center(s) employee
retraining documentation and termination/resignation information on alleged
perpetrators.

•

Increased monitoring and engagement: PQT developed a structured plan for conducting
on-site reviews of providers/youth development center(s) that is included in the
Director’s job plan. PQT staff monitor provider incident reports on a consistent basis
and conduct TFACTS Incident Reporting Refresher Trainings with providers as
needed. PQT also now has a structured process for partnering alongside several DCS
units (SIU, Licensing, Provider Monitoring & Evaluation, Network Development, etc.)
to become more proactive in anticipating and addressing concerns with providers/youth
development center.

Auditor’s Comment
Management did not provide us with evidence that they took the next steps that were
determined necessary by the Provider Quality Teams. Those steps were to ensure the providers
took corrective action which included evidence that management:
•

obtained the provider’s notice of suspension and a performance plan;

•

contacted the provider to confirm the employee was terminated; and

•

obtained evidence that the foster home received training information and completed a
performance improvement plan.
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Employee Qualifications and
Turnover Analysis

Employee Qualifications and Turnover Analysis
EMPLOYEE QUALIFICATIONS
The Department of Children’s Services employs over 3,600 individuals throughout the
state to fulfill the department’s goals and mission to provide high quality prevention and support
services to children and families that promote safety, permanency, and well-being. The
department’s Office of Human Resources is responsible for ensuring potential employee
candidates are qualified for their positions in accordance with state statute and Tennessee
Department of Human Resources policies.
Under Section 8-30-301(c), Tennessee Code Annotated, “The commissioner shall include
the duties of, and pay for, the position or the class, the qualifications required for such position,
and any other information that the commissioner considers pertinent and useful.” According to
Tennessee Department of Human Resources Policy 12-066, prior to employment or before 90 days
following the effective date of the appointment, agencies must verify candidates’ educational
backgrounds based on the position’s requirements and based on the applicant’s submitted proof of
degree. Agencies should also routinely verify candidates’ other relevant information.
The department structured its Office of Human Resources to include an Executive
Director at the central office and four Human Resources Directors over the regional offices. Each
of the regional offices has human resources analysts, who are responsible for the hiring process.
The department’s regional human resources analysts work with the Tennessee Department of
Human Resources to post job listings for their regions. The Tennessee Department of Human
Resources then provides a list of candidates to the regional human resources analysts, who review
the candidates’ qualifications. The regional human resources analysts then interview and perform
reference checks of these potential candidates. The department’s regional Human Resources
offices ultimately select candidates to hire and maintain hiring documentation for each employee
in the respective regional office. The Executive Director issued the following guidance related to
the references regional offices should check:
•

two professional references, one personal for external candidates with a work history;

•

three personal references for candidates without a work history; and

•

one professional reference for current employees.

To help ensure that they check all qualifications of the candidate, the human resources
analysts have available the “HR Personnel File Audit – New Employee” checklist. The checklist
includes the candidate’s name, ID number, job title, and hire date. The checklist also provides a
list of employment requirements, such as proof of education and references.
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Audit Results
Audit Objective: Did the Commissioner and the Office of Human Resources ensure that
employees met the job qualifications in accordance with state statute and
policy?
Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, we found that the Commissioner appointed an interim
Deputy Commissioner of Juvenile Justice who does not meet the qualifications
set by statute. As of the end of our audit fieldwork, this employee continues
to serve as the “interim” Deputy Commissioner. See Observation 7. In
addition, the Office of Human Resources staff did not document and maintain
evidence of employment candidates’ educational and reference checks
required for hiring decisions. See Observation 8.

Observation 7 – On December 29, 2019, the Commissioner appointed an interim Deputy
Commissioner of Juvenile Justice who did not meet employment qualifications set forth in statute
During our review of employment credentials, we determined that the Commissioner
appointed an interim Deputy Commissioner of Juvenile Justice even though the candidate did not
meet the training and experience requirements to hold this position.
Section 37-5-101(b)(2), Tennessee Code Annotated, states,
The deputy commissioner of juvenile justice shall be appointed to lead the division
of juvenile justice and shall serve at the pleasure of the commissioner. The
commissioner shall appoint a person qualified by training and experience in the
area of juvenile justice to perform the duties of deputy commissioner of juvenile
justice. The appointee must be a graduate of an accredited college or university
and be experienced in the field of juvenile justice. [emphasis added]
We discussed with the commissioner her reasons for appointing the interim Deputy
Commissioner and she stated the Deputy Commissioner of Juvenile Justice “was hired in an
interim position. Due to the nature of the job duties for this position, this employee was vetted
and approved by the Governor’s office prior to hire.”
Based on our review of the interim Deputy Commissioner’s personnel file, he is a graduate
of the Federal Bureau of Investigations National Academy, has experience in law enforcement as
a criminal investigator, and was the Deputy Commissioner of the state’s Department of Safety and
Homeland Security. The Human Resources staff, however, could not provide us with
documentation that the employee met the statute’s requirement of graduation from an accredited
college or university.
Additionally, we found, that according to the Rules of the Tennessee Department of Human
Resources, Rule 1120-02-.11, “Appointments,” “To be eligible for an interim appointment, the
employee shall meet the minimum qualifications for the job classification to which the employee
is appointed.” Management could not provide documentation establishing that the Deputy
86

Commissioner of Juvenile Justice had specific training and experience directly related to juvenile
justice.
Rule 1120-02-.11 also indicates interim appointments are “for a period not to exceed one
(1) year” but allows an extension of up to one additional year “if the Commissioner determines
that such an extension is in the best interest of the State.” However, the appointment must still
meet the minimum qualifications as discussed above. The interim Deputy Commissioner’s first
year will end December 28, 2020.
We discussed with the commissioner the conflicts between the requirements of the rule and
the Deputy Commissioner’s qualifications. The Commissioner stated her decision was based on
his experience as a criminal investigator, which would have involved cases with children, and
based on his experience at Safety, which also could have involved children. However, because
the legislature chose to include the word “juvenile” when describing the experience requirement,
the appointee must have experience in the field of juvenile justice.
Without meeting the statutory qualifications when filling positions, management may
make decisions that negatively impact the children they serve. Specifically, the Commissioner’s
appointment of an interim Deputy Commissioner of Juvenile Justice without evidence of
education, training, and experience in juvenile justice could place those children who require
juvenile justice services at a higher risk.
Observation 8 – The department’s Office of Human Resources did not require staff to document
and maintain verification of candidates’ education and references required for hiring decisions
Staff Not Required to Use Checklist to Verify a Candidate’s Qualifications
The Council on Accreditation (COA) sets standards for accredited agencies, including the
Department of Children’s Services. COA PA-HR Standards 2.02 indicates agencies should verify
references and credentials when hiring. COA also provides agencies with the “Personnel Records
Checklist – Private, Public, Canadian,” which lists “items that must be included in an
organization’s Personnel Records as required by COA standards,” including references
verification and credentials verification.
Based on our review, we found that Human Resources staff did not maintain evidence of
their verification of the candidates’ qualifications as support for hiring decisions. Additionally,
only 2 of the regional human resources analysts from the 10 regions in our sample used the “HR
Personnel File Audit – New Employee” checklist to ensure candidates had met the job
qualifications. According to the Executive Director of Human Resources, the checklist was a
guide, not a requirement.
Staff Did Not Document Verification of Candidates’ Education and References
We selected a sample of 60 employee personnel files for our testwork; however, the
department had improperly destroyed 4 of the files before our audit request (see Finding 2) and
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another employee lacked the qualifications required of the position (see Observation 7). For the
remaining 55 employee files, we found that for 10 employee files (18%), the Human Resources
staff did not document that they ensured employees met education requirements or that staff had
verified the candidates’ references prior to hire or within the time allowed by the Tennessee
Department of Human Resources’ Policy 12-066. See Table 12 and additional details below.
Table 12
Testwork Results of Employee Qualification Checks

Deficiency
Identified
Proof of Education
6 of 55 employees
(11%)
Job References
4 of 55 employees
(7%)

Processed
prior to
graduation

Cause of Errors
Documentation
not transferred
with employee

HR staff did not
perform job duties
appropriately

No cause
provided

2

1

-

3

-

-

3

1

Proof of Education Deficiencies
For the two employees the department processed prior to graduation, the department
obtained in-progress transcripts when they hired the employee but did not obtain official proof of
education:
•

One employee was hired on January 2, 2020; after we requested the documentation in
June 2020, the department obtained a picture of her diploma and provided it to us on
July 9, 2020.

•

The second employee was hired on September 4, 2018, prior to his college graduation;
therefore, staff obtained an in-progress transcript as proof of education. Staff did not
obtain the official transcript. After we requested the documentation, on July 6, 2020,
the department obtained a letter from the university indicating the employee received
his degree. Tennessee Department of Human Resources’ policy does not list a
university letter as acceptable proof of education.

The Executive Director of Human Resources indicated the students “were processed prior to
graduation and provided transcripts which were current at the time of hire.”
One employee transferred regions after she was hired, and the department did not maintain
documentation in the file that staff verified her proof of education. The employee was hired on
February 12, 2018; the transcript is dated February 19, 2019. According to the human resources
analyst, when the employee transferred from another region, her transcript was not transferred with
her, and the new region requested she provide transcripts. Since the department lacked
documentation, we could not determine if the human resources analyst verified the employee’s
qualifications when hired.
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For three employees, the Executive Director did not provide reasons that the human
resources staff did not timely obtain proof of education:
•

One employee was hired on May 29, 2018; after we requested the documentation in
June 2020, the transcript was obtained and dated July 8, 2020.

•

The second employee was hired on June 3, 2019; after we requested the documentation
in June 2020, the department obtained a picture of her diploma and provided it to us on
July 9, 2020.

•

The third employee was hired on September 24, 2018; however, staff had not
maintained evidence to verify the bachelor’s degree. Staff did include verification of
the employee’s 2019 master’s degree; however, the documentation was not obtained
until April 24, 2020.

Job References Deficiencies
According to the Executive Director, staff are instructed to check two professional
references and one personal reference for external candidates with work history or three personal
references for external candidates without work history. We found that staff did not maintain
complete reference check documentation for four employees. For three employees, the Executive
Director and a human resources director attributed the problems to regional staff not performing
their jobs appropriately. For two of the three employees, the Executive Director of Human
Resources stated that “management believes the issue occurred due to a local employee not
performing job duties appropriately. This employee [not performing job duties appropriately] is
no longer with the agency.” For the third employee, a human resource director stated, “Upon
learning the analyst did not complete her job appropriately, we have issued disciplinary action.”
For the remaining employee, a human resources analyst indicated management proceeded
with the hire because they were able to contact two professional references; however, the
documentation indicates both contacted references were personal references. The documented
reference checks did not meet the department’s expectations for the number of professional and/or
personal reference checks. The executive director did not provide any additional explanation.
Without verifying employees’ references and educational qualifications, the department
cannot ensure employees meet the qualifications for their positions. As a result, the department
may inadvertently place children at risk by hiring potentially unqualified employees. The
Executive Director of the Office of Human Resources should ensure that staff verify and document
that all employees meet job qualifications as required by Tennessee Department of Human
Resources policies and state statute. In addition, the Commissioner of the Department of
Children’s Services should implement the necessary internal controls to ensure staff perform and
document their verification reviews of employees’ references and educational requirements.

TURNOVER ANALYSIS
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average turnover for state and local
governments, excluding education, for calendar years 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively, was
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20.6%, 19.7%, and 19.5%. Because this data is based upon calendar year, information for 2020 is
not yet available.
Department Separation Statistics
Total separations for fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020 included 1,969 employees.
Average department turnover remained under 20% each fiscal year (16% for fiscal year 2018, 18%
for fiscal year 2019, and 20% for fiscal year 2020). Voluntary separations were highest,
accounting for 82% of all separations. See Table 13.
Table 13
Division Turnover Rates
Division
35910
35950
35960

General Description
Central Office
Program and Field Operations
Wilder Youth Development Center

FY 18
15.5%
14.5%
36.3%

Source: Edison, the state’s enterprise resource planning system.
separations associated with Mountain View or Woodland Hills.

FY 19
17.1%
17.7%
33.9%

FY 20
12.2%
18.6%
46.2%

Chart does not include final

Audit Results
Audit Objective: Did department staffing turnover indicate problems with the department’s
operations and inhibit its ability to meet its mission?
Conclusion:

For two divisions, the department’s average turnover rates were within 20%
for fiscal years 2018 through 2020. For the Wilder Youth Development
Center, the average turnover rates exceeded 20% for fiscal years 2018 through
2020. See Observation 9.

Observation 9 – Department management should evaluate turnover rates
Based on our turnover analysis, we identified that the Wilder Youth Development Center’s
average turnover rate exceeded 20% for fiscal years 2018 through 2020 and was higher than the
average turnover rate of 34.5% for adult correctional systems in Tennessee. Based on our
discussions, management does not believe the turnover rate is a problem. Given the problems we
identified in Finding 6, Finding 7, and Observation 5, management should consider evaluating
the turnover for the Wilder Youth Development Center and determine the impact turnover has had
on the Wilder employees and operations.
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Public Records Management

PUBLIC RECORDS MANAGEMENT
State law requires the Public Records
Commission to determine and order the proper
disposition of the state’s public records and to direct the
Tennessee Department of State’s Records Management
Division to initiate any action necessary to establish the
regulation of record holding and management in any
state agency. Section 10-7-301(6), Tennessee Code
Annotated, defines public records as
all documents, papers, letters, maps, books,
photographs, microfilms, electronic data processing files and output, films, sound
recordings, or other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics made or
received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of
official business by any governmental agency.
Public officials are legally responsible for creating and maintaining records that document
the government business transactions. These records provide evidence of government operations
and accountability to citizens. Public officials must maintain this information according to
established records disposition authorizations (RDAs), which describe the public record, retention
period, and destruction method for each record type under an agency’s authority. Each state entity
designates a Public Records Officer to coordinate with the Public Records Commission and the
Records Management Division.
Statewide RDAs are general retention schedules that apply to state agencies’ records, such
as personnel, fiscal, and administrative records. When a record is not covered by a statewide RDA,
the Public Records Officer must create an agency-specific RDA for that record series and submit
it to the Public Records Commission for approval. When destroying a public record, an agency’s
Public Records Officer must complete and submit a Certificate of Records Destruction to the
Records Management Division.
RDAs may be retired if the record series it refers to is no longer in use, has been merged
with a newly revised RDA, or is covered by a statewide RDA. An RDA submitted to be retired
also goes through the approval process. Once it has been retired, the RDA will be archived and
viewable only by Records Management Division staff.
Department’s Records Management Process
The department’s Division of Budget and Finance is responsible for records management,
and the department’s Records Officer reports to the Assistant Commissioner for the Division of
Budget and Finance. To track its paper files, the department created a records management
database that includes the records’ specific location and retention period. As of February 21, 2020,
the department had 919,026 paper records logged in the database. The department also uses the
Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System case management system to electronically store
documents.
92

The department develops and revises RDAs under the guidance of the department’s
General Counsel and with input from the department’s program staff, who are directly responsible
for the records covered by the RDA. The department must also maintain records in accordance
with the department’s accreditation from the Council on Accreditation (COA); therefore, all
department RDAs must include COA standards when necessary.
As of February 2020, the department had 20 agency-specific RDAs. In addition, the
department’s records were subject to statewide RDAs created by the Records Management
Division.
Audit Results
Audit Objective: Did the department follow the Department of State’s Records Management
Division’s guidance for retaining and destroying the department’s public
records?
Conclusion:

Department management did not comply with the Records Management
Division’s guidance and destroyed files before the end of the RDA-specified
retention period. In addition, management did not ensure the department’s
public records were covered by an RDA. See Finding 8.

Finding 8 – Management did not ensure staff maintained and protected the department’s
public records as required by statute
Criteria, Condition and Cause
The Department of Children’s Services has a basic responsibility to protect the state’s
public records and follow state statute and guidance provided by the Department of State’s Records
Management Division. Section 10-7-509(a), Tennessee Code Annotated, states that “the
disposition of all state records shall occur only through the process of an approved records
disposition authorization.” Furthermore, according to the Department of State’s Records
Management Best Practices and Procedures,
Retention schedules are not merely suggestions. Records cannot be destroyed
before the stated period, nor can they be retained longer than the stated period
unless they are involved in an investigation, litigation, audit, or request pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act.
Furthermore, the Tennessee Office of Attorney General and Reporter notified the
department about a pending lawsuit and placed the department under a litigation hold to preserve
evidence surrounding a lawsuit that went into effect May 15, 2018. This meant that the department
should not destroy any documents, paper or electronic, related to the lawsuit.
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Destruction of Public Records
Our review of the department revealed that management and staff improperly disposed of
public records related to
•

background check results and employment qualifications for
employees and background check results for volunteers who work
with children or with sensitive information (see Finding 2 and
Observation 8); and

•

documentation of provider monitoring and licensure review files (see Finding 5 and
Observation 3).

For each area, department management provided the following explanations:
•

Background check results and employment qualifications – According to the
department’s Executive Director of Human Resources, the department destroyed all
other documentation that did not meet, in their opinion, the documents needed by the
state’s Department of Human Resources (such as letters of dismissal or resignation;
retirement forms; leave balance records and payable time details; and proof of
education, training records, and certificates). For volunteer files, a volunteer
coordinator stated that a previous volunteer coordinator had instructed her to destroy
volunteer records once the volunteer was no longer certified to provide services to the
department.

•

Provider and licensing monitoring files – Based on our discussions with the
department’s Record Officer, the licensing consultants did not adhere to the records
management process, did not inform the Records Officer that they had destroyed the
records, and did not complete certificates of destruction. He also indicated he
mistakenly destroyed provider monitoring documentation while disposing of other
documents.

When we discussed these issues with the Department of State’s Records Management
Division Director, he stated that the department should not destroy documents in accordance with
their effective RDAs until the Attorney General lifts the litigation hold. The Director also stated
that if the department destroys any documents, a representative of the Records Management
Division would need to be present for the destruction to ensure the documents do not violate the
litigation hold. Regardless of the litigation hold, we found that licensing files were destroyed
before the end of the retention period.
Records Not Covered by an RDA
From our review of destroyed records as noted above, we also found records that were not
covered by an RDA. Management did not establish an RDA to cover their separated employee
documentation, including background checks. Additionally, we found the following:
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•

The department’s Policy 1.3 references RDA SW05, which was retired on September
4, 2014. Management did not ensure that the records were covered under an effective
RDA.

•

The Background Check History and IV-E Eligibility Checklist form references RDA
2926, which was retired in February 2016. Management was not aware that the policy
and checklist referenced the retired RDA.

Effect
Public records ensure a state agency’s
official business is fair and transparent. Without
retaining records in accordance with established
RDAs, there is an increased risk that the
department cannot effectively conduct its
operations and assure the public, legislators, and
other stakeholders about management decisions.
Not ensuring that the department’s public records
are properly created, maintained, or retained
through RDAs could lead staff to prematurely
destroy records.

“Without retaining records in
accordance with established RDAs,
there is an increased risk that the
department cannot effectively conduct
its operations and assure the public,
legislators, and other stakeholders
about management decisions.”

Recommendation
The Commissioner should ensure that all the department’s public records have RDAs
approved by the Public Records Commission and that staff follow all established public records
requirements. Additionally, management and staff must adhere to the department’s litigation hold
and follow the necessary requirements of the Records Management Division before destroying
any public records.
Management’s Comment
We concur in part with this finding.
Management concurs that some closed licensure records were destroyed in error by staff
in the Licensing division and without consultation of the department’s Records Officer;
additionally, one closed file from Provider Monitoring and Evaluation was inadvertently destroyed
when a previous employee’s workpapers were mistaken for trash.
On September 21, 2020, at the request of the department, the State of Tennessee Public
Records Commission approved the following DCS records disposition authorizations:
•

RDA 2983 addresses the destruction of closed licensure files and was modified to
extend the retention of these closed files from three to five years;

•

RDA 11385 is a new RDA that addresses the destruction of closed provider monitoring
files and sets the retention of these closed files to five years.

95

The commission also approved additional RDAs and retired another, at the request of DCS:
•

RDA 10223 was modified to mandate permanent retention of closed DCS education
records, additions that were previously part of retired RDA 2881;

•

RDA 2899 was modified to establish five years retention of DCS safety program files;

•

RDA 11387 is a new RDA and mandates five years of retention of Continuous Quality
Improvement meeting minutes records; and

•

RDA 2881 was retired as the records now fall under RDA 10223 (see above).

Management does not concur that documents in former employee personnel files were
improperly destroyed as we contend that current RDA 1280 (a Department of Human Resources
RDA applicable to separated employee records) and RDA SW03 (a statewide RDA that is labeled
“Inactive Human Resource Employee Documentation”) are difficult to navigate and do not
explicitly cover criminal background checks. However, the Comptroller has noted that
“[m]anagement did not establish an RDA to cover their separated employee documentation,
including background checks.” We do not dispute that as to separated employee background
checks, former statewide RDAs have been retired. We take the Comptroller’s point that we should
dispose of these records properly under a current RDA. Accordingly, we have worked with the
Department of Human Resources to allow background checks to be included in the DOHR file for
separated employee records and disposed of in accordance with RDA 1280, the RDA that covers
such records.
Auditor’s Comment
As defined in Section 10-7-301(6), Tennessee Code Annotated, the department’s former
employee and volunteer personnel files are considered public records which cannot be destroyed
without authorization through the state’s established Records Disposition Authorization process.
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Information Systems

INFORMATION SYSTEMS
The Department of Children’s
Services uses information systems to
support its mission-critical business
functions. The Department of Finance
and Administration’s Division of
Strategic Technology Solutions (STS)
manages the department’s network
access, email, and applications; STS also
administers Edison, the state’s enterprise
resource planning system. We focused
our audit work on the department’s
information systems controls and
system development.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS CONTROLS
Information systems controls broadly describe measures to ensure the security, accuracy,
and reliability of hardware and software.

SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Since August 2010, the department has used the Tennessee Family and Child Tracking
System (TFACTS). Since the system’s conception, users have reported various issues with the
system. In the department’s 2014 performance audit, we reviewed TFACTS and determined that
the department needed to improve seven areas related to TFACTS:
•

reporting capabilities and report data reliability;

•

users’ ability to search for information;

•

cumbersome functionalities and steps in order to locate case information;

•

slow speeds and unexpected logouts;

•

financial reporting and payment adjustments;

•

in-house TFACTS training; and

•

the department’s ability to maintain TFACTS’ unsupported OptimalJ development
software, used for program coding purposes, which TFACTS’s vendor discontinued.

Results of Prior Audit
In our 2016 performance audit, we reviewed TFACTS again to determine if the department
had addressed the prior audit issues. During that audit, we found that users continued to report
concerns about the reliability of TFACTS reports, experienced difficulty using the system’s search
function, and continued to experience slow speeds and unexpected logouts. In addition, we found
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the department did not implement TFACTS’ financial functions, which resulted in staff continuing
to manually adjust foster care and adoption assistance payments or manually adjust payments after
changing a child’s eligibility to receive state or federal funds. The department’s fiscal staff also
used labor- and time-intensive manual processes to attempt to maintain an accurate accounting for
federal financial reporting purposes.
Management concurred with the finding and stated they implemented an enterprise search
platform within TFACTS to enhance users’ experience and reduce the possibility of creating
duplicate persons. Regarding slow network speeds and unexpected logouts, management stated
that they would research possible tools to better identify and resolve application performance
issues and network traffic monitoring. Finally, according to management, they initiated the first
of 13 phases to enhance TFACTS’ financial functions and make manual processes unnecessary.
Management stated they would deploy the first phase in February 2017.
Current Audit Results
As of August 2020, management had implemented the following financial functions in
TFACTS:
•

Client Benefits (implemented April 2017) –
allows Child Welfare Benefits Counselors to
initiate the application process for social security
benefits for a child.

•

Subsidy Payment Suspension (implemented
April 2017) – stops Adoption Assistance 37 and
Subsidized Permanent Guardianship 38 subsidy
payments if a child comes back into the
department’s custody, receives extended foster
care services, 39 or comes into full guardianship. 40

•

Foster Parent Payment Verification (implemented November 2019) – allows foster
parents to verify payments, complete child or children verification questionnaires, and
access foster parent assessment information in TFACTS.
Audit Results

1. Audit Objective: Did the department follow state information systems security policies
regarding information systems controls?

Adoption Assistance is a financial assistance program for adopted children with special needs.
Subsidized Permanent Guardianship is a permanent outcome for children that involves the court transferring legal
responsibility for a minor from the department to a caregiver or guardian. The child and family also qualify to receive
ongoing financial support, based on state and federal eligibility criteria.
39
Children in the department’s custody can apply to continue receiving foster care services up to age 21.
40
Full guardianship occurs when all parental rights have been legally severed.
37
38
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Conclusion:

The department did not follow state information systems security policies
regarding information systems controls. See Finding 9.

2. Audit Objective: In response to the prior audit finding, did department management and STS
implement our recommendations relating to system and network
performance and financial function improvements in TFACTS?
Conclusion:

Although department management and STS had implemented some
improvements in TFACTS since the prior audit, they did not fully
implement the financial functions. See Finding 10.

Finding 9 – Department management and Strategic Technology Solutions management did
not provide adequate internal controls in one area, increasing the risk of unauthorized access
to sensitive data
The Department of Children’s Services and the Department of Finance and
Administration’s Division of Strategic Technology Solutions (STS) management did not
effectively design and monitor internal controls in one area, increasing the risk of unauthorized
access to sensitive data. We found internal control deficiencies related to one of the department’s
systems; both the department and STS did not adhere to state policies. Ineffective implementation
and operation of internal controls increases the likelihood of errors, data loss, and unauthorized
access to department information.
Pursuant to Standard 9.61 of the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Government
Auditing Standards, we omitted details from this finding because they are confidential under the
provisions of Section 10-7-504(i), Tennessee Code Annotated. We provided the department and
STS management with detailed information regarding the specific conditions we identified, as well
as the related criteria, causes, and our specific recommendations for improvement.
Recommendation
Department and STS management should correct these conditions by promptly developing
and consistently implementing internal controls in these areas. Management should implement
effective controls to ensure compliance with applicable requirements; assign staff to be responsible
for ongoing monitoring of the risks and mitigating controls; and take action if deficiencies occur.
Management’s Comment – Department of Children’s Services
We concur with the finding. Management will work with agency leadership and STS to
implement internal controls to strengthen areas of deficiency.

Management’s Comment – Department of Finance and Administration, Division of Strategic
Technology Solutions
We concur. STS has revised certain processes and implemented additional internal controls
to further mitigate the risk associated with this finding.
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Finding 10 – Although department management took steps to improve TFACTS’
performance and network issues, the TFACTS financial functions are still not fully
implemented after 10 years
Condition and Cause
We have noted problems
As noted in the department’s 2014 and 2016 audit
with TFACTS’ financial
reports, management of the Department of Children’s Services
functions since 2014.
still have not fully implemented the financial functions in
TFACTS. As a result, management and staff have had to
create manual workarounds for payments to foster parents and other beneficiaries, along with
financial processing and reporting that TFACTS still cannot perform.
To automate TFACTS’ financial functions and minimize manual workarounds, the
department’s Management Advisory Committee 41 approved a 13-phase project in 2016.
According to the department’s revised 6-month follow-up, dated January 31, 2020, the TFACTS
financial enhancement was a complete rewrite of the financial processing in the system. The
project was originally broken down and scheduled to be deployed in phases. However, because
of the level of integration, the department’s Fiscal Product Owners required that the entire project
be deployed and implemented in its entirety, which delayed introducing the benefits of the new
functionality.
In their 6-month follow-up response, management acknowledged that the implementation
of the TFACTS financial functions encountered significant delays. Management specifically
mentioned that increases in the scope of the project resulted in the implementation date being
extended. According to the department’s Chief Information Officer (CIO), 42 after the project was
completed and management tested the final product’s functionality, too many of the test cases
failed or produced inaccurate results, which ultimately led management to conclude that the
product’s overall quality was poor. In March 2020, the department and the Department of Finance
and Administration’s Strategic Technology Solution’s Division (STS) began a new TFACTS
financial enhancement project. In nine phases, management will rewrite the TFACTS financial
module. Management stated another factor that has contributed to the extension of the project’s
implementation date is the need to conduct extensive testing and deliver training to department
staff statewide. In addition, there were new requests for increases in scope that have never been
included in the project before, which caused the implementation date to be extended. According
to the department’s CIO, department management expects the new financial enhancement project
to go live by January 2021.

The Management Advisory Committee is composed of members of the department’s upper management who review
and prioritize the department’s information technology projects, the department’s STS technical group, and STS’
business domain director.
42
The department’s CIO is an employee of the Department of Finance and Administration’s Strategic Technology
Solution’s Division (STS). STS assigned the CIO to the department.
41
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Criteria
According to STS’s Information Systems Council - Information Resources Policies, Policy
5.00, “Information Systems Management & System Development Life Cycle,” the objectives
include the need to
Deliver quality systems on time and within budget in a consistent and maintainable
manner that conforms to the State’s software and hardware, architectural, and
security standards.
Effect
Without adhering to state information management policies, the department’s objective to
achieve an effective TFACTS financial module will be difficult to accomplish and may result in
continuing operational inefficiencies. Since TFACTS went live in 2010 and as of June 2020, the
department has spent approximately $98 million in state and federal funds. According to the
department’s CIO, the costs consist of project costs and system maintenance. For further details
about the TFACTS timeline, projects, and post-implementation costs, see Appendix 15.
Recommendation
Department management should continue their efforts to complete TFACTS’ financial
enhancement project in order to meet the expected go-live date, and we will review the new
financial module during the next performance audit.
Management’s Comment
We concur with this finding.
DCS leadership and STS have been working closely together in the final stretch of the
TFACTS fiscal enhancement project and, in 2019 under this administration, created a steering
committee composed of technical developers, program directors, and fiscal users. The steering
committee has met weekly to monitor the program’s progress. STS reports that the fiscal
enhancement project is currently on schedule and on track with the development and new testing
activities. Testing results have been successful to date and STS expects the fiscal enhancement
project to go live in the first quarter of 2021.
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Appendices

APPENDIX 1

Internal Control Significant to the Audit Objectives
The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government (Green Book) sets internal control standards for federal entities and serves
as best practice for non-federal government entities, including state and local government
agencies. As stated in the Green Book overview, 43
Internal control is a process used by management to help an entity achieve its
objectives . . . Internal control helps an entity run its operations effectively and
efficiently; report reliable information about its operations; and comply with
applicable laws and regulations.
The Green Book’s standards are organized into five components of internal control: control
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring.
In an effective system of internal control, these five components work together to help an entity
achieve its objectives. Each of the five components of internal control contains principles, which
are the requirements an entity should follow to establish an effective system of internal control.
We illustrate the five components and their underlying principles below:
Control Environment

Control Activities

Principle 1

Demonstrate Commitment to Integrity
and Ethical Values

Principle 10

Design Control Activities

Principle 2

Exercise Oversight Responsibility

Principle 11

Design Activities for the Information
System

Principle 12

Implement Control Activities

Principle 3
Principle 4
Principle 5
Principle 6
Principle 7
Principle 8
Principle 9

Establish Structure, Responsibility, and
Authority
Demonstrate Commitment to Competence
Enforce Accountability

Risk Assessment

Define Objectives and Risk Tolerances
Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Risks
Assess Fraud Risk
Identify, Analyze, and Respond to
Change

Information and Communication

Principle 13
Principle 14
Principle 15
Principle 16
Principle 17

Use Quality Information
Communicate Internally
Communicate Externally

Monitoring

Perform Monitoring Activities
Evaluate Issues and Remediate
Deficiencies

In compliance with generally accepted government auditing standards, we must determine
whether internal control is significant to our audit objectives. We base our determination of
significance on whether an entity’s internal control impacts our audit conclusion. If some, but not
all, internal control components are significant to the audit objectives, we must identify those
internal control components and underlying principles that are significant to the audit objectives.
In the following matrix, we list our audit objectives, indicate whether internal control was
significant to our audit objectives, and identify which internal control components and underlying
principles were significant to those objectives.

43

For further information on the Green Book, please refer to https://www.gao.gov/greenbook/overview.
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Child Services

Audit Objectives

Did the Office of Child Programs management
evaluate and approve foster care parents as required
by the department’s Policy 16.4, “Foster Home
Selection and Approval”?
Did management have a process in place to recruit
2 and retain foster parents?
Did management follow the department’s policies
3 and procedures to ensure that foster parents
completed in-service training?
Probation and Aftercare Supervision
Did management and staff monitor children on
1 probation and aftercare supervision, as required by
department policy?
Incident Reporting at Youth Development Centers
In response to the prior audit finding, did
department management ensure timely reporting of
incident reports that occurred at the former and
1
current youth development centers operated by the
department?
1

Foster Care Placements
1 Did the Office of Child Programs comply with
department Rule 0250-4-9-.07(5) to ensure children
were placed in foster homes with six children or
less? Did the Office of Child Programs staff
complete the placement exception request form in
accordance with department Policy 16.46?
Employee and Volunteer Screening
Did the Office of Human Resources staff conduct
1 background checks on employees before their hire
date?
Did the regional volunteer coordinators conduct
background checks on volunteers before allowing
2 them to serve the department?
Child Abuse Hotline Investigations
In response to the prior audit finding, did the
department ensure that investigations of Priority 1
allegations of child abuse were completed timely
1 and that case files contained the appropriate
documentation, as required by the department’s
policies and procedures?
Child Protective Investigation Teams
In response to the prior audit finding, did the
department issue statewide protocols for Child
1 Protective Investigation Teams (CPITs)?

Significance

1

Yes

Internal Control Components and Underlying Principles
Significant to the Audit Objectives
Control Environment
Risk Assessment
Control Activities Information & Communication Monitoring
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes
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-

-
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-

-

-

-

-
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No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No
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No
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No

No

No
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No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No
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Internal Control Components and Underlying Principles
Significant to the Audit Objectives
Control Environment
Risk Assessment
Control Activities Information & Communication Monitoring
Audit Objectives

Significance

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

No

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No
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No

Yes
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Yes

No
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No
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No
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No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No
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No

Yes

No
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No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Investigations of Provider Employees and Wilder Youth Development Center Employees
Did the department monitor providers and provider
employees that violated department standards,
Yes
No
No
1 contract provisions, or state regulations?

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Case Manager Caseloads
Did the department analyze caseloads to ensure
1
compliance with state statute?
Provider and Licensed Facilities
Did the Office of Continuous Quality Improvement
(CQI) monitor providers for compliance with state
1 statutes, department rules, and contract
requirements?
Did CQI staff monitor pre-hire background checks
of provider employees to ensure the providers
2
completed the checks before the employees started
working?
Did CQI monitor and inspect licensed agencies for
3 compliance with state licensure requirements and
department rules?
Wilder Youth Development Center
Did the department ensure the Wilder Youth
1 Development Center followed PREA staffing
standards?
Restrictive Behavior Management Techniques
Did the Licensing Division’s staff review restrictive
behavior management (RBM) incidents at juvenile
detention centers as part of the annual licensure
reviews? Did regional clinicians review RBM
1
incidents at hardware-secure residential child caring
agencies (RCCAs) and the Wilder youth
development center?

2

Did the department conduct in-depth reviews on
contract provider employees that were named as the
alleged perpetrator in multiple investigations?

Employee Qualifications
Did the Commissioner and the Office of Human
Resources ensure that employees met the job
1
qualifications in accordance with state statute and
policy?

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No
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No
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No
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No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No
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Internal Control Components and Underlying Principles
Significant to the Audit Objectives
Control Environment
Risk Assessment
Control Activities Information & Communication Monitoring
Audit Objectives
Turnover Analysis
Did department staffing turnover indicate problems
1 with the department’s operations and inhibit its
ability to meet its mission?
Public Records Management
Did the department follow the Department of
1 State’s Records Management Division’s guidance
for retaining and destroying the department’s public
records?
Information Systems Controls
Did the department follow state information
1 systems security policies regarding information
systems controls?
In response to the prior audit finding, did
department management and STS implement our
recommendations relating to system and network
2
performance and financial function improvements
in TFACTS?

Significance

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-
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APPENDIX 2

Department of Children’s Services
Expenditures and Revenues for Fiscal Years 2016 Through 2019
UNAUDITED INFORMATION
Description
Expenditures
Grants and Subsidies
Salaries and Wages
Employee Benefits
Professional Services by State
Agency
Professional Services by Third
Party
Travel
Supplies and Materials
Data Processing
Utilities and Fuel
Communications
Training
Maintenance and Repairs
Rentals and Insurance
Awards and Indemnities
Equipment
Unclassified
Printing and Duplicating
Motor Vehicle Operation
Inventory
Total Expenditures
Revenues
Interdepartmental
Federal Revenue
Current Services
Refund of Prior Year
Expenditures
Non-Government Revenue
Sale of Real Estate
Refund of PY Federal Expense
Other
Appropriations
Work Program Original Entry
WP – Salary Policy
Revenue Expansion (Federal,
Other)
Carryforward Unencumbered
Balance
Supplemental Appropriation
Major Maintenance Carryforward
Total Revenues and
Appropriations
Source: Edison.

2016
$ 410,290,380
176,044,667
75,906,619

Fiscal Year
2017
2018
$ 447,525,318
$ 493,912,893
184,682,647
187,770,308
77,094,708
83,010,624

61,521,438

63,259,997

22,175,919
8,888,277
4,564,649
2,995,760
995,014
720,242
713,591
432,808
313,627
190,518
154,503
44,000
29,379
10,020
(186,656)
$ 765,804,755

22,007,632
8,955,444
3,906,046
2,759,800
971,833
692,138
652,033
503,728
118,090
103,447
16,754
45,600
33,003
8,342
(20,955)
$ 813,315,605

336,693,929
129,268,606
275,012

69,524,980

2019
$ 523,352,995
183,270,115
76,697,893
77,894,341

21,050,315
9,421,681
3,809,867
3,195,351
685,416
643,947
472,005
515,660
188,048
172,089
12,529
46,800
14,811
8,289
(7,412)
$ 874,448,201

22,069,919
10,415,552
3,685,426
3,014,598
444,933
627,961
636,276
841,331
195,848
72,073
197,896
46,470
28,241
3,056
(1,113)
$ 903,493,811

353,508,041
159,063,102
203,598

384,228,771
171,724,816
889,468

404,316,039
169,574,598
1,122,715

244,765
60,621
48,593
9,148
146

314,463
65,000
7,807
221

3,170
20,000
3,821
70

325,137
2,500
12,384
-

736,194,600
1,165,600

767,687,600
2,217,300

801,313,100
2,366,000

825,787,500
2,649,100

37,887,200

53,542,700

77,742,700

90,927,511

5,454,359
-

4,407,239
-

4,217,700
-

2,808,228
5,000,000

330,680
$1,247,633,259

441,900
$1,341,458,971

635,791
$1,443,145,407

627,714
$1,503,153,426
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Source: Edison.
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APPENDIX 3

Department of Children’s Services Operations
The Department of Children’s Services consists of a
central office, located in Nashville, 12 regions, and a youth
development center. See the regional map in Appendix 5.
The department is divided into the following 15 divisions:

The organizational
chart for the
Department of
Children’s Services is in
Appendix 4.

The Office of Child Safety operates the Child Abuse
Hotline and conducts investigations of serious or severe child abuse and neglect. The Special
Investigations Unit responds to allegations of abuse and neglect in settings such as schools, day
cares, or foster homes involving an employee or volunteer acting as a caregiver.
The Office of Juvenile Justice serves youth adjudicated delinquent. 44 The department
places and treats youth in custody at provider and department facilities, and monitors youth then
placed on aftercare and probation. The office also administers the Interstate Compact for Juveniles
to transfer supervision of these youth between states.
The Office of Child Programs supports child permanency through foster care, adoption, inhome family support services, and child independent living. This office also manages the
department’s network of private providers of in-home and out-of-home support services.
The Office of Child Health manages the physical, emotional, behavioral, and educational
health of youth in the department’s care.
The Office of Continuous Quality Improvement includes divisions responsible for
reviewing and monitoring the department’s and partner agencies’ operations. These divisions
assess compliance with federal standards and accreditation requirements, monitor risk
management, conduct internal audits, oversee agencies licensed by the department, monitor data,
manage records releases, monitor contracted providers, and review child deaths.
The Office of Training and Professional Development develops and administers training
and professional development to department staff, foster parents, and provider staff.
The Office of Human Resources manages departmental human resource functions for
department employees across the state, including recruitment, hiring, and employee engagement.
This office also includes the Office of Internal Affairs, which is responsible for investigating
matters related to the department’s management and operation.
The Office of Finance and Budget provides fiscal services including accounts payable,
financial planning, and budgeting.

A youth who has been determined by a judge to have committed an act designated as a crime under the law if
committed by an adult.

44
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The Office of Information Technology (OIT) was a division of the department until January
2018. Due to a statewide initiative to consolidate IT services, all OIT staff were reassigned to the
Department of Finance and Administration as IT support for the Department of Children’s Services
(DCS). All DCS IT support provides IT support specifically for DCS. See Assistance from Other
State Agencies below.
The Office of General Counsel provides legal advice and representation to the department.
The Administrative Procedures Division includes three attorneys as administrative judges
that preside over the department’s contested cases.
The Office of Customer Focused Services communicates with customers to answer
questions and responds to comments and concerns.
The Communications Office coordinates the department’s internal and external
communications.
The Legislative Office manages the department’s legislative actions and monitors
legislation that may impact the department.
The Office of Facilities Management coordinates department facility use, change, and
compliance with safety regulations.
Assistance From Other State Agencies
The Department of Children’s Services (DCS) contracts with the Department of Finance
and Administration (F&A) for general accounting functions, such as recording accounting
transactions; reviewing and approving DCS’s state payment card purchases; maintaining accounts
receivables; monitoring collection efforts; and determining monthly agency cost allocations and
labor distributions. F&A’s Strategic Technology Solutions provides DCS with computer
workstation support.
DCS’s business unit code in Edison is 359.10.
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APPENDIX 4

Department of Children’s Services
Organizational Chart
November 2020

Source: Department of Children’s Services.
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APPENDIX 5

Department of Children’s Services
Regional Map
February 2020

Northwest

Mid-Cumberland

Upper Cumberland

Knox

Southwest

Davidson

East

Smoky Mountain

Shelby

South Central

TN Valley

Northeast

Source: Department of Children’s Services.
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APPENDIX 6

Methodologies to Achieve Audit Objectives
CHILD SERVICES

FOSTER CARE SERVICES
Foster Care Parent Approval
To obtain an understanding of relevant internal control, we met with the Director of Foster
Care and Resource Eligibility and the Team Coordinator for the department’s Davidson Region
and performed walkthroughs and testwork of the key control involving regional approval. We also
reviewed the department’s Policy 16.4, “Foster Home Selection and Approval.”
To determine if the department evaluated and approved foster care homes and foster care
parents, we obtained the list of foster homes approved from October 1, 2016, to June 9, 2020, and
the individuals in each home. From this list, we identified 4,467 unique foster homes with 14,489
individuals. We selected a random, stratified sample of 26 foster homes from across the 12
regions. In addition, we reviewed all files in TFACTS and on paper associated with these homes
to determine if each region approved all adults in the home.
To determine if foster care parents completed the pre-service training, we obtained a list of
7,819 foster parents who were approved during October 1, 2016, through June 9, 2020, and
selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 25 foster parents and reviewed the assessment forms.
Foster Home Recruitment and Retention
To achieve objective 2, we met with the Director of Foster Care and Resource Eligibility,
the Team Coordinator for the Davidson Region, and the Foster Parent Support Team Leader of the
department’s Northwest Region. We also reviewed the department’s Policy 16.7, “Foster Family
Recruitment and Retention.”
To determine if the department recruited and retained foster care parents, we obtained and
reviewed the 2017, 2018, and 2019 annual recruitment and retention plans for each of the 12
regional offices. We also reviewed the number of foster home closures and new foster homes
recruited by the department in 2017, 2018, and 2019 and calculated the recruitment percentage
compared to the number of closures to determine if management met their goal to recruit 10%
more foster homes than were closed in good standing during the previous year.
Foster Care Parent Training
To assess management’s operating effectiveness of internal control as it relates to audit
objectives 1 and 3, we met with the Director of Training and Professional Development, the
Training and Curriculum Director, the Training Officer, and a Foster Parent Support Staff
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employee; performed a walkthrough of the approval process; and tested the approval assessment
form to determine if supervisors reviewed the assessment form. We also reviewed the
department’s Policy 16.4, “Foster Home Selection and Approval”; Policy 16.8, “Responsibilities
of Approved Foster Homes”; Policy 16.9, “Required Foster Parent In-Service Training”; and the
training reports for October 2016 through May 2020. To determine if foster care parents completed
in-service training, we obtained a list of 11,183 foster parents that were active anytime from
October 1, 2016, to June 9, 2020. From this list, we selected a nonstatistical, random sample of
25 foster parents and reviewed their training records.

PROBATION AND AFTERCARE SUPERVISION
To achieve our objective, we interviewed the Office of Juvenile Justice staff and reviewed
the department’s policies and procedures to gain an understanding of probation and aftercare
supervision requirements. To assess management’s design and implementation of internal controls
as they relate to the audit objective, we performed walkthroughs to obtain an understanding of
relevant internal controls.
To determine whether the Office of Juvenile Justice staff monitored children placed on
probation as required by department policy, we obtained a population of 6,147 probation cases that
were documented in TFACTS for the period October 1, 2016, through March 9, 2020, and selected
a nonstatistical, random sample of 62 probation cases. To determine whether Office of Juvenile
Justice staff monitored children who received aftercare services, we obtained a population of 3,111
aftercare cases that were documented in TFACTS for the period October 1, 2016, through March
9, 2020, and selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 60 aftercare cases. For both the probation
and aftercare samples, we reviewed the case recordings of the supervision visits in TFACTS to
determine whether the family service workers monitored the children who received probation and
aftercare services as required.

INCIDENT REPORTING AT YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTERS
To achieve our objective, we discussed the incident reporting process with the Office of
Juvenile Justice staff and obtained and reviewed the department’s incident reporting policies and
procedures. To determine whether management corrected the prior audit finding by ensuring that
staff timely entered incident reports in TFACTS, we obtained a population of 6,445 incident
reports (5,511 from Wilder, 176 from Mountain View, and 758 from Woodland Hills) that staff
entered in TFACTS from March 15, 2017, through March 30, 2020, or until the youth development
center was privatized. For each former and current youth development center, we reviewed the
list of incident reports that were entered more than 5 business days after the incident occurred (13
of 5,511 for Wilder, 5 of 176 for Mountain View, and 22 of 758 for Woodland Hills). We then
reviewed documentation and management’s explanations to determine why the incident reports
were not entered timely.
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SAFETY OF CHILDREN

FOSTER CARE PLACEMENTS
To achieve our objectives, we discussed the foster care placement process with the Office
of Child Programs staff and obtained and reviewed the department’s rules; placement policies and
procedures; applicable federal guidance governing foster care placements; and the Uniform
Administrative Procedures Act governing department rulemaking procedures. We obtained and
reviewed the department’s May 11, 2020, Resource Home Mega Report, which included the total
number of custodial 45 and non-custodial 46 children in all foster homes.
To determine if the Office of Child Programs staff completed Placement Exception
Request (PER) forms according to Policy 16.46, from the May 11, 2020, Resource Home Mega
Report, we selected a nonstatistical sample of 25 homes, which represented 92 total custodial
children, and reviewed each child’s PER form which management provided, or we accessed in the
Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System.

EMPLOYEE AND VOLUNTEER SCREENING
To assess management’s design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of internal
control as it relates to audit objectives 1 and 2, we interviewed the Executive Director of Human
Resources, volunteer coordinators, and regional human resources analysts to obtain an
understanding of relevant internal control for the background check process. We also walked
through the procedures for employee and volunteer background checks, and reviewed state statute
and department policies for background checks.
We obtained a population of 3,644 employees who were active as of January 22, 2020. We
filtered the population to include only those employees hired since January 1, 2018, resulting in a
new population of 853 employees. We selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 60 employees.
We were unable to test 1 employee due to natural disaster damage to the regional office of the
employee. We also selected the Deputy Commissioner of Juvenile Justice for our review. We
performed testwork and reviewed background check results retained by the department to
determine if staff followed state statute and departmental policy by performing background checks
and accurately documenting the results on the internal checklist. In addition, we reperformed
checks of the sex offender registry, abuse registry, and TFACTS records for the 60 employees
selected for our testwork.
We obtained a population of 740 volunteers who served the department during the period
October 1, 2016, through May 27, 2020. We selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 60
volunteers to determine if the staff followed state statute and departmental policy when they
performed background checks and if staff accurately documented the results on the background
A child who is in the department’s custody.
A child who is not in the department’s custody. The physical care and custody of the child(ren) is with the parent
or legal custodian.
41
42
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checklist. To test whether the department staff performed background checks for volunteers, we
requested the volunteer lists from each volunteer coordinator or human resources analyst. We
reviewed volunteer background check information to determine if department staff performed
checks prior to allowing volunteers to serve the department. For some volunteers, we had to
request additional information regarding volunteer start dates.

CHILD ABUSE HOTLINE INVESTIGATIONS
To gain an understanding of the Office of Child Safety operating procedures and to assess
management’s design of internal control as it relates to the audit objective, we conducted
interviews with applicable personnel; performed walkthroughs of the regional Office of Child
Safety’s procedures for conducting and documenting Priority 1 investigations; and reviewed
department policies and procedures.
We obtained a population of 22,961 Priority 1 investigation cases that the department
received between October 1, 2016, and March 9, 2020. We selected a random, nonstatistical
sample of 25 cases. We also expanded our testwork to ensure we reviewed cases from each of the
department’s regions; we selected the first instance of each of 2 regions not represented in the
initial sample of 25 cases, for a total sample of 27 cases from the department’s 12 regions. We
reviewed the investigation files in the Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System (TFACTS)
to determine if staff timely responded to allegations and documented that they performed
investigations as required.

CHILD PROTECTIVE INVESTIGATION TEAMS
To achieve our objective, we interviewed the Executive Director of the Office of Child
Safety and reviewed state statute. We also obtained and reviewed the Tennessee Child Protective
Investigation Team (CPIT) Protocol Guidelines, released in May 2017.

CASE MANAGER CASELOADS
To assess management’s design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of internal
control as it relates to the audit objective, we interviewed the Program Director of the Office of
Continuous Quality Improvement, the Deputy Commissioner of Child Programs, the Executive
Director of Child Safety, the Executive Director of Juvenile Justice, and 10 region administrators,
and we performed walkthroughs, analysis, and review of the department’s caseload analysis.
We also reviewed state statute and maximum caseload standards from Nebraska, Kentucky,
Indiana, and Delaware. We obtained and reviewed caseload summaries and caseload compliance
and averages reports prepared each month from January 2019 through February 2020. We also
used the department’s caseload data provided in the caseload summaries maintained by the Office
of Child Programs to analyze the caseloads by individual case managers.
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PROVIDERS, LICENSED FACILITIES, AND WILDER YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
CENTER

PROVIDER AND LICENSED FACILITIES
Provider Monitoring and Evaluation and Monitoring of Licensed Child Welfare Agencies
To assess management’s design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of internal
controls as they relate to audit objectives 1 and 3, we interviewed the Director of Licensing to
obtain an understanding of relevant internal controls and performed walkthroughs; reviewed
relevant rules, policies and procedures, and provider manuals; and performed testwork of
management’s control activities.
We obtained a list of all custodial contract providers that the monitoring division monitored
or selected for monitoring from October 1, 2016, through June 20, 2020. From a population of
124 custodial providers, we selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 25 providers and reviewed
their monitoring files to determine (1) whether the Director of Provider Monitoring and Evaluation
reviewed the files and drafted reports prior to publication; (2) whether monitoring division staff
ensured providers complied with their contracts and department policies; and (3) whether
monitoring division staff obtained planned corrective action from the providers for all problems
noted during monitoring.
We obtained a list of all agencies the division licensed between January 1, 2017, and
December 31, 2019. From a population of 728 annual licensing monitoring visits, we selected a
nonstatistical, stratified, random sample of 80 licensed visits and reviewed the licensing files to
determine (1) whether the Director of Licensing reviewed the licensing staff’s working papers
before issuing the license to the agency; (2) whether the licensing staff ensured that agencies were
in compliance with state statutes and department rules; and (3) whether the licensing staff
performed the annual licensing visit prior to the agency’s license expiration date.
We interviewed the licensing staff who conduct the annual licensing reviews at juvenile
detention centers and reviewed the Licensing Division’s 2018 and 2019 annual reviews for each
juvenile detention center to determine if the licensing staff reviewed the staffing levels.
Provider Employee Background Checks
To assess management’s design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of internal
controls as it relates to audit objective 2, we interviewed the Director of Provider Monitoring and
Evaluation and the Director of Foster Care and Resource Eligibility to obtain an understanding of
relevant internal controls. We also performed a walkthrough of procedures for the monitoring of
provider background checks, and we reviewed state statute, the provider manual, and departmental
policy for background check requirements.
We obtained a population of 124 provider agencies from October 1, 2016, through June
20, 2020. We selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 17 provider agencies with a total of 77
provider employees to determine if the Provider Monitoring and Evaluation staff monitored
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provider employee background checks. From the provider agencies, we requested the provider
employee background check documentation to compare to the monitoring results from the
department’s Provider Monitoring and Evaluation staff. In addition, we reperformed checks for
the sex offender registry, abuse registry, and TFACTS.

WILDER YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER
We obtained Wilder Youth Development Center’s 2018, 2019, and 2020 PREA staffing
plan assessments. We also requested copies of Wilder’s staffing logs and youth population counts
for the period January 1, 2018, to February 29, 2020, to determine if the department complied with
PREA staffing requirements.

RESTRICTIVE BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
To achieve our objective, we interviewed the Director of the Licensing Division and the
Child Welfare Licensing Program Manager for Juvenile Detention Centers. We also reviewed the
department’s restrictive behavior management (RBM) rules and policies and procedures. In
addition, we reviewed the Licensing Division’s 2018 RBM reviews for all 17 juvenile detention
centers and the 2019 license reviews for all 17 juvenile detention centers. We also reviewed the
Licensing Division’s 2018 and 2019 juvenile detention centers’ RBM documentation and
reviewed the juvenile detention centers’ 2018 and 2019 seclusion incident reports. We reviewed
all of the Wilder Youth Development Center’s 2018 and 2019 incident reports, and all of the
Mountain View Academy for Young Men’s (a RCCA) 2018 and 2019 incident reports.

INVESTIGATIONS OF PROVIDER EMPLOYEES AND WILDER YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
CENTER EMPLOYEES
We interviewed the Executive Director of the Office of Continuous Quality Improvement
and the Director of the Office of Continuous Quality Improvement’s Provider Quality Team
Division. We also performed a walkthrough of procedures for the Provider Quality Teams’
provider violation process.
We also reviewed the Office of Continuous Quality Improvement’s policies, as well as the
department’s rules and statutes. In addition, we reviewed the Provider Quality Teams’ meeting
minutes from January 2018 through March 2020; the tracking spreadsheets for each of the teams;
minutes from meetings with providers; providers’ corrective action plans; and Provider
Performance Improvement Plans that the department issued in 2018 and 2019. Finally, we
obtained a list of Special Investigations Unit investigations and training logs for the department’s
Wilder Youth Development Center employees.
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EMPLOYEE QUALIFICATIONS AND TURNOVER ANALYSIS

EMPLOYEE QUALIFICATIONS
To assess management’s design of internal control as it relates to the audit objective, we
interviewed the Human Resources Executive Director and three regional human resources analysts
to obtain an understanding of relevant internal controls and performed a walkthrough of the
procedures for verifying employee qualifications. We also reviewed Section 8-30-305, Tennessee
Code Annotated; the Department of Human Resources’ Policies 12-006 and 12-066; the
Department of Children’s Services Policy 4.17, “Administrative Policies and Procedures”; and the
Tennessee Excellence, Accountability and Management Act.
We obtained a list of 3,644 active employees as of January 22, 2020. We filtered the
population to include only those employees hired since January 1, 2018, for a population of 853
employees. We selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 60 employees. We were unable to test
1 employee due to natural disaster damage to the regional office. We also selected the Deputy
Commissioner of Juvenile Justice for our review. We performed testwork and reviewed employee
files to determine if the Commissioner and the regional human resources analysts (1) verified that
employees met the qualifications for their positions and (2) documented the employees’ job
qualifications.

TURNOVER ANALYSIS
To achieve our objective, we reviewed turnover rates for the department to gain an
understanding of turnover trends. We then compared the department’s turnover rates to national
rates obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We also analyzed turnover rates by division to
find any outliers. We compared the Wider Youth Detention Center’s average turnover rates to
turnover rates for the adult correctional systems in Tennessee.

PUBLIC RECORDS MANAGMENT

PUBLIC RECORDS MANAGEMENT
To gain an understanding of the records management process, we interviewed the
department’s Records Officer, and we reviewed the Secretary of State’s Records Management Best
Practices and Procedures, Tennessee Code Annotated, the Rules of Public Records Commission,
and internal policies and procedures. We also reviewed the department’s records disposition
authorizations (RDAs) and statewide RDAs to ensure compliance with statewide records
management procedures and requirements.
For each audit area, we inspected documentation as part of our testwork. We compared
the results of our audit work to our expectations based on the written policies and procedures and
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our understanding of management’s processes. Our objectives and testwork in each area are
described in further detail in the applicable sections of our report.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

INFORMATION SYSTEMS CONTROLS
To achieve our objectives, we interviewed the department’s current and former Chief
Information Officers. To assess management’s design, implementation, and operating
effectiveness of internal control as it relates to audit objectives 1 and 2, we interviewed
management to obtain an understanding of relevant internal controls, performed walkthroughs,
reviewed relevant policies and procedures, and performed testwork of management’s control
activities.
We also reviewed a TFACTS Financial Enhancements PowerPoint, which we obtained
from the Department of Finance and Administration’s Division of Strategic Technology Solutions.
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APPENDIX 7

Terms and Definitions Related to Incidents
The following terms and definitions were obtained from the Department of Children’s Services’
(DCS) “Supplemental to Policy 1.4, Incident Reporting.” While the list below is not inclusive, it
is meant to be used as a guide by those individuals charged with reporting incidents.
1. Abduction – A child/youth is taken from a placement by unauthorized individuals (e.g., alleged
perpetrators of abuse, non-custodial parents or relatives, etc.)
2. Arrest/Police Involvement with Child or Youth – A child/youth that is either arrested while in
the custody of DCS and the arrest has been confirmed by a law enforcement agency; or a
child/youth is involved in direct contact with a law enforcement agency and they are not
arrested.
3. Assault – An assault is a willful and malicious attack by a child/youth on another person (this
does not include “horseplay”). A physical fight between youth is the willful participation
between two or more youth in a physical altercation.
4. Assault by Youth on Staff – A youth in DCS custody physically attacks a staff member and
the assault may or may not require medical attention.
5. Confinement – Protective custody is when a youth voluntarily requests to be placed in
confinement due to a legitimate fear for his/her safety. Emergency confinement is when a
youth advocates to other youth that they act in a concerted effort and there is clear and present
danger that actions would cause harm to other youth/staff; take control of any part of the
institution; or cause destruction of property which may significantly alter the living conditions
of other youth or jeopardize the security of the facility.
6. Contraband – Any item possessed by an individual or found within the facility that is illegal
by law or that is expressly prohibited by those legally charged with the responsibility for the
administration and operation of the facility or program and is rationally related to legitimate
security, safety or treatment concerns.
7. Emergency Medical Treatment – A child/youth is injured or suffered an illness that requires
emergency medical attention beyond what the facility staff can provide.
8. Emergency Use of Psychotropic Medication(s) – An emergency one-time dose of a
psychotropic medication in the event of a psychiatric emergency when all other measures have
been determined unlikely to prevent the child/youth from imminent harm to self and/or others.
9. Major Event at Agency – An event at a congregate care location causing a significant
disruption to the overall functioning of the program AND necessitates notifying an emergency
official. This event affects all, or nearly all, of the children and staff at the location, (e.g., riot,
fire, flood, etc.).
10. Mechanical Restraints – The application of a mechanical device, material, or equipment
attached or adjacent to the child/youth’s body, including ambulatory restraints, which the
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child/youth cannot easily remove and that restrict freedom of movement or normal access to
the child/youth’s body.
11. Medication Error – A medication error is when a medication is not administered according to
the prescribing provider and/or according to DCS policies and procedures.
12. Mental Health Crisis – A child/youth is engaged in or experiencing self-injurious behavior,
suicidal ideation or behavior, homicidal ideation or behavior, or acute psychotic episode.
13. Physical Restraint – The use of body contact by staff with a child/youth to restrict freedom of
movement or normal access to his or her body.
14. Property – Any state property that is lost, stolen, missing or damaged with or without intent.
Any personal property that is damaged, missing or stolen while the owner is in the performance
of their duties for the State or on State property.
15. Runaway/Escape – A child/youth who is away from home, residence or any other residential
placement of the child/youth’s parent, guardian or other legal custodian (DCS) without their
consent. Escape is defined as a youth who leaves the grounds of a YDC without permission or
who leaves the care and custody of those transporting them off campus without permission.
17. Search – A strip search is a visual inspection of the youth’s body. A body cavity search is an
in-depth search of a youth’s body only by medical, or health care, personnel when probable
cause exists that contraband is concealed within a body cavity that would threaten the safety
and security of the YDC or its personnel.
18. Seclusion – The confinement of a child/youth alone in a room or an area where the child/youth
is physically prevented from leaving. This definition is not limited to instances in which a
child/youth is confined by a locked or closed door.
19. Security Breach – A violation of established security procedures that occurs either on campus
or during the transport of a child/youth that places staff or youth at risk. May also include the
loss of security equipment such as keys, restraints, radios or tools.
20. Sexual Abuse – Sexual abuse of a student by another student, or by a staff member, contractor,
or volunteer includes any of the following acts, with or without consent of the student:
a) Contact, penetration, any other intentional touching that is unrelated to official duties
or where the staff member, contractor, or volunteer has the intent to abuse, arouse, or
gratify sexual desire.
b) Any attempt, threat, or request by a staff member, contractor, or volunteer to engage in
the activities described in 20 (a).
c) Any display by a staff member, contractor, or volunteer of his or her uncovered
genitalia, buttocks, or breast in the presence of a student.
d) Voyeurism by a staff member, contractor, or volunteer.
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21. Sexual Harassment – Repeated and unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
or verbal comments, gestures, or actions of a derogatory or offensive sexual nature by one
student directed toward another student, or to a student by a staff member, contractor, or
volunteer.
22. Use of Chemical Defense Spray – The discharge, either purposeful or accidental, of chemical
defense spray assigned to a staff member.
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APPENDIX 8

Staff Caseload Counts Greater Than 20 for Calendar Year 2019
Based on the Department’s Method of One Day Each Month
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

21-29 Cases
Staff
% of Staff
208
11.7%
215
12.2%
241
13.5%
237
13.1%
224
12.4%
218
12.0%
155
8.4%
179
9.8%
199
10.9%
214
11.8%
253
13.6%
230
12.3%

30-39 Cases
Staff
% of Staff
75
4.2%
81
4.6%
63
3.5%
92
5.1%
79
4.4%
57
3.1%
29
1.6%
49
2.7%
48
2.6%
55
3.0%
79
4.3%
84
4.5%

40+ Cases
Staff
% of Staff
19
1.1%
18
1.0%
25
1.4%
31
1.7%
35
1.9%
19
1.0%
12
0.7%
7
0.4%
10
0.5%
6
0.3%
21
1.1%
20
1.1%

Source: Tennessee Family and Child Tracking System reports from the Department of Children’s Services.
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APPENDIX 9

Types of Licensed Child Care Facilities
License Type
Family Boarding Home
Group Care Home
Child Placing Agency
Residential Child Caring Agency

Maternity Home
Runaway House
Juvenile Detention Center
Temporary Holding Resource
Child Abuse Prevention Agency

Description
Residential program serving 6 or fewer children.
Essentially an individually licensed foster home.
Residential program serving 7 to 12 children in one location.
Any single agency offering international and/or domestic
adoption services, private foster care, group care homes,
family boarding homes, or any combination thereof.
Residential program that serves 13 or more children in 1
home or building, or through 2 or more homes located on
contiguous properties with a combined total of 13 or more
children.
Neo- and post-natal residential services for pregnant
residents. Includes both minor and adult clients. License
can be supplemental to existing residential license.
These facilities provide short-term sanctuary or housing to
any person under the age of 18 who is away from the
residence of their parent or guardian without consent.
Temporary, hardware-secure housing for youth awaiting
adjudication or disposition of juvenile court.
Temporary, hardware-secure housing for youth awaiting
adjudication or disposition of juvenile court. Maximum stay
is 72 hours. At least 50% of beds must be non-secure.
Any person [excluding any person licensed to practice
medicine or psychology], corporation [excluding any
school, hospital, mental health center, or similar institution
operated or approved by an agency or Department of the
State of Tennessee], or agency [excluding any church or
church related organization] which provides any services,
designed to prevent or treat child abuse or neglect or to
protect children from child abuse or neglect.

Source: Department of Children’s Services’ Office of Continuous Quality Improvement’s Licensing Division.
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APPENDIX 10

Juvenile Detention Centers

Source: Auditor generated based on the department’s list of juvenile detention centers.

128

Facility
Bedford County Juvenile
Detention Center
Blount County Juvenile
Detention Center
Bradley County Juvenile
Detention Center
Davidson County Juvenile
Detention Center
Hamilton County Juvenile
Detention Center
Madison County Juvenile
Detention Center
Middle Tennessee Juvenile
Detention Center
Putnam County Juvenile
Detention Center
Rhea County Juvenile
Detention Center
Richard L. Bean Juvenile
Service Center/ Knox County
Juvenile Detention Center
Rutherford County Juvenile
Detention Center
Scott County Juvenile
Detention Center
Sevier County Juvenile
Services Center
Shelby County Juvenile
Detention Center
UHS/McDowell Juvenile
Detention Center
Upper East Tennessee Regional
Juvenile Detention Center
Williamson County Juvenile
Detention Center

Juvenile Detention Centers
County
Sheriff
Privately
Bed
DCS
Owned/
Office
Owned/
Capacity
Contracted
Operated Operated Operated
6

X

33

X

27

X

X
X
X

86

X

26

X

8

X

X

53

X

20

X

X

7

X

X

120

X

64

X

12

X

26

X

135

X

X

X

X

X

4

X

12

X

12

X

Source: Department of Children’s Services Office of Juvenile Justice.
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X

APPENDIX 11

Youth Development Center and Hardware-Secure Residential Child Caring Agencies

Source: Auditor generated based on information from the department’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Licensing
Division.

Youth Development Center and Hardware-Secure Residential Child Caring Agencies
Bed
DCS
Privately
DCS
Facility
Capacity
Operated Operated Contracted
*John S. Wilder Youth Development
120
X
Center
*Mountain View Academy for Young
Men (Hardware-Secure Residential
24
X
X
Child Caring Agency)
Hollis Residential Treatment Center
(Hardware-Secure Residential Child
13
X
X
Caring Agency)

Source: Department of Children’s Services Office of Juvenile Justice and Licensing Division.
* Facility is owned by the Department of Children’s Services
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APPENDIX 12

Department Rule for Restrictive Behavior Management Techniques
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133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

APPENDIX 13

Department Policies for Restrictive Behavior Management Techniques
State of Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services

Administrative Policies and Procedures: 19.11
Subject:

Use of Physical Restraint and Seclusion

Authority:

TCA 33-3-104, 33-3-120, 37-5-105, 37-5-106

Standards:

COA: PA-BSM 2, BSM 3, BSM 4, BSM 5, BSM 6; DCS Practice Standards: 7-100A, 7121C, 7-122D, 7-200A, 7-201A, 7-202A, 7-204A, 7-215C, 7-216C, 7-217C, 7-218C, 7-219C,
7-220C, 7-223C, 7-224C, 7-227C, 7-228C, 7-229C, 8-304; ACA: 4-JCF-3C03, 4-JCF-2A19, 4-JCF-2A-29, 4-JCF-2A-30; JCAHO Behavioral Health Standard; Rules of the
Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, Mental Health
Services, Chapter 0940-03-09, Use of Isolation, Mechanical Restraint, and Physical Holding
Restraint in Mental Health Residential Treatment Facilities; PREA: 115.342

Application:

To all Department of Children’s Services and Youth Development Center Employees and
Contract Providers (with the exception of Detention Centers).

Policy Statement:
DCS is committed to reducing, and ideally preventing, the use of physical restraint and seclusion of the
children/youth it serves. Physical restraint and seclusion may be used only in an emergency when the
child/youth, due to his/her current behavior, poses an imminent risk of harm to himself/herself or others. This
policy applies to all children and youth in DCS custody/guardianship regardless of adjudication. Physical
restraint and seclusion will not be used as a means of punishment, discipline, coercion, convenience or
retaliation nor used as a supplement for a lack of staff presence or competency.

Purpose:
To set clear minimal standards and expectations for DCS employees, Contract Providers and DCS
Kin/Foster/Adoptive Parents in order to maintain a safe and therapeutic environment for children and youth in
all care settings. The use of physical restraint or seclusion is seen as a restrictive intervention and one that
poses a risk to the physical and/or psychological well-being of a child/youth.

Procedures:
A. Definitions of
Physical Restraint
and Seclusion

1. “Physical restraint” is the use of body contact by staff with a child/youth to restrict
freedom of movement or normal access to his or her body.
The following is not considered physical restraint and is considered acceptable:
 Physical touch associated with prompting, comforting or assisting that does
not prevent the service recipient’s freedom of movement or normal access to
his or her body;
2. “Seclusion” is the confinement of a child/youth alone in a room or an area where
the child/youth is physically prevented from leaving. This definition is not limited to
instances in which a child/youth is confined by a locked or closed door.
Seclusion does not include:
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a) The segregation of a child/youth for the purpose of managing biological
contagion consistent with the Centers for Disease Control Guidelines;
b) Confinement to a locked unit or ward where other children/youth are present.
Seclusion is not solely confinement of a child/youth to an area, but separation of
the child/youth from other persons; or
c) Voluntary time-out involving the voluntary separation of an individual child/youth
from others. The child/youth is allowed to end the separation at will.
d) Locking youth in their rooms in a YDC setting for routine purposes. The only
times that locking youth in their rooms is acceptable are described in Policy 27.1,
Securing Student Rooms at a Youth Development Center.
B. Use of Physical
Restraint and
Seclusion

1. Physical Restraint is allowed only in a DCS Youth Development Center and
facilities contracted by the Department of Children’s Services and licensed as a
Mental Health Residential Treatment Facility for Children and Youth (Rules of the
Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services,
Licensure, Chapter 0940-5-37), an Intellectual Developmental Disabilities
Residential Habilitation Facility (Chapter 0940-05-24) or appropriately staffed Group
Homes.
2. Group Homes authorized to make use of physical restraints maintain a staffing
pattern of 1:5 (one direct-care, awake staff for every five on-site youth) during
waking hours and 1:8 (one direct-care, awake staff for every eight on-site youth)
during sleeping hours, and have the ability to adhere to all aspects of this policy.
Staff persons counted in the staff-to-child/youth ratio may only be persons who are
assigned to provide direct program services as described by written job description.
3. Physical Restraint and seclusion are prohibited by DCS in Contract Provider
kin/foster/adoptive homes (See DCS Policy 16.8, Responsibilities of Approved
Foster Homes and 19.12, Behavior Management).
4. While DCS prohibits the use of physical restraint in foster homes and group settings
without appropriate staffing or training, there may be rare emergency situations in
which a foster parent or group home staff member may have to intervene physically
in order to keep a youth safe (e.g. to separate two youths who are fighting when
one or both youth require restriction of movement). The provider will report all
incidents of physical restraint as outlined in DCS Policy 1.4 Incident Reporting,
including documentation elements 1a-1e from section K of this policy.
5. Seclusion is allowed only in a DCS Youth Development Center and facilities
contracted by the Department of Children’s Services and licensed as a Mental
Health Residential Treatment Facility for Children and Youth (Rules of the
Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services,
Licensure, Chapter 0940-5-37).
6. The facility has an organizational philosophy that works to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate the use of all physical restraints and seclusion and prevent emergencies
that have the potential to lead to the use of restraints or seclusions.
7. Physical restraint and seclusion are emergency safety interventions, not therapeutic
techniques, and are implemented in a manner designed to protect the child/youth’s
safety, dignity and emotional well-being.
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8. Staffing levels and resources are set to minimize circumstances that give rise to
emergency situations that may require the use of physical restraint or seclusion,
and that maximize safety when these interventions are used. There is sufficient
staffing to ensure appropriate supervision of all other children/youth while trained
staff devotes full time and attention to all uses and phases of physical restraint and
seclusion.
9. The use of physical restraint is allowed only in the case of an emergency, when the
child/youth is at imminent danger of self-harm or of harming others and no other
option exists to protect the safety of the child/youth and staff members.
10. In a YDC setting, physical restraint may also be justified to prevent a clear and
immediate escape attempt.
11. Clothing may not be removed from a child/youth in conjunction with the use of
physical restraint or seclusion, other than that which is determined to place the
child/youth or others at risk.
C. Initial Assessment
1. Upon the child/youth’s placement into the facility, an initial assessment (which may
and Notification
incorporate information and assessments prior to admission into the facility) takes
place to obtain information about the child/youth that could help minimize the use of
physical restraint or seclusion. The assessment includes the identification of:
a) Precursors of behavior that put youth or others at risk of harm.
b) Techniques, methods or tools that will help the child/youth control his or her
behavior. When appropriate, parents, family members and placement staff may
assist in the identification of such techniques based on knowledge of what
interventions have been beneficial in the past for the individual child/youth;
c) Pre-existing medical or psychiatric conditions or physical disabilities and
limitations that would place the child/youth at greater risk during physical
restraint or seclusion; and
d) History of sexual or physical abuse or trauma that would place the child/youth at
greater psychological risk during physical restraint or seclusion.
2. Upon the child/youth’s admission into the program, the YDC or Contract Provider
Agency informs the child/youth and his/her legal guardian(s) of the policy regarding
the use of physical restraint or seclusion during emergency situations that may
occur while the child/youth is in the program. The communication is in a manner
that the child/youth and his/her legal guardian(s) understand and the parent or legal
guardian’s consent will be sought. This information is communicated both orally
and in writing. For youth in a YDC, it may be difficult to involve parents or legal
guardians, however, conversations with families are held to the most reasonable
extent possible.
D. Training

1. All staff who make use of physical restraint or seclusion are trained prior to
performing these interventions and annually thereafter by a certified trainer in
nationally recognized crisis intervention program.
2. The training involves a post-test and the observation of staff in practice to ensure
competency.
3. Records of staff completion of training is maintained and made available to DCS
upon request.
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4. Training addresses prevention of the use of restrictive behavior management
techniques through a curriculum that includes the following:
a) Recognizing aggressive and out-of-control behavior, psychosocial issues,
medical conditions, and other contributing factors that may lead to a crisis;
b) Understanding how staff behavior can influence the behavior of children/youth;
c) Understanding the limitations of restrictive behavior management techniques
such as physical restraint or seclusion;
d) Listening and communication techniques such as negotiation and mediation;
e) Involving the person in regaining control and encouraging self-calming
behaviors;
f)

Separation of individuals involved in an altercation;

g) Physical intervention for the temporary touching or holding of the hand(s),
wrist(s), arm(s), shoulder(s) or back for the purpose of inducing the service
recipient to walk to a safe location;
h) Voluntary time out to allow the person to calm down, and,
i)

Other non-restrictive methods to de-escalate and reduce episodes of
aggressive and out-of-control behavior.

5. Training includes staff understanding of:
a) When it is appropriate to use a restrictive intervention such as physical restraint
or seclusion
b) Safe use of physical restraint and seclusion, including time limits
c) Understanding of the experience of being placed in a physical restraint or in
seclusion
d) Response techniques to prevent and reduce injury
e) Negative effects that can result from misuse of restrictive interventions
6. Training also includes staff learning to recognize and assess the following during a
restrictive behavior management intervention, such as physical restraint or
seclusion:
a) Physical and mental status of the child/youth, including signs of physical
distress,
b) Nutritional and hydration needs of the child/youth,
c) Readiness to discontinue use of the physical restraint or seclusion, and
d) Recognizing when medical or other emergency personnel are needed.
E. Authorization and
1. The staff member(s) performing the physical restraint contacts a Qualified Clinician
performance of
to authorize the intervention either prior to the intervention, or immediately following
Physical Restraint
the intervention if obtaining prior permission is infeasible due to the emergent
or Seclusion
nature of the situation. While it is best practice to obtain this authorization prior to
the intervention, DCS understands that this is not always possible when handling
the types of emergencies requiring the use of physical restraint or seclusion.
Original Effective Date: DCS 27.3, 04/01/04
Current Effective Date: 09/11/17
Supersedes: DCS 27.2 & 27.3, 07/01/16
CS-0001
RDA SW22

Page 4 of 9

148

Subject: Use of Physical Restraint and Seclusion

19.11

2. Authorization of intervention: Clinicians qualified to authorize physical restraint or
seclusion are noted in the definition section under “Qualified Clinician” and differ
slightly for a YDC. DCS acknowledges that when restraint is used consistent with
B4, the provider may not have the type of clinician noted in this section.
3. For seclusion, objects (such as belts, shoes, jewelry) that can be used to inflict selfinjury are to be taken from the child/youth prior to placement of the child/youth in
the seclusion room if there are indications in the child/youth’s record or if the
child/youth’s current behavior suggests that such precautions are warranted.
4. A new authorization is required if there is a change in the intervention utilized. If the
use of physical restraint or seclusion has been discontinued, it may be used again
only with a new authorization, even if a previously authorized time limit has not
expired.
5. Authorizations for the use of physical restraint are time-limited up to fifteen (15)
minutes for children age nine (9) years and under and up to thirty (30) minutes for
children/youth ages ten (10) years and over. Physical restraints lasting longer than
the allowed time frames require clinical justification for continuation and a new
authorization.
6. Authorizations for the use of seclusion are time-limited up to fifteen (15) minutes for
children age nine (9) and under, up to thirty (30) minutes for children/youth age 1013 and up to one (1) hour for youth age 14 and over. Seclusion lasting longer than
the specified time frame requires clinical justification and a new authorization.
7. The new authorization of restraints or seclusions that exceed the initial time limits
must be from a qualified clinician. The new authorization will have the same time
limits as those identified in E5 and E6 above.
8. Time-limited authorizations do not mean that the use of restrictive behavior
management interventions will be applied for the entire length of time for which the
authorization is written. Physical restraint and seclusion is used only for the
minimum amount of time necessary.
F. Seclusion Room
Characteristics

Seclusion is provided only in a clean, dry, temperate location and free of potentially
hazardous conditions from which the child/youth might harm him or herself or others.
Rooms used for seclusion allow staff full view of the child/youth in all areas of the
room. The room will have the following qualities:
a) For non-YDC facilities, the entrance to the room is either unlocked for ingress
and egress, or is fitted with a sensor (or other suitable safety device) that must
be continuously controlled by the staff member monitoring the room for the
door to remain locked.
b) The room is lighted and well ventilated.
c) Light fixtures are screened or recessed, interior doorknobs are removed, and
hinges are recessed.
d) The room is at a minimum fifty (50) square feet in area.
e) The room is unfurnished and may have padding that is designed specifically for
use in psychiatric or similar settings and approved by the local health and fire
authorities.
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The room contains an observation window the dimensions of which permit a
child/youth to be in view regardless of where he/she is positioned in the room.

g) Inspected and approved under regulations adopted by the State Fire Marshal
prior to usage.
G. Monitoring and
assessment

1. A child/youth in physical restraint or in seclusion is continually assessed and
monitored. All staff involved in conducting or monitoring restraints or seclusions are
fully trained in compliance with the Training section (D) of this policy.
 Monitoring of physical restraint is by direct visual observation and staff remain in
the immediate physical presence of and in the same room as the child/youth.
Video monitoring does not meet this requirement. Monitoring of seclusion is by
direct in-person (face-to-face) visual observation through the seclusion room
window or in the room itself.
2. In addition to monitoring the child/youth on a continuous, face-to-face basis, staff
assess the child/youth every 15 minutes for:
a) Any harmful health effects or signs of any injury associated with the intervention;
b) Psychological status and comfort of child/youth;
c) Child/youth’s need for food, water, and use of bathroom facilities;
d) Readiness to discontinue the intervention; and
e) Difficulty breathing and any other physical complaints that may signal the need
to discontinue the intervention.

H. Termination and
Follow-up
Assessment

1. Physical restraint and seclusion are used for the minimum time possible. These
interventions are terminated when the behavior justifying their use no longer exists
or if the face-to-face assessments required by this policy do not occur. Immediate
release occurs with any threat to the child/youth’s physical or emotional well-being.
2. For non-YDC’s, within one (1) hour of the initiation of the use of physical restraint, a
Qualified Clinician or Registered Nurse will conduct an in-person evaluation of the
individual. The purpose of this in-person assessment is to work with the youth and
staff to determine ways the youth can regain control and make any necessary
revisions to the youth’s treatment plan.
3. For a YDC, nursing staff is notified immediately following any incident of seclusion
or restraint.
a) Nursing staff is notified immediately. If nursing staff is not available, security
staff that was not involved in the incident is responsible for assessing the youth
for injuries.
b) A photograph of the youth’s face is taken and photographs of any observed or
reported injuries from the waist up and from the knees down. All injuries are
documented on form CS-0166 Accident/Incident/Injury Report and
photographs are attached to the report. Photographs are taken by nursing or by
a security supervisor if nursing staff are unavailable.
c) Nursing staff document the incident, the findings from the assessment,
photographs and any treatment given to the youth in the medical chart.
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I. Medical Treatment

If a child/youth is injured as a result of the use of physical restraint or seclusion, staff
immediately obtains medical treatment for that child/youth.

J. Debriefing

1. The youth, staff and parent or legal guardian participate in a debriefing about the
physical restraint or seclusion episode as soon as possible, but no longer than
twenty-four (24) hours after the intervention occurred.
2. The debriefing occurs in a safe, confidential setting.
3. Parents, legal guardians and/or DCS employees are provided the opportunity to
participate in a discussion with appropriate staff about the episode that precipitated
the use of physical restraint or seclusion. If this is not feasible, attempts to reach
these individuals or reason for not including these individuals are documented in
the Incident Report.
4. The debriefing with the youth, staff and parent or legal guardian is used to:
a) Ascertain that the child/youth’s physical well-being, psychological comfort, and
right to privacy were addressed;
b) Identify any trauma that may have resulted from the incident and identify
services to address the trauma;
c) Identify what led to the emergency and what could have been handled
differently;
d) Facilitate the child/youth’s reentry into routine activities; and
e) When indicated, modify the child/youth’s treatment plan.
5. Debriefing with staff takes place in order to:
a) Assess staff physical and emotional status.
b) Discuss what precipitating events led to the intervention, how the incident was
handled, and discuss any necessary changes to procedures or training to avoid
future incidents
6. Debriefing takes place with any children/youth or other individuals who witnessed
the incident, with an emphasis placed on returning the environment to pre-incident
condition and resuming the normal program routine.
7. YDC staff follows the steps outlined in the Procedure: Steps for Debriefing and
Reporting the Use of Seclusion in a Youth Development Center (YDC) and
document the debriefing utilizing form CS-0165, Youth Behavior Management
Debriefing.

K. Notification and
Documentation

1. The Department of Children’s Services is notified of all incidents of physical
restraints or seclusions as outlined in DCS Policy 1.4 Incident Reporting.
Documentation includes the following:
a) A clear description of the events and behavior leading to the initiation of the
physical restraint or seclusion, including the specific risk of harm presented by
the child/youth
b) A description of attempts by staff to prevent and de-escalate the child/youth
prior to utilizing physical restraint or seclusion
c) Names of the child/youth and personnel involved
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d) Duration of intervention
e) A description of all injuries that occur because of the intervention
f)

Verification of continuous observation and 15 minute checks

g) A note that debriefing occurred
h) A note about who authorized and re-authorized the intervention, and who saw
the youth within 1 hour (if applicable).
2. Until and unless Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) has occurred, the
child/youth’s parents are notified within 24 hours of the occurrence of any physical
restraint or seclusion and outcome of debriefing.
3. An acknowledgement, in writing, from the child/youth and the parent, guardian or
DCS, as appropriate, that he or she has been informed of the facility’s policy on
the use of physical restraint in an emergency situation is placed in the
child/youth’s record.
L. Internal Review

1. The YDC or Contract Provider Agency engage in ongoing performance
improvement activities that focus on the reduction of the use of physical restraint
and seclusion. Information obtained through the review processes are considered,
at least quarterly, in the identification of specific performance improvement activities
and in the evaluation of the effectiveness of performance improvement activities.
2. Agencies utilize data throughout the year to identify trends in use of restrictive
behavior management techniques in order to reduce the use of physical restraint
and seclusion.
3. The YDC or Contract Provider Agency ensures that a routine process is in place to
address the use of crisis intervention and physical restraint or seclusion in
individual and/or group supervision with all direct service and clinical staff. Such
supervision focuses on analyzing individual interventions as well as patterns of
intervention to identify ways to increase the effective use of prevention methods
and further reduce the use of physical restraint or seclusion.
4. The YDC or Contract Provider Agency ensures that the program or clinical director
is notified following each use of seclusion or physical restraint and that each
incident is administratively reviewed no later than one (1) working day following an
incident.

Forms:

CS-0165, Youth Behavior Management Debriefing
CS-0166 Accident/Incident/Injury Report
CS-0496, Incident Report
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Children’s Health Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-310 H.R. 4365)

Collateral
documents:

DCS Policy 1.4, Incident Reporting
DCS Policy 19.1, Suicide/Self Harm Prevention and Intervention in a Youth
Development Center
DCS Policy 19.12, Behavior Management
Procedure: Steps for Debriefing and Reporting the Use of Seclusion in a Youth
Development Centers (YDC)
Tennessee Department of Mental Health/Developmental Disabilities Rules and
Regulations
DCS Standards of Professional Practice For Serving Children and Families: A
Model of Practice

Glossary:
Term
Isolation

Definition

Physical
restraint:

The use of body contact by staff with a child or youth to restrict freedom of movement or
normal access to his or her body.

Qualified
Clinician

A Qualified Clinician is any one of the following:

See Seclusion

•

Medical doctor or doctor of osteopathy

•

Certified nurse practitioner

•

Physician assistant

•

Nurse with a master’s degree in nursing who functions as a psychiatric nurse

•

Psychologist with Health Service Provider designation

•

Licensed professional counselor

•

Senior psychological examiner

•

Licensed marriage and family therapist

•

Licensed clinical social worker

For a YDC only: A Licensed Practical Nurse or a Registered Nurse may also serve as a
Qualified Clinician.
Seclusion

The confinement of a child/youth alone in a room or an area where the child/youth is
physically prevented from leaving. This definition is not limited to instances in which a
child/youth is confined by a locked or closed door.

Secure Facility

For the purposes of this DCS Policy: A Youth Development Center, DMHDD licensed
residential mental health facility, psychiatric hospital.
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Supersedes: DCS 27.2 & 27.3, 07/01/16
CS-0001
RDA SW22
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State of Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services

Administrative Policies and Procedures: 27.35 DOE

Subject:

Use of Mechanical Restraints

Authority:

TCA 37-5-106

Standards:

COA: PA-BSM 1.02, PA-BSM 2.03, PA-BSM 5.01-5.02, PA-BSM 5.06-5.07, PA-BSM
6.01

Application:

To all employees of Youth Development Centers.

Active Memo:

This linked memo supplements requirements in this policy: DOE Policy 27.35
Directive- Date 3/1/16

Active Memo

This linked DCS form supplements requirements in this policy: CS-1083,
Authorization for the Use of Mechanical Restraints and Procedures for
Inoperable Mechanical Restraints –Date 10/19/16

Policy Statement:
The use of mechanical restraints on a youth shall be a temporary measure and shall not continue longer
than is absolutely necessary to prevent the serious bodily injury of youths and/or staff and/or substantial
damage to facility property. The use of mechanical restraints shall be fully documented and reported and
shall never be applied as punishment.

Procedures:
A.

Mechanical restraints shall be applied in a manner which is not injurious to the youth and
used, only in the following instances:
1. As a precaution against escape during the movement of a youth who presents a high
risk for escape within a facility or when transporting a youth outside the facility.
2. To prevent self-injury to a youth;
3. To prevent injury to another youth or staff member;
4. When a youth is causing substantial destruction to property and cannot otherwise be
restrained;
5. For medical reasons, when authorized by a physician or by medical staff under the
guidance of a protocol authorized by the responsible facility physician.

B.

Each Superintendent shall designate in writing those staff members authorized to approve
the use of mechanical restraints and those staff members authorized to routinely carry

Original Effective Date: 27.35 DOE, 07/01/90
Current Effective Date: 10/19/16
Supersedes: 27.35 DOE, 03/01/16
CS-0001
RDA SW22
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mechanical restraints.
C.

Superintendents shall ensure that all staff members authorized to apply mechanical
restraints are properly trained in the use of such restraints.

D.

Each use of mechanical restraints must have the prior approval of the Superintendent or
designee.

E.

In an emergency situation, the use of mechanical restraints shall be reported, as soon as
possible and in no event longer than one hour, to the staff member authorized to approve
such use.

F.

The use of mechanical restraints shall be a temporary measure and shall not continue for
longer than is necessary. Youths shall not remain in mechanical restraints in excess of
three (3) continuous hours except as prescribed in Section III (G).

G.

Prior approval to use mechanical restraints while transporting a youth must obtained from
the Superintendent or designee. This approval must document the reason(s) why
mechanical restraints are necessary in the specific circumstances. Mechanical restraints
shall be removed as soon as possible after the youth has arrived at his/her destination.

H.

While the youth is in mechanical restraints, he/she shall remain under the constant visual
supervision of a staff member. The supervising staff member shall check the mechanical
restraints every 15 minutes. This provision shall not apply when the youth is being
transported, however, the youth should be checked each time the vehicle is stopped.

I.

Mechanical restraints shall never be applied as punishment or used in a manner so as to
cause any unnecessary discomfort for the youth.

J.

Each incident of use of mechanical restraints shall be reported on CS-0311 Facility
Incident Report, by the person applying the restraints. The report will be submitted to the
Superintendent for review and a copy placed in the youth's file. Copies of all Facility
Incident Report forms shall be forwarded to the Director of Youth Development Centers.

Forms:

CS-0311 Facility Incident Report

(Note: This Policy Cannot Be Revised Without Prior Permission
of Chancery Court, Davidson County, Nashville, Tennessee.)

Original Effective Date: 27.35 DOE, 07/01/90
Current Effective Date: 10/19/16
Supersedes: 27.35 DOE, 07/15/09
CS-0001
RDA SW22
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State of Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services

Administrative Policies and Procedures: 27.36 DOE

Subject:

Use of Chemical Agents (Mace)

Authority:

TCA 37-5-106

Standards:

None

Application:

To all employees at Youth Development Centers.

Active Memo:

This linked memo supplements requirements in this policy: DOE Policy 27.36
Directive

Policy Statement:
Mace shall be issued as standard security equipment only at Taft Youth Center. Mace shall be used only
in emergency situations involving an immediate likelihood of serious bodily injury to a student, visitor,
and/or staff member. Mace shall be used only by trained personnel who have been authorized for such
use by the Superintendent. Mace shall be used only as a last resort and its use shall be preceded by an
oral warning of the intended action.

Procedures:
A.

Employees shall not possess or use chemical agents except as specifically provided in this policy.

B.

Prior to the employee being issued mace, he/she shall be trained in the proper use of chemical
agents and this shall be documented on the employee’s training record.

C.

A written record of the issue of mace canisters, including the name of the employees and the
date, shall be maintained by the Children’s services manager of Security. Its issue at other
juvenile facilities shall be limited to emergency situations and then only at the-discretion of the
Commissioner or designee.

D.

Mace shall be used only when there is an immediate likelihood of serious bodily injury to a
student, visitor, and/or staff member, and only after less severe measures to bring the situation
under control have been determined to be ineffective. Examples of situations where the use of
mace would be acceptable are as follows:
1. To break up a fight between or among students who do not respond to an
oral order to discontinue, and with whom physical intervention by staff is ineffective or clearly
ill advised.

Original Effective Date: 27.36 DOE, 07/01/90
Current Effective Date: 03/01/16
Supersedes: 27.36 DOE, 07/15/09
CS-0001
RDA SW22
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2. To repel a student who is out of control of normal supervision and presents an immediate
danger to himself/herself or the overall functioning of the facility.

E.

An oral warning of the intention to use mace must be given prior to its use.

F.

Any person exposed to mace shall be given immediate medical attention by the medical staff.
Such cases shall be documented in the student's medical records.

G.

A staff member who has used mace shall submit a Facility Incident Report (Form CS-0311) to the
Children’s services manager of Security prior to the end of their shift.

H.

The Children’s services manager of Security shall submit the Facility Incident Report (Form CS0311)) for the Superintendent's review within 24 hours following an the incident.

I.

The Superintendent or designee shall report any use of mace on the Department of Children’s
Services Facility Incident Report (Form CS-0311). The use of mace report shall be attached to
the critical incident report.

J.

When it is not in use, the Children’s services manager of Security shall ensure that the mace is
stored in a locked, secure area that is inaccessible to students. Such area shall be designated by
the Superintendent.

K.

The Youth Services Manager of Security shall be responsible for ensuring that and old canisters
of mace are disposed of in a manner which prevents them from becoming accessible to students.
He/she shall also be responsible for ensuring that an accurate inventory of mace is maintained
and for making a monthly report to the Superintendent concerning such inventory.

L.

Inappropriate use of mace shall be grounds for possible disciplinary action up to, and including,
termination of employment. When a staff member becomes aware of a misuse of mace, he/she
shall report immediately such misuse to his/her supervisor, who shall report such misuse to the
Superintendent within 24 hours after receiving the report. After receiving such report, the
Superintendent or designee shall investigate the incident promptly and take whatever action
he/she deems appropriate. The results of the superintendent's investigation and any action taken
shall be in writing and shall be maintained on file for a period of three (3) years at a central
location designated by the superintendent.

Forms:

CS-0311 Facility Incident Report

(Note: This Policy Cannot Be Revised Without Prior Permission
of Chancery Court, Davidson County, Nashville, Tennessee.)

Original Effective Date: 27.36 DOE, 07/01/90
Current Effective Date: 03/01/16
Supersedes: 27.36 DOE, 07/15/09
CS-0001
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APPENDIX 14
Restrictive Behavior Management Incidents
Number of RBM Incidents
2018–2019

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

JOHN S. WILDER YDC

6,003

KNOX COUNTY JDC
HAMILTON COUNTY JDC

7,000

763
622

DAVIDSON COUNTY JDC

319

MOUNTAIN VIEW RCCA

304

MIDDLE TN JDC

265

RUTHERFORD COUNTY JDC

232

PUTNAM COUNTY JDC

169

SHELBY COUNTY JDC

33

BRADLEY COUNTY JDC

27

SEVIER COUNTY JDC

25

MADISON COUNTY JDC

14

BEDFORD COUNTY JDC

11

UPPER EAST TN JDC

7

SCOTT COUNTY JDC

5

MCDOWELL/UHS JDC

4

BLOUNT COUNTY JDC

2

RHEA COUNTY JDC

0

WILLIAMSON COUNTY JDC

0

Source: Department of Children’s Services and incident reports uploaded to the Tennessee Family and Child
Tracking System (TFACTS).

Number of RBM Incidents by Category 2018–2019
Restrictive Behavior Technique
Facility*
Bedford County JDC
Blount County JDC
Bradley County JDC
Davidson County JDC
Hamilton County JDC
Knox County JDC
Madison County JDC
McDowell/UHS JDC

Seclusion
6
1
24
4
519
678
4
0

Chemical
Defense
Spray
5
0
0
1
53
0
7
0

Physical
Restraint

Mechanical
Restraint

Taser

Pressure
Point

Total

0
0
1
219
40
61
3
2

0
0
2
95
10
24
0
2

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

11
2
27
319
622
763
14
4
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Restrictive Behavior Technique
Facility*
Middle TN JDC
Putnam County JDC
Rhea County JDC
Rutherford County JDC
Scott County JDC
Sevier County JDC
Shelby County JDC
Upper East TN JDC
Williamson County JDC
John S. Wilder YDC
Mountain View RCCA

Seclusion
1
93
0
64
0
8
0
0
0
2,414
54

Chemical
Defense
Spray
85
8
0
68
5
0
0
4
0
0
0

Physical
Restraint

Mechanical
Restraint

Taser

Pressure
Point

Total

90
24
0
42
0
7
22
1
0
381
192

89
42
0
80
0
10
11
2
0
3208
58

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

265
169
0
232
5
25
33
7
0
6,003
304

*Hollis Residential Treatment Center (RCCA) opened in May 2020; therefore, auditors did not include it in the table.
Sources: Department of Children’s Services and incident reports uploaded to the Tennessee Family and Child Tracking
System (TFACTS).
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APPENDIX 15

TFACTS Timeline and Project Descriptions

Source: Chief Information Officer for the Department of Children’s Services
Department of Children’s Services
TFACTS Timeline
Department’s Information
Systems’ functions
consolidated under Strategic
Technology Solutions

Juvenile Justice – Evidence
Based Practice

Commercial Sexual Exploitation
of a Minor

SOLR

Assessments – Phase 1

Permanency Plan –
Phase 1 (CFTM)

Document Storage Project –
Phase 1

Incident Reporting
Modifications

National Youth in Transition
Database External Interface

Health/ Well Being Redesign –
Phase 2

Case Assignment Roles

Juvenile Justice Child and
Adolescent Needs and
Strength (CANS)
Assessment Enhancement

TFACTS Readable Summary

TFACTS Mobility
TFACTS
Implementation

2010

2011–2012

TFACTS Data Dashboards

Services Request

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Central Intake Workflow

In-Home Tennessee

Financials – Accounts Payable

Diligent Search

TFACTS Data Warehouse

Child Death/Near Death
Workflow

TFACTS Mobility
Fostering Connections
Server Migration
Batch and Report Scheduler

Child Abuse Hotline Web
Referral and Tracking

2016

Juvenile Justice Violations Report
DCS Background Check

2017

Financial Enhancement –
Phase 1
Credit Check for Youth
IV- E Candidacy Project
CARA Project
School Maintenance

Health/Well Being
Enhancement- Release 1

Court Redesign – Phase 1

Fast 2.0 Enhancement

High-Risk Youth Identification
Project
TFACTS Performance

Source: Department of Children’s Services’ Chief Information Officer
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2018

2019

Permanency Plan
Redesign – Phase 2

TFACTS Projects Descriptions

Source: Chief Information Officer for the Department of Children’s Services (DCS)

2010
2011–2012
2013

TFACTS Implementation – System was implemented in August 2010.
Service Requests – Implemented small enhancements/bug fixes post
implementation.
Central Intake Workflow – Developed and implemented a new, customized
workflow for the Central Intake Unit within Child Protective Services.
Financials – Accounts Payable – Developed and implemented an accounts
payable function that allowed the Department to recoup overpayments to vendors
through reductions to ongoing service payments.
TFACTS Data Warehouse – Implemented a new TFACTS Data Warehouse
Architecture to support the agency’s reporting and business analysis requirements.
TFACTS Mobility – Implemented application enhancements to support use of
mobile technology by the field case workers. This established the framework to
deploy and pilot 90 iPad devices to case workers in three regions. Eighty percent
of the pilot participants who responded to a survey reported that the use of mobile
technology enabled them to more quickly enter information into TFACTS and
access work-related information at critical times.
Fostering Connections – Implemented the TFACTS modifications required to
support Fostering Connections, including more automated eligibility
determinations for the Fostering Connections, Independent Living and Subsidized
Permanent Guardianship programs.
Server Migration – Migrated forty-five servers that support the various
development, training and production TFACTS environments from the old legacy
network to the new State Enterprise network. The Department was recognized by
the State’s Office of Information Resources (OIR) for their proactive participation
and project work which allowed the massive project to achieve its goals and stay
on schedule. Completion of this project has positioned DCS to begin work to
implement full disaster recovery capabilities.
Batch and Report Scheduler – Began the migration of TFACTS batch
processing and reporting to a new automated scheduling system.
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2014

Incident Reporting (IR) Modifications – DCS utilized two separate TFACTS
modules to capture, record and report incidents involving children and youth.
These modules, Serious Incident Reporting and Critical Incident Reporting,
supported the child welfare and juvenile justice populations, respectively.
Stakeholders (i.e. providers, DCS management, incident owners, the policy
owner, juvenile justice management, Youth Development Center staff, Brian A.
Settlement Agreement monitors, and the Office of Information Technology)
reached a consensus that the following five major improvements were needed.
1. Merging the Critical Incident Reporting and Serious Incident Reporting
modules into one IR module
2. Revising the types and subtypes of many of the IRs with changes to the
severity levels, as well as the groups required to respond to them
3. Creating of staff-related IRs, similar to the child-related IRs
4. Implementing a series of technical changes to the face of the system to
make it more user-friendly
5. Revising the existing IR reports, including the capability for providers to
pull their own data
Case Assignment Roles – The original implementation of case assignment roles
in TFACTS created unnecessary complexity and confusion in the assignment
process – one of the most commonly used functions in the system. It was also
impossible to produce accurate caseload reports from TFACTS.
The Case Assignment role should be representative of the body of work that a
person who is assigned the role is responsible for on a case (e.g. Investigation,
Family, Adoption, and Resource).
The goals of this project were:
•

To streamline / simplify the assignment process and the maintenance of
case assignments and

•

To use assignment roles as a key to producing reliable, accurate caseload
reports.

This first phase of this project included the modifications needed in TFACTS to
streamline the assignment and maintenance of case assignments, the
modifications to 24 key performance indicator (KPI) reports and 9 TFACTS
forms, and the addition of six new caseload reports for the Brian A Settlement
Agreement. The necessary TFACTS modifications, which required a conversion
of the existing TFACTS data (including how the data is transformed into the
Department’s Data Warehouse for reporting), were implemented in December
2014. The 24 key reports were delivered in December 2014 through February
2015.
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2014
(cont.)

TFACTS Mobility – After concluding a successful pilot in the previous reporting
period, the MAC [Management Advisory Committee] approved a project to
deploy up to 2,600 tablet devices to case management staff across the state. This
project leveraged the TFACTS enhancements completed during the pilot project.
After extensive planning and preparation, the project team began an aggressive
deployment schedule in November 2014. All devices were deployed by March 2015.
The ability to access and enter case data at any time improved both service delivery
and the quality of the data entered in TFACTS. It also positioned the Department to
provide alternative work schedules and work-at-home opportunities.
TFACTS Data Dashboards – The first TFACTS Data Dashboard presenting
children in custody by region was made available in January 2015. DCS
management identified three additional metrics – Adoptions by Month, Custody
Entries/Exits and Trial Home Visits – for which data dashboards were available
within a few business days. The Department’s goal is to establish two additional
dashboards by the end of March 2015. The MAC will identify and prioritize
additional key performance metrics for inclusion in existing or future data
dashboards. Select data that are refreshed daily stream via URL and display on a
55” monitor in the DCS Central Office Suite.

2015

The dashboards reflect real-time data and are available in a standalone portal as
well as within TFACTS. As this data analytic functionality expands, staff will be
able to “drill down” from a summary metric so that very specific data can be
analyzed. DCS will begin rolling interactive reports and dashboards out to the
regions in March 2015. This will provide up-to-date analytics to front line
personnel. Rather than having weekly and monthly measures, current to-date
numbers are available at all times.
In-Home Tennessee (approved IV-E Waiver Project) – The US DHHS
approved the Department’s request for a Title IV-E waiver child welfare
demonstration that expands and enhances the State’s existing In-Home Tennessee
initiative, which sought to develop a wraparound service framework to prevent
out-of-home placement among children referred to the State’s child welfare
system for alleged maltreatment.
The necessary changes to TFACTS to support the demonstration project include:
1. a means to indicate that a child is part of the waiver population;
2. modifications to the Random Moment Sample functionality;
3. modifications to the Family Assessment and Screening Tool (FAST); and
4. approximately six new reports.
The main objective of the project was to capture the data and provide the reports
necessary for DCS and US DHHS [Department of Health and Human Services]
to evaluate the effectiveness of the demonstration project.
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2015
(cont.)

Diligent Search – The process of documenting diligent search activities
performed by case managers who attempt to locate parents, grandparents and
other relative resources for children was streamlined and improved in June 2015.
Child Death/Near Death Workflow – TFACTS functionality was created and
deployed to production in June 2015 to document, track, and report information
related to the deaths of children where there has been an allegation of neglect or
abuse, or the child is in custody of the Department at the time of their death.
Child Abuse Hotline Web Referral and Tracking – A web referral application
was developed and delivered in April 2015 to allow users to complete a child
abuse referral online. Once the referral form is submitted, the information is
populated to TFACTS by way of a web service and an intake ID is returned to the
user.
Health/Well Being Enhancement – Release 1 (ICD-10) – TFACTS was
modified to provide the ability to enter ICD-10 codes and include them on case
information that is transmitted to TennCare (Medicaid). This functionality was
developed, tested and implemented prior to CMS’s October 1, 2015 deadline.

2016

FAST 2.0 Enhancement – The enhancement improved the Family Advocacy and
Support Tool (FAST) Assessment within TFACTS, removing the need to use
other tools. The new assessment version was implemented in July 2015.
Juvenile Justice – Evidence Based Practice – This enhancement allows staff to
collect evidence-based services provided directly to delinquent youth in TFACTS,
removing the time-consuming efforts of entering and tracking data in
spreadsheets.
SOLR (Searching On Lucene with Replication) – This project replaced the
previous search engine in TFACTS with SOLR, a fast open source enterprise
search platform built on Apache Lucene™ technology. SOLR provides
distributed indexing, replication and load-balanced querying, automated failover
and recovery, centralized configuration and more. SOLR is much more efficient,
robust, and accurate. Completed December 2016.
Permanency Plan – Phase I (CFTM) – This project represented the integration
and standardization of information between case planning modules in TFACTS
Child and Family Team Meetings (CFTMs), Strengths and Concerns, Permanency
Goals, Permanency Plans and Case Services. This has streamlined the case
planning and permanency plan creation workflows, reduced duplicate data entry
and improved the consistency of information between modules. Completed July
2016.
National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD) external interface – This
project created the ability to enable collection, compilation and submission of data
to meet federal reporting requirements. Completed November 2016.
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2016
(cont.)

2017

Juvenile Justice Child and Adolescent Needs and Strengths (CANS)
Assessment Enhancement – This project involved the addition of a section of
questions on the CANS assessment that capture information needed to determine
a delinquent youth’s Community Risk score. The added questions and updated
algorithm enabled the Agency to eliminate the Youth Level of Service (YLS)
assessment tool from the battery of assessments. Elimination of the YLS
streamlined the assessment process for front-line staff, ended on-going Agency
costs paid to the proprietor for scoring each assessment, and resulted in avoidance
of a SACWIS compliancy issue as the YLS code was not transferable. Completed
June 2016.
TFACTS Financial Enhancements Phase 1 – Enhancements to Client
Benefits accounting – Client Benefits enhancement supports the automation and
maximizing of Client Benefit funds, issuing SSI/SSA [Supplemental Security
Income/ Social Security Administration] refunds, and implements a general ledger
interface with the State’s accounting system. Completed March 2017.
Credit Checks for Youth – This project enhances and streamlines the ability to
verify that a youth’s credit is in good standing by creating a batch process to report
credit scores. Federal laws P.L. 112-32 and 112-34 (section 475(5)(l) of the Act)
amended the case review system definition to require that each child aged 14 and
above, who resides in foster care, receive an annual copy of a consumer credit
report until discharged from foster care. Additionally, the child must be assisted
in interpreting the credit report and in resolving any inaccuracies. This replaces a
time-consuming manual process. Automation allows for efficiency in processing
credit checks and creates a vehicle to quickly respond to any identified credit
issues. Completed March 2017.
IV-E Candidacy Project – The purpose of this project was to provide a means to
more accurately and completely identify children/youth who meet the criteria for
the IV-E Candidacy program. DCS will review all non-custodial children/youth
for eligibility to participate in the Title IV-E Candidacy Program. These
children/youth are at serious and imminent risk of removal from their home and
DCS is either making reasonable efforts to prevent removal by arranging services,
or is petitioning the courts to seek removal from their home.
To identify the IV-E Candidacy population, appropriate documentation must be
present to justify the indication. Federal rules state that the evidence of IV-E
Candidacy must exist on a permanency plan or a court order. TFACTS now
automatically generates/creates a Need record to represent IV-E Candidacy.
TFACTS also ensures the IV-E Candidacy need is included and/or addressed on
a permanency plan when one is created. Completed October 2017.
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2017
(cont.)

CARA Project – CARA stands for the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery
Act, a federal law that amends CAPTA (Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act) to refocus states on the issues of substance abuse. Specifically, it expands
the federal definition to target pre-natal exposure of infants beyond illegal
substances to include legal prescriptions and Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder
(also known as Fetal Alcohol Syndrome).
The purpose of this project was to create the ability for DCS to track and report,
as required under CARA, cases that DCS accepts, identifies, and provides services
for the population meeting this criteria.
Tracking this information will provide a better understanding of where
Tennessee’s prenatally exposed infants are born, where they are raised and what
services are applied. This, in turn, will allow DCS to understand their safety, wellbeing and permanency outcomes for the children and their families. At a macro
level, funds and targeted partnerships can be applied. This forms the foundation
of the information for meeting internal Tennessee needs as well as meeting the
reporting requirements under the law. Completed September 2017.
School Maintenance – The TFACTS Person Education - School Maintenance
project consisted of two main parts: Enhancing the search tool to locate a person
and adding a school record for a person. Additionally, the project will create a
data table of all TN schools, school systems and school districts that can be
maintained by the DCS Education Division. DCS is now able to keep the school
information current without requiring a system enhancement requests. Completed
October 2017.
Court Redesign - Phase 1 – The Court Redesign project is a multi-phase project
aiming to streamline the court screens, removal records and legal status
functionality in TFACTS. The agency needs an efficient process to obtain
accurate and timely legal information about children and families for monitoring
purposes as well as analytical review. Currently, the information is entered on
multiple screens which are not well integrated. This creates many data quality
issues requiring intervention by DCS IT Support to correct.
Phase 1 of the project involved modifying TFACTS to allow a standardized way
to show that non-custodial episodes (Probation, Diversion, Aftercare, Family
Support Services and Family Crisis Intervention Services) have ended (or closed).
These included any additional information needed to record and track the
appropriate reporting elements. Previously, no consistent/reliable method to
indicate Non-custodial ended episodes existed. This resulted in numerous ended
cases showing as active, thus requiring multiple data clean-up activities.
Completed November 2017.
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2017
(cont.)

High-Risk Youth Identification Project – DCS considers a child/youth as
“High-Risk” if their current CANS (Child and Adolescent Needs and Strengths)
assessment score is 2 or higher in one of the following domains: Sexual
Aggression, Sexually Reactive, and/or Danger to Others. When a child/youth is
determined to be “High-Risk” there are special steps/activities/protocols that must
be completed when identifying appropriate placement and services for that child.
Previously, a spreadsheet was used to monitor and track children/youth identified
as “High-Risk.” This was not an efficient/effective means to manage this
population because it required staff to find the information outside of TFACTS
and the information in the spreadsheet was not timely.
TFACTS now displays a visual indicator for children/youth who have been
identified as High-Risk so all the critical information needed to effectively
manage a child’s placement/services is now in the system. Completed October
2017.

2018

TFACTS Performance – Prior to 2018, TFACTS users often experienced long
wait times for loading screens within TFACTS. To correct this issue, DCS began
several initiatives. Telerik Consultants were utilized to provide guidance in
improving the integration of Telerik widgets within TFACTS. As a result of
deploying Telerik recommendations, staff have realized tangible improvements in
TFACTS performance. An enhancement to Dynatrace reports for tracking
performance was used to analyze other issues impacting system performance,
such as high volume demands and server usage. Based on Dynatrace analysis,
four new servers were added to meet user volume and module load time. Reports
continue to be utilized to monitor performance so any future issues may be
addressed in timely manner. The project was completed as of December 31, 2017
but monitoring performance will be an ongoing process with regular report outs
to DCS IT support management.
Department’s Information Systems functions consolidated under Strategic
Technology Solutions – January 7, 2018, the department consolidate all IT
operations and staff to the Department of Finance and Administration’s Division
of Strategic Technology Solutions.
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of a Minor – (CSEM) – The enhancement to
capture sex-trafficking information available in TFACTS was completed in 2016
but not implemented in TFACTS until 2018 at DCS Agency request.
Assessments – Phase 1 – This multi-phase project will ultimately result in the
automatic creation of Strengths and Needs based on Assessment scores. Strengths
and Needs (and their associated Action Steps) are building blocks of the
Permanency Plan. Currently, Strengths and Needs must be manually created by
the Department’s family service workers. Automatic creation of strengths and
needs will reduce the amount of data entry required and will also help to provide
consistency in the documentation of these items.
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2018
(cont.)

Phase 1 of this project consisted of the automation of the Child and Adolescent
Needs and Strengths (CANS) 2.0 tool. The automation of CANS 2.0 involved
adding/changing assessment questions, adjusting the scoring algorithm, and
converting the CANS to the new assessment model in TFACTS. Completed
January 2018.
Document Storage Project - Phase 1 – Phase 1 of the Document Storage Project
replaced the FileNet repository for all TFACTS documents with Box. While
using FileNet, DCS Staff and Private Providers were required to be on the State
Network in order to access documents uploaded and attached to a person or case
in TFACTS. This transition to BOX now allows TFACTS users to access
documents off the State Network. Previously, a user may have been required to
upload a document to 15 different places in TFACTS. This made finding
documents for DCS workers and support staff extremely difficult. This phase of
the project also provided a foundation for the development of a process to
catalog/organize documents that are scanned and uploaded into TFACTS.
Document categories based on File Organization policies/protocols were
established, increasing ease of viewing. The new content management tool now
serves as the repository for documentation the agency wishes to digitize, such as
Adoption records, perm plans, court orders, medical info, etc. Completed
November 2018.
Health/Well Being Redesign – Phase 2 – Phase 2 involved the creation of a new
Health Service Confirmation page that allows the entry of medical exam
information and any resulting Needs and Action Steps for the child. Early and
Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSD&T) Medical Assessments
are entered via the External Assessment page built in Phase One of Perm Plan.
With this enhancement, authorized users have the ability to enter the seven
EPSD&T Components, add any Needs and Action steps resulting from the
EPSD&T exam, and add physicians’ notes. A new Service Action step was built
to integrate the financial component of TFACTS with the provision of services to
children and families. Currently, this service is not being used in Perm Plan Phase
1. Completed August 2018.
TFACTS Readable Summary – The TFACTS Readable Summary enhancement
represents a “one place” to go to in TFACTS to read what is going on with a
child/family. From the Electronic Case File on the Person Home Page, staff are
now able to search for specific Event Types (CFTMs, Collateral Contacts,
Consultations, etc.) and then click the “View Full Narrative” link on the search
results to see the complete narrative information for the events. Previously the
user had to click each event to view the information. Many events have a printable
report summary; staff can now select one or more event types, search for all or for
specific date ranges, and then print out a report summary of all the selected event
types in the specified date range. This feature is particularly useful for Legal,
Adoption and other staff who are preparing case records to provide to courts.
Completed August 2018.
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Juvenile Justice Violations Report – The Juvenile Justice Violations Report
project enabled the capture of information related to the violation of the Rules of
Probation or Aftercare and for Violation Reports to be documented in and printed
from TFACTS. Per DCS Policy, violations of the rules of Probation or Aftercare
committed by delinquent youth are investigated and applicable corrective actions
developed for minor violations or the appropriate violation petitions filed with the
Courts for major violations. For major violations, a Violation Report must be
completed and be included as part of the youth's master file. Completed April
2018.
DCS Background Check – An upgrade was added to TFACTS for
accommodating a portal for DCS Background check functionality. This new
service within TFACTS replaced a legacy application. It is used by external
parties (school systems, childcare providers and other State agencies) to ensure
any persons seeking employment with their agency have not been substantiated
as a perpetrator of child abuse or neglect by DCS Child Protective Services.
Completed October 2018.
Permanency Plan Redesign – Phase 2 – Phase 2 of this project focused solely
on the creation of the Permanency Plan document. Each program area had its own
requirements for the information required on a permanency plan. Staff are now
able to generate and print a permanency plan populated with information directly
from TFACTS and only need to include the information needed for their specific
program area. Completed January 2019.
Post-Implementation TFACTS Cost
Federal Fiscal Year 2010 Through June 2020
FFY 2010
Estimated
Actuals

FFY 2011
Actuals

FFY 2012
Actuals

FFY 2013
Actuals

FFY 2014
Actuals

FFY 2015
Actuals

State Dollars
Federal Dollars

$572,290
$417,515

$12,237,585
$9,688,738

$4,912,841
$2,561,624

$4,944,396
$3,496,787

$4,600,509
$3,481,102

$5,041,560
$3,249,990

Total Dollars

$989,805

$21,926,323

$7,474,465

$8,441,183

$8,081,611

$8,291,550

FFY 2018
Actuals

FFY 2017
Actuals

State Dollars
Federal Dollars

$5,053,060
$2,672,551

$4,840,449
$2,515,589

$5,525,430
$3,042,314

$6,486,977
$3,769,706

$5,663,222
$3,370,523

Total Dollars

$7,725,611

$7,356,038

$8,567,744

$10,256,683

$9,033,745

Source: Chief Information Officer for the Department of Children’s Services.
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FFY 2019
Actuals

FFY 2020 June 2020
Actuals

FFY 2016
Actuals

Total Post-Implementation TFACTS Cost
State Dollars
$59,878,319
Federal Dollars
$38,266,439
TOTAL
$98,144,758

Source: Chief Information Officer for the Department of Children’s Services.
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